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Victorian literature translated the systemic organization of extraction-based globalization into aesthetic structure. This chapter shows how literary forms like the multiplot novel and lyric poem strained and changed shape to account for the world-spanning mechanisms of imperialism, colonialism, and an extraction-based fossil capitalism that reshaped “the environment” across the nineteenth-century British imperium. Describing a “supply-chain sublime,” it shows how the improvement and development valorized by John Stuart Mill (and before him, John Locke) had material corollaries in scarred and abandoned zones that rarely focalize canonical works. Seen in this context, exhibits like Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897), George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1871–2), Anthony Trollope’s The Eustace Diamonds (1873), and Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach” (1867) recode extractive globalization into signals we can detect, but only with an “environmental” reading practice that construes ecological matters to inhere in sociopolitical conditions, and that sees environmental issues as finally moral ones too.
Driven originally by colonization and more recently by globalization, for more than four centuries the English language has been spreading to all corners of the globe, producing distinct and stable young varieties as well as the young discipline of ‘World Englishes’ to describe and analyze them. The present paper surveys and discusses several models that have been developed to explain the bewildering variety of forms and contexts which characterize these varieties. Early classifying approaches include categorizations and visualizations of varieties and variety types based on some of their properties, most importantly Kachru’s ‘Three Circles’ model. An evolutionary perspective is at the center of the ‘Dynamic Model’ of postcolonial Englishes. More recent trends at theorizing capture the ongoing dynamism and diversification of English by highlighting ‘forces’ which drive this process; in general, boundaries between nations are seen as diminishing also through the unbounded spread of linguistic forms in cyberspace. A few more suggestions at and reflections on modelling, most importantly Hundt’s comparison of theoretical and statistical modelling, are summarized and assessed.
The setting up of “second registries” by European governments in the 1980s was a formative moment in contemporary maritime history. Developed in an effort to counteract the growing use of offshore flags of convenience, these registries provided European shipping companies with spaces of exception from normal regulation, lifting national manning requirements and allowing for foreign labor to be hired on local wages. This article investigates the emergence of the Nordic variants, called “international ship registries” (ISRs). Employing a global perspective which focuses on the interplay between business actors, narratives, and national politics, it argues that the influence of offshore actors in shaping the Nordic developments was more pronounced than previous research suggests. The ISR policy was originally proposed to Norwegian policymakers by an offshore shipowner living in Bermuda. From there, it transferred to Denmark and Sweden, shaping their policy debates in the 1980s and 1990s.
This paper studies how the first wave of globalization shaped electoral populism in the United States. We assemble a new county-level dataset covering presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial elections between 1870 and 1900 and ask whether deeper integration into international trade increased support for populist parties. We measure globalization exposure with a new port market access index that captures counties’ connectivity to major US ports, weighted by port-level international trade volumes and adjusted for transportation costs. Counties with greater port market access consistently exhibit higher populist vote shares. We then examine the economic mechanisms underlying this relationship. Using a county-level crop portfolio price index constructed from fixed within-county value shares, we show that greater port market access is associated with larger declines in agricultural prices. The political effects of globalization are significantly stronger in counties initially specialized in crops that experienced the largest global price declines. These results highlight the historical origins of the globalization–populism link and suggest that economic dislocation has long been a catalyst for political backlash.
This chapter deals with the interrelationships between forms of American English and Caribbean English and creoles, both past and present. Close demographic connections between the North American mainland and what was to become the Anglophone Caribbean have existed since the earliest days of colonial settlement. Later, American linguistic influence spread in the region through institutional links, occasional visits or migration by Caribbean nationals for work or education, and tourism as well as television. During the present age of globalisation, American English has extended its range and impact considerably, both worldwide and in the Caribbean. At the same time, individual Caribbean creoles such as Jamaican have also influenced the development of English in North America, by way of diaspora communities, the global success of reggae, dancehall and Rastafarianism, and the use of ‘Cyber-Jamaican’ on the web.
We analyzed the determinants and potential of U.S. agricultural exports to South Asian, Southeast Asian, and Southern African countries by employing a stochastic frontier gravity model. Our estimated results suggest that importers’ GDP, institutional quality, globalization level, and participation in Trade and Investment Framework Agreement significantly promote U.S. exports, while geographic distance and landlocked status act as major constraints. The derived technical efficiency scores reveal considerable underperformance of U.S. exports. We recommend that the United States can expand and strengthen its Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, institutional cooperation, interconnectedness, and direct policy focus toward countries with the largest export gaps.
This chapter investigates the role of science and technology as a function of the history of the World War II effort to transform national security resource and acquisition under Vannevar Bush at MIT, its effects upon American society as President Eisenhower warned the nation in 1961, and the later forces of globalization, the knowledge economy and accelerating emerging and disruptive science and technology as applied to war and terror today. Important is our understanding of our application of a specific logic to war and terror after 9/11; forward deployment of American military power overseas and homeland security (defense of the homeland) for the purpose of understanding the rapid evolution of technological capability in achieving outcomes. Furthermore, we will look more specifically at emerging science and technology as a particular area of technological innovation that stems from research and development phenomena that is tasked to provide outsize national security, specifically counterterrorism deliverables for the United States.
Using Wine Spectator’s Top 100 lists for 1988–2025, this note applies Bai–Perron structural break tests to regional and country shares and identifies three distinct periods: 1988–1997, 1998–2015, and 2016–2025. Real prices decline across phases, with the sharpest drop in the most recent period, while scores remain stable and concentration falls sharply between the first two periods and then levels off. Turnover also declines in the most recent period, indicating reduced year-to-year movement in regional representation. Robust regressions confirm that prices are lower in periods with lower concentration. The findings extend earlier JWE studies by providing a longer horizon and a structural break perspective on long-run changes in representation and pricing.
This chapter examines the historical evolution of the relationship between multinationals enterprises and global value chains, highlighting their role in shaping global capitalism. Since the late nineteenth century, multinationals have used global value chains to integrate resources, labor, and markets, reinforcing economic specialization while promoting technological transfer. However, these processes have also entrenched inequalities, reinforced economic dependencies and exacerbated social disparities. The chapter traces the development of global value chains from the first global economy to post–World War II industrial expansion, exploring how multinational strategies both influenced and were shaped by technological advances and geopolitical changes. It also addresses the impact of recent trends such as a slowdown in global economic integration and geopolitical tensions, which have triggered a shift toward regionalization and the restructuring of global value chains.
This chapter studies the historical evolution of the relationship between multinationals and dictatorial regimes. The chapter covers the first global economy (1860s–1930s), World War II, the Cold War (1948–1989), and the post–Cold War authoritarianism (1989–2010s) and shows that dictatorial regimes and foreign multinationals supported each other when the dictators’ political and economic agendas converged with the multinationals’ corporate goals. When these agendas stopped converging or if the multinationalss did not generate economic growth or political stability, the dictators were willing to violate existing contracts regardless of ideological affinities with the foreign investors. Moreover, multinationals were not passive actors in regime change processes that brought dictators to power, but actively promoted coups and legitimized post-coup dictatorial regimes when the previous democratic regime threatened their operations. The early twenty first century witnessed the rise of multinationals originating in dictatorial regimes, which adds a layer of complexity to these dynamics.
Revival processes appear central to folk musics across different cultural and national traditions. Consequently, this chapter argues that, rather than perceiving revival as the exception, processes of revival and change should thus be perceived as a central feature of tradition. As is outlined here, revival needs to be approached from a much broader perspective. Falling back on case studies from England, Latvia, and Germany, this chapter further analyzes how acts of revival are entangled with themes of authenticity and nostalgia. Utilizing different claims of authenticity as elaborated by Denis Dutton, these waves of revivalism might be described as a defensive mechanism against eras of accelerated global change. Following scholars such as Svetlana Boym and Ross Cole, folk revivalism can thus be understood as an act of imaginative investment in the past and future, a nexus where nostalgia and utopia – as a counterpoint or solution to this sentiment of loss – meet.
This chapter analyzes the role of multinational enterprises in driving both globalization and deglobalization waves historically. Emerging from industrialized Western economies, multinationals played a key role in expanding global capitalism after 1840 by transferring financial, organizational, and cultural assets across borders. They took various forms and proved highly resilient, withstanding shifts in policy regimes and often reinforcing rather than disrupting institutional and societal norms that restricted growth outside the West. Their ability, and motivation, to locate value-added activities in the most attractive locations means that they have often strengthened clustering and reinforced gaps in wealth and income. The most successful non-Western economies since the 1960s – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and later China – limited foreign multinationals or required technology transfers to local firms. Multinationals frequently contributed to global challenges rather than solving them, yet their overall impact was a complex mix of positive and negative factors.
The chapter analyzes folk music and performance practices in a contemporary Indian and South Asian context. It covers the meaning and deployment of the term ‘folk’, its wider implications relating to caste, class, and taste, as well as its status in existing practices and scholarship. Whereas colonialists saw folk song as part of the enterprise to understand indigenous minds to better control and administer them, nationalists viewed it as a great resource to reconstruct the nation. After India’s independence, the state along with its middle class tried to institutionalize and appropriate folk song to cater to their tastes, however, it remained largely outside of their control and continues to maintain local and communitarian connections. Adopting a decolonial perspective, this chapter also addresses local hierarchies based on caste and cultural dispossession. Finally, it views folk song and music both as part of everyday life as well as a critique of everyday life that opens up an emancipatory discourse for the future.
This chapter traces how multinationals have historically navigated nationality-related challenges, adapting their strategies to evolving political, economic, and regulatory environments. It examines five key dimensions of nationality – corporate nationality, ownership nationality, home–host country relations, national management styles, and product perception – and their shifting importance over time. Early globalization fostered flexible corporate nationalities. However, World War I, rising economic nationalism, trade restrictions, and foreign direct investment regulations led multinationals to actively manage their corporate and ownership nationality. Regardless of increasing global economic integration since the 1970s, national affiliation remained relevant for market access, competitive advantage, and mitigating political risk. The aftermath of the global financial crisis, however, marked by renewed economic nationalism, prioritization of national interests, and identity politics as well as new geopolitical conflict created new nationality-related challenges.
This article challenges the traditional view of the linear causality of technological globalization in the history of modern predictive meteorology. According to this linear narrative, telegraphy, by enabling near-instantaneous communication over vast distances, was the causa efficiens that directly and inevitably produced large-scale weather forecasting. However, the role of Jesuit scientists in East Asia as pioneers of cyclone warning systems not only demonstrates that the linear narrative is too simple but invites a rigorous examination of the relationships between prior knowledge networks and technological infrastructures. This article contends that the expansion of technological networks does not inexorably imply the expansion of knowledge networks. There was not, therefore, a unidirectional causal relationship but a concomitant two-way interaction; that is, there was a coextension of knowledge and technological networks, where both Jesuit scientists and telegraph companies benefited from each other and shared common goals confronting a global threat—cyclones. This offers a new perspective not only on the history of meteorological services but also of science globalization.
The introductory chapter introduces the contemporary challenge of immigration from a psychological perspective. The focus is on how host society members and immigrants feel about and perceive the situation. In the twenty-first century, at least some host society members in Western and non-Western countries perceive immigration as a threat. This perceived threat can be economic (e.g., they are coming here and taking our jobs) and/or cultural (e.g., they are not adapting to our way of life and language, but continuing to live in their own ways). Central to the controversy of immigration is national identity, and the threat of immigrants against “who we are.” The plan of the book and the major psychological themes underlying immigration are described.
Chapter 4 explores how rising perceived threats associated with globalization have led to a backlash, discussed in the newly emerging literature on “deglobalization.” The roots of this deglobalization movement were already evident in fractured globalization. On the one hand, identity needs tend to pull people to the local level but, on the other hand, economic forces are pushing people toward the global level. This sets up competing trends: for example, at the same time that integration into the European Union is ongoing, there is Brexit taking the UK out of Europe, and Scottish nationalism and Irish nationalism pushing to get Scotland and Northern Ireland out of the UK. The backlash against globalization is in part a reaction to perceived threats “against our group, our way of life, our culture, our language, our values, and everything about us” in the face of perceived large-scale “invasions” (examples of such perceived invaders are Mexicans “invading” the USA, Muslims “invading” Europe, Westerners “invading” Islamic societies, and so on).
This chapter looks at changes in the first quarter of the twenty-first century and discusses possible future developments. The role of social media, migration, and travel in the rapid global spread of new features is discussed, as is the levelling of local and regional varieties and the rise of multicultural varieties in large cities. The Oxford English Dictionary is used to illustrate patterns of lexical innovation and changes of meaning in this period. Recent changes in the nature and status of Received Pronunciation are outlined. Sections devoted to recent changes in pronunciation and grammar are followed by discussion of possible future trends.
Recent literature argues that with ever‐increasing levels of supranational constraints governments have less ‘room to manoeuvre’; therefore, voters will place less weight on policy outcomes in their voting decisions. The question that remains less explored is how voters fill this accountability gap. We argue that, in this context, voters may move away from outcome‐ to input‐oriented voting. Fulfilling their promises becomes less vital for incumbents as long as they exhibit effort to overturn an unpopular policy framework. We test this argument against a survey experiment conducted in the run‐up to the September 2015 election in Greece, where we find a positive impact of the incumbent's exerted effort to challenge the status quo of austerity on vote intention for SYRIZA – the senior coalition government partner at the time – despite the failed outcome of the government's bailout negotiations.
Recent political changes in established democracies have led to a new cleavage, often described as a juxtaposition of ‘winners’ and ‘losers of globalization’. Despite a growing interest in subjective group membership and identity, previous research has not studied whether individuals actually categorize themselves as globalization winners or losers and what effect this has. Based on survey data from Germany, we report evidence of a division between self‐categorized globalization winners and losers that is partially but not completely rooted in social structure and associated with attitudes towards globalization‐related issues and party choices. We thereby confirm many of the assumptions from prior research – such as that (self‐categorized) losers of globalization tend to hold lower levels of education and lean towards the radical right. At the same time, the self‐categorizations are not merely transmission belts of socio‐structural effects but seem to be politically consequential in their own right. We conclude that the categories of globalization winners and losers have the potential to form part of the identity component of the globalization cleavage and are important for understanding how political entrepreneurs appeal to voters on their side of the new divide.