The book’s introduction explains the history of thought experiments in philosophy. It also describes Hans Christian Ørsted’s interactions with Kierkegaard and his influence on Kierkegaard’s concept of Tankeexperiment. The introduction outlines the ways in which thought experiments make thoughts meaningful by providing immediate presentations.

Chapter 11 introduces basic EEG and MEG data analysis methods. It begins with an explanation of the noise components in EEG and MEG signals and discusses various methods of noise reduction, including filtering and independent component analysis (ICA). Spectral analysis, event-related response (ERR) analysis, and steady-state evoked response (ssER) analysis are then introduced. Each method is explained in plain language, followed by more detailed explanations to meet the different needs of beginners and advanced readers. Relevant statistical methods and data presentation formats are also introduced, using various data analysis platforms.

In two of Kierkegaard’s earliest works, The Concept of Irony and Either/Or, imaginary construction (i.e., thought experiment, or Experiment) is often characterized negatively. However, the three core features of thought experiment shared by Ørsted and Mach also begin to emerge, laying foundations for a more positive view in other works. Kierkegaard’s characterizations of thought experiment indicate that imaginary construction guides mental action. This focus contrasts with the standard emphasis in Kierkegaard scholarship on thought experiment as supplying the concreteness of (empirical) actuality. In The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard critiques irony as a retreat from reality but also shows it can be used to achieve new kinds of wholeheartedness and unity. In this chapter, I will argue that thought experiments can similarly lead the experimenter away from reality but, like irony, may also be a useful tool for self-development.

We present the main methods that are used to modulate brain activity directly. These methods are often used in combination or following up on neuroimaging experiments, in a means to test causal hypotheses. We include microstimulation, deep brain stimulation, focused ultrasound stimulation (FUS), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and its sub-types like single- and double-pulse and repetitive TMS. We end with transcranial current stimulation (TCS), also known as trancranial electric stimulation (TES), which comes in several variants such as transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS) and transcranial alternating current stimulation (TACS).

This chapter distinguishes the work of thought experiments in exemplifying concepts from their role in aiding cognition of regulative ideas. Contemporary interest in thought experiments as a “method of cases” treats thought experiments as providing instances or exemplars. For regulative ideas as Kant understands them, however, no observable instances or exemplars are possible. Nevertheless, thought experiments can direct attention toward regulative ideas negatively (by distinguishing them from what is observable) or positively by indicating a direction for extrapolation or ongoing inquiry. These positive uses are forms of cognition. The distinction between regulative and constitutive concepts matters for thought experiments that deal with regulative ideas such as the self – for example, for thought experiments about personal identity, where a number of objections to the use of thought experiments have been raised. I argue in this chapter that some of these objections can be answered by distinguishing regulative from constitutive concepts.

Kant thinks it is possible to achieve nonperceptual cognition in three ways: (1) through practical action, (2) by analogy, and (3) through construction. The type of cognition available depends on the kind of object or concept being cognized. The fact that cognition of nonperceptual objects is possible in some cases opens the way for thought experiments to provide cognition in ways that go beyond providing fictional examples and exemplifications. In this chapter, I describe these other possibilities for cognition and show how they are at work in different kinds of thought experiments in philosophy.

This chapter proposes that thought experiments are a cognitive apparatus and situates this view among contemporary accounts of thought experiment. I set forward the project of the book, which is to (1) propose a new account of thought experiments as a method and (2) trace the historical foundations of the term and concept of “thought experiment” from Kant through Ørsted to Kierkegaard. I define “cognition” [Erkenntnis] for Kant as a synthesis of concepts with intuitions and propose that Kierkegaard, like Kant and Ørsted, views thought experiments as useful for achieving cognitions. I introduce the term Tanke-experiment in Kierkegaard and suggest why it has been little emphasized by Kierkegaard scholars and remains widely unacknowledged in contemporary descriptions of the history of thought experiment.

This chapter analyzes Stages on Life’s Way as an extended thought experiment. Though it has some similarities with a literary work of art and is sometimes called a novel, I distinguish extended thought experiment narratives like Stages from literary novels. I will show how Stages, like Repetition, embodies and develops Ørsted’s core elements of variation, active constitution, and the pursuit of genuine thought. I will also contrast Stages as a “psychological experiment” with the field of empirical psychology emerging in the 1800s. Against increasing interest in empirical observation, Kierkegaard’s thought experiments direct attention to what is not outwardly observable.

Neurons generate electromagnetic fields as they communicate with each other. Chapter 9 introduces the electromagnetic field as a key concept overarching different electrophysiological brain activities. The concept corrects common misconceptions (e.g. "EEG is the sum of action potentials") and provides a common basis for data analysis of field signals. Basic properties of the field signal, amplitude, phase and frequency, are explained in plain language.

In addition, two major noninvasive techniques for measuring field activity, electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG), are introduced. The advantages and disadvantages of the methods are discussed with a brief history of the techniques.

This method explains in an accessible way what the underlying principles are of magnetic resonance imaging, which underlies all structural imaging methods that are described in the next chapter.

This chapter sets the stage. We provide several examples of how neuroimaging findings have been covered in popular media, and the criticism that such coverage has elicited. This book intends to provide the knowledge and facts to understand the potential and proper use and mis-use of neuroimaging methods. We end with a brief overview of the different types of neuroimaging methods, and how they are organized with respect to spatial resolution, temporal resolution, and level of invasiveness.