A kitten’s early experiences have lasting effects on adult behaviour and welfare. Domestic cat (Felis silvestris catus) breeders play an important role in shaping these outcomes through their knowledge and understanding of early environment and socialisation. This study aimed to investigate Swedish pedigree cat breeders’ knowledge, attitudes and current socialisation practices. An online survey was distributed via social media to active Swedish breeders of pedigree cats (n = 133). The data were analysed primarily using descriptive statistics with several areas for improvement being identified. More breeders stated the importance of multiple people handling the kittens than they applied in practice. Significantly more breeders reported that it was important for kittens to interact with other companion animals than they demonstrated in practice. Gaps in knowledge were identified regarding the optimal age for socialisation, handling quantity, and the heritability of traits relating to the approach to new experiences. Breeders generally expressed positive attitudes towards socialisation and wished they could have prioritised it more. These findings have important implications for animal welfare, as insufficient early socialisation can increase the risk of fear-related behaviours and reduced overall cat welfare later in life. In conclusion, this study, although based on a convenience sample, provides an important first step towards understanding and improving kitten socialisation practices in Sweden and elsewhere.

That parties fulfil their pre‐election pledges once they are in government is a fundamental idea of many democracy models. This paper addresses the question of whether the government/opposition status of their party affects how much citizens want governments to fulfil their promises. We hypothesize that interest‐driven, rational voters are more likely to prefer their own party to keep its promises and investigate whether this rationale is impacted by public opinion and expert views. The analysis is based on a survey experiment conducted in Australia and Austria. It finds that voters broadly adhere to the democratic principle of expecting pledge fulfilment but, at the same time, some take a rational approach to government promises. The opinions of the public and experts mitigate but do not change this effect. Another key finding is the significant difference in the preference for promise keeping versus promise breaking between government and opposition voters in the Austrian case, the country with the more heterogeneous and polarized political system. This paper contributes to the literature on voters’ attitudes on democracy and pledge fulfilment by showing that voters are normatively driven but a significant number of voters deviate and instead follow the rational voter logic.

How much do citizens support artificial intelligence (AI) in government and politics at different levels of decision‐making authority and to what extent is this AI support associated with citizens’ conceptions of democracy? Using original survey data from Germany, the analysis shows that people are overall sceptical toward using AI in the political realm. The findings suggest that how much citizens endorse democracy as liberal democracy as opposed to several of its disfigurations matters for AI support, but only in high‐level politics. While a stronger commitment to liberal democracy is linked to lower support for AI, the findings contradict the idea that a technocratic notion of democracy lies behind greater acceptance of political AI uses. Acceptance is higher only among those holding reductionist conceptions of democracy which embody the idea that whatever works to accommodate people's views and preferences is fine. Populists, in turn, appear to be against AI in political decision making.

Several scholars in the United States have recently addressed an increased partisan animosity between Democrats and Republicans, and have termed this phenomenon ‘affective polarisation’. This surge in partisan affective polarisation is perceived to be highly problematic, as it has been found to have a negative impact on the functioning of the party system and even society at large. The aim of this article is to study the concept of affective polarisation in European party systems. It introduces the Affective Polarisation Index (API) that allows for measuring and comparing levels of affective polarisation also in multiparty systems. This novel measure is applied to 22 European democracies and the United States between 2005 and 2016. The results indicate that affective polarisation is acutely present in European party systems, as partisans are often extremely hostile towards competing parties. The most affectively polarised countries are in Central Eastern and Southern Europe where the degree of affective polarisation is notably higher than it is in the United States, while Northwestern European countries are more moderate in terms of partisan feelings. Further analysis reveals that affective polarisation is significantly correlated with ideological polarisation, but the relationship between the two appears to be conditional: in some Western European political systems ideological polarisation does not lead itself to strong interparty hostility, while in Central Eastern Europe a high degree of affective polarisation can be present even in ideologically centrist party structures. These findings validate the claim that ideological and affective polarisation are two distinct aspects of polarisation, and that the latter also merits additional attention.

Income and political attitudes are powerfully correlated in cross-sectional data, yet research based on panel data finds at most a weak correlation. In this paper, we examine this puzzling pattern by exploring the long-term evolution of attitudes over the life cycle. We evaluate the predictions of five different explanations on the relationship between attitudes and income experiences. These explanations focus on, respectively: socialization, anticipation, myopic self-interest, learning and status maximization. We employ accelerated longitudinal design models using data on core political values that span up to sixteen years from the British Household Panel Survey. Our findings reconcile the mixed evidence in the literature: the correlation between income and political attitudes, strong in cross-sectional studies but weak in short panel studies, emerges because attitudes crystallize – slowly but systematically – as income evolves over the life cycle. This pattern is most consistent with the learning explanation.

Increasing attention is placed to redistributive attitudes, especially in the light of growing inequalities throughout the world. From Aristotle to Marx, the discipline classically shares a simple, albeit powerful assumption: individuals are mainly (or even only) motivated by their own self-interest. However, it is also assumed that alternative motivations may emerge as soon as the context allows this to happen. This article tests the impact of economic well-being at the societal level. Two main hypotheses are tested. First, the so-called ‘governmental protection hypothesis’, according to which support for redistribution declines at times of higher levels of national affluence. Second, the ‘declining self-interest hypothesis’, whereby national prosperity is expected to mitigate the income-based polarisation of redistributive preferences. While empirical evidence confirms the former, but not the latter, it also opens up a window of opportunity to develop an alternative theoretical explanation of attitude formation rooted in the social psychological literature.

The interdependencies and conflicts between civil society and welfare states are of continuing interest and controversy among civil society researchers. Particularly, issues of motivation, collaboration, management, and institutional contexts have been subject to extensive scrutiny. Less prominent on this research agenda, the issue of public perceptions and legitimacy is highly relevant to the conversation on welfare state and civil society. This study contributes on this topic by investigating the public legitimacy of volunteer involvement in public welfare services. The article presents findings from a qualitative interview study of perceptions of welfare institutions conducted in 2013–2014 among 115 participants from Sweden and Denmark. The hypothesis investigated is that the Nordic model of welfare is legitimized by its public nature to a degree which excludes volunteers from legitimately contributing as part of public welfare institutions. Findings suggest that volunteers are held in high regard among Swedes and Danes, but the involvement of volunteers in public welfare provision is deemed both a threat to the Nordic model of Welfare and matter-out-of-place in regards to the role the interview participants ascribed to volunteers and civil society.

To what extent do economic concerns drive anti‐migrant attitudes? Key theoretical arguments extract two central motives: increased labour market competition and the fiscal burden linked to the influx of migrants. This article provides new evidence regarding the impact of material self‐interest on attitudes towards immigrants. It reports the results of a survey experiment embedded in representative surveys in 15 European countries before and after the European refugee crisis in 2014. As anticipated by the fiscal burden argument, it is found that rich natives prefer highly skilled over low‐skilled migration more than low‐income respondents do. Moreover, the study shows that these tax concerns among the wealthy are stronger if fiscal exposure to migration is high. No support is found for the labour market competition argument predicting that natives will be most opposed to migrants with similar skills. The results suggest that highly skilled migrants are preferred over low‐skilled migrants irrespective of natives’ skill levels.

Social category information plays a central role in speech perception and processing. To date, research on this topic has struggled to model how social category perceptions evolve over the time course of an interaction. In this article, we build on recent methodological developments to investigate trajectories of listener perceptions, focusing on how impressions change as linguistic, social, and contextual details emerge. We base our arguments on an analysis of listeners' real-time evaluations of the perceived competence of speakers of two British regional accents during a mock interview for a job in a law firm. Results indicate a need to move away from the view, predominant in sociolinguistics, of category perception as a discrete phenomenon and toward a model of perception as inference under uncertainty. We discuss implications for theories of sociolinguistic cognition and for understandings of accent bias.

This study focuses on social media use of citizens from two groups that are often associated with the rise of social media: populist and postmaterialist citizens. Considering their ideological underpinnings, we theorize that they will make more political use of social media and that this further reifies their political attitudes into voting for populist and postmaterialist parties, respectively. Using unique survey data including the relatively new populist attitudes and political use of social media, we test this theory on the Dutch case. We find that both groups do not read political news or connect to politicians more, but both are more likely to react to political content. Moreover, social media use does not seem to lead to a retention in one’s own ideological funnel signified by populist or postmaterialist voting. Among more postmaterialist citizens, passive social media use even makes it more likely to vote for other parties.

While animal welfare is a growing global concern, there has been very little research into how it is understood in Iran. Cultural, religious, and legal factors influence attitudes and practices in ways not addressed by existing research. This study provides culturally grounded insights for improvement of animal welfare in Iran. Utilising a validated survey tool, we investigated the attitudes of Iranians toward the welfare of farmed, companion, and wild animals. A total of 325 responses were collected. The findings indicate that animal welfare is considered important to Iranians, with the majority expressing interest in improving the welfare practices. Despite varying degrees of familiarity with different animal species, there was a consensus on the importance of enacting laws to protect animal welfare. Most participants agreed that chickens feel pain (92.9%) and emotions (79%), whereas fewer attributed these capacities to fish, with 63.6% acknowledging pain and 59.5% acknowledging emotions. Furthermore, most of the participants agreed that animals should not endure pain in the slaughter process (97.8% agreement). While the majority of participants agreed that pre-slaughter stunning was better for the animals (78.7%), only 51.7% agreed that they would prefer to eat meat from animals that had been stunned; reflecting the traditionally held views regarding the role of stunning in Halal meat production. The results of the current study support previous findings suggesting that concern for animals may be a universal human inclination, although, in Iran, attitudes towards specific species and agricultural practices are also shaped by religious perspectives.

This contribution presents a perceptual dialectology study conducted with 123 Albanian-speaking participants, who rated the correctness and pleasantness of speech around Albania. We investigate how ratings were modulated by three factors: a well-established dialectal division within Albania, relative urbanization across the country, and the participants’ dialect backgrounds. These three factors were found to interact in the correctness and pleasantness ratings given by the participants, which is generally consistent with previous perceptual dialectology studies conducted in other linguistic settings but also highlights some nuances and complexities in this relationship. While heavily urbanized centers in central Albania were rated as highly correct and pleasant independently from prior dialect descriptions or dialect background of the participants, in one dialect area, less urbanized counties were rated more pleasant. We argue that these insights from non-linguists could serve as starting point for future scientific inquiry.

Since the 2010s, social scientists have increasingly conducted survey-experimental studies that explore what factors drive public attitudes towards migrants in host countries. We conducted a systematic meta-analysis of 118 such studies, comprising 428,881 respondents from fifty-three countries. We find that sociotropic economic concerns play a key role, with individuals being more welcoming towards migrants who contribute to the economy through their professional occupation, education, or language skills. In contrast, there is limited evidence that hosts evaluate migrants based on egocentric economic concerns. Cultural concerns are also important; notably, we uncover a persistent anti-Muslim bias. Humanitarian concerns shape attitudes as well – especially towards forcibly displaced migrants, who are generally viewed more favorably than economic migrants. Climate migrants place between conflict migrants and economic migrants in terms of public perception. Our meta-analysis raises several questions that remain unanswered in the literature, suggesting important directions for future research.

How does right-wing terrorism affect electoral support for populist radical right parties (PRRPs)? Recent research has produced contrary answers to this question. We argue that only high-intensity attacks, whose motives and targets mirror PRRPs’ nativist agenda, are likely to generate a media backlash that dampens electoral support for PRRPs. We test this argument by combining high-frequency survey and social media data with a natural and survey experimental design. We find that right-wing terror reduced support for the radical right party Alternative für Deutschland after one of the most intense nativist attacks in recent German history. An analysis of all ninety-eight fatal right-wing attacks in Germany between 1990 and 2020 supports our argument. Our findings contribute to an understanding of how political violence triggers partisan detachment and have important implications for media responsibility in the aftermath of terrorist attacks.

Amid declining public standing, many political parties seek to regain disaffected voters through various institutional strategies. One key approach is democratizing legislative candidate selection to grant party members or voters greater influence and signal improved responsiveness, transparency, and legitimacy. Yet does this strategy pay off electorally? The growing literature on this topic provides conflicting answers and limited evidence. We argue that more inclusive candidate selection does not have meaningful effects at the polls despite its merits. Whereas voters favor such procedures in principle, as some suggest, they underprioritize them in favor of other considerations when electing parties. We support this argument with observational and experimental data, including a matching difference-in-differences estimation of party performance across thirty-four democracies and a survey democracies and a survey experiment in three countries. This article contributes to our understanding of the relationship between party institutions and voter behavior in an age of eroding public trust and rising anti-establishment sentiment.

Ideology is a powerful tool for parties in armed conflicts, as it provides a source of motivation for combatants to stay in group under difficult circumstances and to perform actions that put them at risk or defy their personal ethical codes. But once in peacetime, besides the effects of past negative intergroup experiences, radical beliefs may become an obstacle to reconciliation and prolong the confrontation in the minds of ex-combatants. An examination of 484 recently decommissioned soldiers and insurgents in Colombia shows how the persistent ideological differences among former enemies help us explain postconflict intergroup bias beyond the effects of wartime victimization. We conclude that addressing the ideological radicalization that prolongs confrontation after armed conflict ceases is fundamental to creating proper conditions for reconciliation, and it offers a viable policy alternative to the much-needed healing from wartime-related trauma.

Despite consensus that quality of life (QoL) in later adulthood is multi-dimensional, scholars’ perceptions of the dimensions the construct comprises differ. Under the premise that models and measures of QoL should correspond with lay perspectives to have relevance to the targeted population, we investigated the constituents of QoL in later adulthood as perceived by middle-aged and older laypersons. We fielded a factorial design vignette experiment among 2,544 respondents aged 50+ participating in the Dutch Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences panel to assess how 11 dimensions identified from four established QoL instruments designed for older people (WHOQOL-OLD, CASP-19, OPQOL, ICECAP-O) influence QoL evaluations. The study extends prior work on lay perspectives on QoL by combining the internal validity of an experiment with the external validity of a true population sample. All dimensions considered significantly impacted the QoL ratings in the expected direction. Enjoyment and social participation had a significantly larger contribution than the other dimensions. Models stratified by age group showed a strong degree of similarity, suggesting a high level of consensus across age groups about the constituents of QoL in later adulthood. The study highlights the necessity of capturing a broad range of dimensions when conceptualizing QoL in later adulthood. Our finding that dimensions that were omitted in selected established instruments still contributed substantially to QoL evaluations arguably implies that these instruments may have suboptimal content validity. The insights gained from this study are important for developing and evaluating policies aimed at improving QoL for the ageing population.