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This paper examines the impact of Sunday blue law reforms on small-scale wineries in the United States. Using establishment-level data from 2000 to 2020, we employ an event-study framework to analyze the impact of changes in Sunday alcohol sales regulations across states on the performance of small wineries. We find that deregulation is associated with substantial declines in the performance of small wineries. On average, sales fell by 25.5%, employment declined by 7.8%, and survival rates dropped by 5.2% following the repeal of Sunday sales restrictions. These adverse effects are particularly pronounced among the smallest wineries and those located in metropolitan counties. The results suggest that while deregulation increased consumer access to alcohol on Sundays, it also intensified competition from large-scale retail outlets, thereby undermining the direct-to-consumer sales channels that are critical to small wine producers.
This article introduces a blockchain-based insurance scheme that integrates parametric and collaborative elements. A pool of investors, referred to as surplus providers, locks funds in a smart contract, enabling blockchain users to underwrite parametric insurance contracts. These contracts automatically trigger compensation when predefined conditions are met. The collaborative aspect is embodied in the generation of tokens, which are distributed to surplus providers. These tokens represent each participant’s share of the surplus and grant voting rights for management decisions. The smart contract is developed in Solidity, a high-level programming language for the Ethereum blockchain, and deployed on the Sepolia testnet, with data processing and analysis conducted using Python. In addition, open-source code is provided and main research challenges are identified, so that further research can be carried out to overcome limitations of this first proof of concept.
In this study, we provide ex post empirical analysis of the effects of climate policies on carbon emissions at the aggregate national level, using a comprehensive database of 121 countries. Carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETS), and the overall stringency of climate policies are considered. We use dynamic panel regressions, controlling for macroeconomic factors (economic development, GDP growth, urbanisation and the energy mix). Higher carbon taxes and ETS prices reduce carbon emissions. An increase in carbon taxes by $10 per ton of CO2 reduces CO2 emissions per capita by 1.3% in the short run and by 4.6% in the long run.
This paper investigates the stability of the demand for money in the United States and provides a comparison among the simple-sum monetary aggregates, the original (non-credit-card-augmented) Divisia monetary aggregates, and the credit-augmented Divisia and credit-augmented Divisia inside aggregates. We use quarterly data from the Center for Financial Stability and the Pesaran et al. (2001) bounds test procedure to investigate the long-run relation between the monetary aggregates and their respective user costs. In doing so, we use three classic money demand functions—the log–log, the semi-log, and the Selden and Latané specifications. With quarterly data over the 1967:q1 through 2025:q1 period, for which the original Divisia monetary aggregates are available, we find evidence of a stable money demand function only with the Sum M4 aggregate under all money demand specifications, but not with any of the Divisia aggregates. With quarterly data over the post-2006 period, for which the credit-augmented Divisia monetary aggregates are also available, our findings show that the demand for money is stable across all money demand specifications with all of the original Divisia aggregates and the credit-augmented Divisia aggregates (but not with all of the credit-augmented Divisia inside aggregates). We also find evidence of cointegration with the Sum M3 and Sum M4 aggregates under all three money demand specifications, but not with the Fed’s Sum M2 aggregate.
These are the WTO's authorized and paginated reports in English. They are an essential addition to the library of all practising trade lawyers and a useful tool for students and academics worldwide working in the field of international economic or trade law. DSR 2023: Volume II contains the panel report on 'China – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Products from Japan' (WT/DS601)
These are the WTO's authorized and paginated reports in English. They are an essential addition to the library of all practising trade lawyers and a useful tool for students and academics worldwide working in the field of international economic or trade law. DSR 2023: Volume I contains the panel report on 'United States – Safeguard Measure on Imports of Large Residential Washers' (WT/DS546).
The power that the ruling class has over institutions of authority gives them the ability to use that power to transfer income and wealth from some to others. It enables them to transfer control over resources from the masses to themselves and to transfer resources among the masses to preserve their positions in the political hierarchy by buying support. The ability of the political class to redistribute is the direct result of their control over institutions of authority. Despite the coercive institutions that enforce redistribution, citizens generally view it as a legitimate function of government, and those citizen views are supported by academic arguments that it enhances social welfare. The chapter analyzes this interaction between citizen opinion and academic support for government redistribution.
There is a political marketplace in which individuals transact with each other to produce public policy, but access to the political marketplace is limited because high transaction costs prevent the masses from participating. This divides the population into two groups: the political elite and the masses. Many people have observed this division, but often have gone on to advocate giving more power, and eliciting more participation, from the masses. That is wishful thinking. This volume explains not only why that division exists, but why it must exist. Because political power necessarily rests with an elite few, the only way it can be constrained from being abused is within an institutional structure that requires elites to compete among themselves for power, so some within the elite check and balance the power of others.
Imprecise Bayesianism has been proposed as an alternative to Standard Bayesianism, partly because of its tools for representing ambiguity. Instead of representing credences via precise probabilities, a set of probability distributions is used to model belief states. However, there are criticisms of Imprecise Bayesianism’s update rule. A recent alternative update rule is Alpha Cut, which evades some of the primary criticisms of Imprecise Bayesian updating. We compare Alpha Cut with Imprecise Bayesianism and another alternative update approach called Calibration. We find that Alpha Cut has problems with respect to ambiguity, coherence, and performance qualities, whereas there are more promising alternatives.
One way that citizens can become involved in public policy issues is to join interest groups that share their interests. By accumulating a large membership of voters, and by amassing resources in the form of dues, interest group leaders influence public policy. Individual members face the same incentive problems with interest groups as they do as voters. Each individual member will have negligible influence over the interest group’s activities. They can either choose to join and contribute, or not, but members are still excluded from the political marketplace. Their collective contributions convey power to the leaders of those interest groups, who are able to transact with the political elite in the political marketplace. As individuals, members of interest groups remain powerless. The leaders of those groups gain the bargaining power to enter the political elite.
Artisanal-and-small-scale gold mining supports millions of livelihoods in the Global South but is the largest anthropogenic source of mercury emissions. Many initiatives promote mercury-free technologies that small miners could employ. Few document mercury impacts. We study an alternative: instead of processing themselves, small miners sell their ore to plants employing larger-scale, mercury-free technologies that also raise gold yields. Some ore-selling occurs without policy intervention, yet impacts on incomes and mercury use remain unclear. We assess ore-selling preferences of female waste-rock collectors (jancheras) in Ecuador, using a discrete-choice experiment. Results demonstrate that jancheras generally are open to ore-selling, yet often reject options similar to a recent pilot intervention. Offers that address formalization hurdles (invoicing), inabilities to meet quantity minima (given limits upon association, storage, and credit), and constraints on trust (including in plants’ ore testing) could increase adoption by tailoring related interventions to the preferences of and challenges for defined populations.
This study examines how WTO members have engaged in Ministerial Conferences from 1996 to 2024 by analyzing over 1,500 formal ministerial statements. Despite being the most public and standardized form of participation in WTO deliberations, these statements have rarely been analyzed systematically. By treating them as indicators of institutional engagement, the study traces long-term patterns in the frequency, intensity, and content of member participation. The analysis confirms some established expectations – such as the tendency of economically larger members to participate more actively – but also uncovers less visible dynamics. Engagement levels shifted significantly around key institutional moments, notably the rise and suspension of the Doha Development Agenda, and evolved unevenly between developed and developing members. Methodologically, the study demonstrates how computational text analysis can extract meaningful patterns from formal international discourse. Using metadata and text-based measures, it shows how member statements can offer insight into negotiation alignments and institutional vitality. These findings complement existing accounts of WTO behavior and suggest new directions for understanding participation and representation in multilateral trade governance.
Whereas goods and services can be exchanged through bilateral transactions, political outcomes typically require collective agreement. For example, legislation typically requires the approval of a majority of the legislature. Rent-seeking models often depict rent-seeking as a contest in which the rent goes to the highest bidder. In the actual political marketplace, there are not rents that are available to bidders, and rarely is there a single contact point through which rent-seekers can bid for and be awarded rents. Government activity is initiated by some demand for access to government power. This chapter explains the interactions between suppliers and demanders for access to government power and analyzes the institutions within which the negotiating process produces public policies.
Public policy is designed in a marketplace in which policymakers and well-connected interest groups negotiate with each other. This is more than an analogy. There is an actual marketplace in which legislators exchange votes and other favors, and lobbyists and interest groups offer legislators benefits in exchange for supporting programs and policies they favor. The good that is supplied in the political marketplace is access to government power. An important characteristic of the political marketplace is that only a small subset of the population is able to participate in it. Most people face high transaction costs that exclude them from being able to participate in the political marketplace. The political elite engage in politics as exchange, while most people are unable to transact in the political bargaining process.
One check on the abuse of power by the political elite is the ability of people to move away from those who abuse their power. In agricultural societies, this is difficult to do because individuals who move must leave their land behind. Land is not mobile. One result of the Industrial Revolution was that capital displaced land as the most significant factor of production, and capital is more mobile than land. The mobility of physical and human capital has constrained the abuse of authority and has contributed to the shift from feudal political institutions toward democracy.
Institutions of organization are designed to lower transaction costs. Transaction costs tend to be prohibitively high when large numbers of people would be required to engage in a transaction, so those transactions will not occur. Classic cases of externalities, such as when large numbers of people in an area suffer from air pollution from nearby industries, are good examples. Large numbers prevent those suffering from pollution from negotiating with those who are causing it. One way that market institutions deal with the problem of large numbers is to reduce those large number cases down to bilateral exchanges. With two parties engaged in transactions, transaction costs are lower, which facilitates mutually advantageous exchange. That works well for institutions of organization, but is difficult to apply to institutions of governance because one set of rules is designed for the entire population. Transaction costs are necessarily high, which means that only an elite few will be able to negotiate in the design of those institutions of authority and governance.
The scope of authority of the political elite tends to expand because those in authority seek more power, and the masses often perceive problems and demand that those in power do something to address those problems. The demands of the masses are supported by the academic concept of market failure, which legitimizes the expansion of the elite’s scope of authority. Despite theories of market failure that are used to justify government action, most government programs do not correspond with the problems identified by economic theory. Interventions in response to the demands for government action often create additional unforeseen problems, which leads to more demands for government action. The result is that the scope of authority of the ruling class tends to continually expand as the political elite identify problems and the masses demand that the elite address those problems.