From the founding era to the turn of the twentieth century, Congress has at times asserted its power over elections robustly and creatively, even in periods of judicial obstruction, and its role in shaping the nation’s electoral landscape has always been pivotal – even when contested, uneven, or ineffective. This period invokes a rich and overlooked history that reveals a repository of federal authority over elections that was triggered (or ignored) less for reasons of federalism, and more so due to pragmatic, principled, or partisan considerations.

Erin C. Cassese and Yueshan Long document gender differences in public opinion and vote choice. They provide evidence of the emergence and trajectory of the gender gap in vote choice over time and in the most recent elections but demonstrate how the influence of gender is variable and contingent on other voter characteristics such as race, class, geography, and party. Cassese and Long outline common theoretical explanations for the gender gap and situate the American gap in global perspective. Shifting their attention from cause to effect, Cassese and Long explore how beliefs about women and men voters – including social constructions of key voting groups – shape campaign strategy and political communications. They evaluate the specific appeals to women and men voters in the 2024 presidential election, with particular attention to the influence of the overturning of Roe v. Wade in voter mobilization.

Celeste Montoya examines the role that gendered mobilization has played in US electoral politics, both historically and in the recent elections. She provides a conceptualization of gendered mobilization that emphasizes the importance of looking at the role that gender (often at the intersection of race and class) plays in a wide array of US social movements. She provides a historical overview that demonstrates the various ways in which gendered mobilizations have influenced the development of US democracy and the evolution of its electoral politics. Montoya focuses specifically on the mobilizations surrounding the 2024 election, outlining the mobilization of the MAGA movement around restricting transgender rights and opposing critical race theory, gender studies, and DEI. She identifies race-gendered mobilization among progressives in 2024 as well, emphasizing the role of intersectional coalitions in advocating for racial justice and reproductive rights among other issues. Gendered mobilization has been a significant part of efforts to expand political participation and representation, as well as those to restrict it. It has shaped party platforms and electoral coalitions. The patterns of the past help explain the current political moment and what may be at stake.

Kelly Dittmar examines the gender, race, and intersectional dynamics of presidential politics, focusing specifically on the dominance of masculinity and whiteness at the highest level of American politics. After providing an overview of concepts key to understanding the presidency as a raced and gendered institution, she presents a history of the pioneering women who have dared to step forward to seek the presidency or vice presidency. Dittmar then evaluates how Kamala Harris, Nikki Haley, and Donald Trump navigated gender and intersectional dynamics on the campaign trail. She analyzes the ways that gender and race influenced the strategies employed by these candidates, media coverage of their campaigns, and public responses to their candidacies. While Dittmar points to areas of progress, she illustrates how a presidential campaign that exploited white and male grievance and reinforced gendered, racialized, and intersectional stereotypes emerged victorious in 2024.

Richard L. Fox, Kelly Dittmar, and Susan J. Carroll introduce the volume by offering an overview of the gendered nature of elections, discussing why gender matters in electoral politics, and providing context for how gender factored into the 2024 election. In addition, the Introduction provides an overview of the volume’s organization and chapters.

This chapter focusses on Curll’s relations with the civic affairs of London. It gives a brief survey of his admission to a guild and position as a liveryman of the Cordwainer’s Company, outside the powerful body of Stationers. Further, it outlines his behaviour over a number of years in City and national elections, from 1710 to 1734, noting his tendency to veer between votes for opposition parties and those for pro-ministerial candidates, depending on the political climate and his personal situation. His relations with Robert Walpole are sketched out. Comparisons are drawn between his actions and those of representative figures in the trade, especially those with whom Curll worked regularly. Where appropriate, the distinct voting patterns of Stationers and Cordwainers are noted. A conclusion summarises the changing political stance across the first four decades of the century, both of Curll himself and of members of the Stationers’ bloc.

Our task was not helped by the fact that the civil service had been prevented by the Cameron government from making any preparations for a leave vote. In fact, the civil service and No. 10 generally were still in a state of shock. The only real European policy experts all came from the ‘Remain’ side of the fence. While their professionalism was not in doubt, it was clearly going to be a huge task for them to pivot to embrace the new reality of the UK’s changed status with the EU. It wasn’t long before the UK’s long-serving Ambassador to the EU, Ivan Rogers, was moved on. His expertise was never in question, but in the weekly meetings with the Prime Minister in her study behind the Cabinet Room, he barely sought to disguise his dismay at the UK’s decision. Treating Brexit as a problem to be managed rather than an opportunity to be seized was never going to go down well with the Brexiteers still drunk on their own success. What Ivan saw as pragmatism, the Brexiteers saw as pessimism. He quickly became public enemy number one and was swiftly replaced.

Under the usual rules of US political parties, candidates are vetted by party insiders, and people who lose a presidential race don’t get a second shot. Trump defied this and many other historical traditions. Understanding this means understanding election narratives and beliefs about electability, and how those in the GOP today are different from what they were in the past and what the Democratic Party has. The chapter provides a book outline.

Only one person can answer as to the sincerity of the decision Boris made to back leave. The now infamous two articles allow his enemies to present his decision as an act of calculating duplicity for which they will forever believe him guilty. This perhaps also provides a focus for the real cause of their angst – that he beat them. I can only observe that I saw him use this device often in decision-making. Whatever motivated his decision in February 2016, he certainly owned it from there on. Johnson’s arrival as the public face of leave brought energy and stardust to the campaign. New voters seemed to ‘have permission’ to vote leave because of Johnson’s arrival. He moved the centre of gravity of the campaign away from the purely Faragist proposition. A good test of the effectiveness of the message was in the reaction of some of the arch-Brexiteers. Supreme bores like Bernard Jenkin deeply resented Johnson, whom they regarded as a Johnny-come-lately. Those not stuck in the time warp of 1992–7 rejoiced at it.

In early twentieth century, there were widespread demands for increased tariffs and other barriers. However, by 1906, a relatively open trading system had stabilised. The victory of the Liberals in the British election in 1906 and their commitment to free trade, as well as to the German government’s management of its trade policy, culminating in trade treaties from 1904, shaped this outcome. The defeat of proposals for higher trade barriers resulted not only from economic considerations, but also geopolitical ones. British Liberals argued that a free trade empire was more secure than one surrounded by tariff barriers, while German leaders recognised that trade was an essential element of German power. Debates about trade were transnational. The outcomes reduced trade as a source of political tension and weakened the argument that securing markets required military and naval force. Austria-Hungary tried to use commercial pressure to influence Serbia, but the subsequent ‘Pig War’ saw Serbia diversify its commercial partners, an achievement that was partly possible because of the defeat of those calling for trade barriers in Britain and Germany.