Open science initiatives have gained traction in recent years. However, open peer-review practices, i.e., reforms that (i) modify the identifiability of stakeholders and (ii) establish channels for the open communication of information between stakeholders, have seen very little adoption in economics. In this paper, we explore the feasibility and desirability of such reforms. We present insights derived from survey data documenting the attitudes of 802 experimental/behavioral economists, a conceptual framework, a literature review, and cross-disciplinary data on current journal practices. On (i), most respondents support preserving anonymity for referees, but views about anonymity for authors and associate editors are mixed. On (ii), most respondents are open to publishing anonymized referee reports, sharing reports between referees, and allowing authors to appeal editorial decisions. Active reviewers, editors, and respondents from the US/Canada are generally less open to transparency reforms.

Web archives are an exhaustive source for humanities research. They are, however, hard to navigate and research with material from web archives is often opaque as no existing software for exploring web archives provide researcher with the possibility to track their pathways around the archive. This article presents an extension of the Open-Source software SolrWayback, which provides researchers with a navigation tracking feature that supports a more reproducible and transparent methodology for documenting how a web archive collection has been explored as part of research. The functionality has been developed from a user- and test-driven approach, where the needs of contemporary historians have decided how the feature was implemented. This user-centered approach provides new functionality for a piece of software that has primarily been developed by archiving institutions.

This study elicits iconicity ratings for Hong Kong Sign Language (HKSL) from L1 HKSL Deaf signers and L1 Cantonese hearing non-signers, as well as non-signer guessing accuracy, and compares these norms with other sign languages. Iconicity ratings were collected for 972 HKSL signs from Deaf signers and hearing non-signers and correlated with guesses made by hearing non-signers in three guessing paradigms, that is, three-alternative forced choice (3AFC) translation selection, 3AFC video selection and an open-ended (open cloze) response task. HKSL signs were rated for iconicity comparably to American Sign Language (ASL) and Israeli Sign Language (ISL), with Deaf signers rating signs with higher iconicity overall. We also correlated HKSL iconicity ratings across signs with synonymous translations from languages with available ratings, ASL (634 signs), ISL (158 signs) and British Sign Language (99 signs). Guessing accuracy was found to correlate with higher HKSL iconicity ratings. As for semantic transparency, 3AFC guessing results indicate that many signs are in fact ‘translucent’, whereby inference based on the context provided by answer choices allows hearing non-signers to select the target answer with high accuracy. Our open-ended guessing task yielded considerably lower accuracy; however, accurate responses (2,183 of 15,228) were found to correlate with higher iconicity ratings.

In recent epistemology, introspection principles are commonly rejected. One of the central reasons for this is the adoption of Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments (1996, 2000) and the popularity of the associated epistemic externalist position. This rejection, however, comes with theoretical costs concerning the applications of introspection principles in epistemic and doxastic logic and modeling cooperative behavior. In this paper, I provide a way to solve this dilemma by arguing that the principle KB – expressing one’s privileged knowledge of their beliefs – remains unscathed by Williamson’s argument while saving the important theoretical applications introspective principles are used for. I propose a way of justifying KB and rejecting KK on principled grounds using Byrne’s (Byrne, A. (2005). ‘Introspection.’ Philosophical Topics 33(1), 79–104., Byrne, A. (2018). Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) transparency account of introspection, improving upon a previous attempt by Das and Salow (Das, N. and Salow, B. (2018). ‘Transparency and the KK Principle.’ Noûs 52(1), 3–23.). This defense of KB, unlike many in the literature, is consistent with epistemic externalism and allows one to reject the problematic KK principle and maintain that non-introspective knowledge is guided by Williamson’s margin-for-error principle.

Large grant-making philanthropic foundations in the UK and the EU can have a significant influence over environmental law and as such are worthy of more attention from environmental law scholars. Through analysis of publicly available documents, we identify in this paper an absence of consistent transparency by these foundations. This makes their influence hard to understand, hard to research, hard even to see at work in the world. Transparency is complex and challenging, however. And so, rather than berating problematic approaches, we explore through interviews with actors in the field, as well as the academic literature, both the difficulties that foundations experience in pursuing transparent practices and the benefits of transparency. We conclude by identifying some principles for improved visibility of foundation work.

Poor public understanding of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has become a matter of acute concern. Even when lacking expert technical knowledge, there are good democratic, economic and other societal reasons for ensuring that the public right to know operates effectively in the AI era. Yet, the trade-secret claims of AI providers and deployers are widely seen as a potential barrier to information disclosure rights and duties, which has provoked calls for areas of significant public interest to be carved out from the protections of trade-secrets law. Such transparency carve-outs are, however, likely to lead to uncertainty, over-inclusion and ineffectiveness. In this article, we argue that the dynamic, public-driven character of the right to know can be better secured through third-party participation and public-interest stewardship innovations in AI transparency.

This case note analyses the General Court’s judgment in Arysta Lifescience v EFSA (Case T-222/23), which addresses the tensions arising from the disclosure of the lists of co-formulant in the context of the EU risk assessment of pesticides. The decision consolidates the General Court’s interpretation of “information relating to emissions into the environment” under Article 6(1) of Aarhus Regulation, confirming its applicability to the list of co-formulants contained in representative products.

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has introduced several policy measures to better align financial markets with sustainability goals. So far, these policies have mainly aimed to improve how information on the sustainability impacts of investments is collected and transmitted. Policymakers hope that adjustments to the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets will lead to a shift in investments that translates into transformational change in the real economy. The EU’s sustainable finance policies often follow a reflexive law approach and confine themselves to setting procedural and organisational norms. This article analyses the potential and limitations of this approach and argues that sustainable finance policies must be sufficiently detailed and binding to avoid the risk, associated with reflexive law policies, of granting too much discretion to agents with vested interests detrimental to the governance aims. However, detailed and binding policies do not fully realise the advantages in dealing with highly complex and dynamic situations that are often ascribed to reflexive law policies. While sustainable finance policies that address the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets are for various reasons still important, their potential and advantages compared to other governance approaches should not be exaggerated.

After presenting Boyle’s appeal to the Sartrean notion of nonpositional self-awareness in explaining Evans’ “transparency fact” concerning self-knowledge, I argue that his explanation suffers a certain instability. To the extent that nonpositional self-awareness is taken to be a matter of first-order ‘transparent’ orientation to the world, Boyle’s suggestion concerning the character of explicit positional self-knowledge is compromised. On the other hand, to the extent that nonpositional awareness is regarded as a form of genuine self-awareness, his explanation overintellectualizes first-order mental states. I conclude by raising questions regarding Boyle’s success in providing a viable alternative to epistemic accounts of basic self-knowledge.