We provide an introduction in the main pre-processing steps that are involved when analyzing imaging data: Correction for slice timing, motion correction, coregistration, normalization, and spatial smoothing

We discuss three more advanced statistical analysis approaches. First, the analysis of functional connectivity, including topics like directional and effective functional connectivity, modulations of connectivity by task (psychophysiological interactions), and resting-state fMRI. Second, we cover multivariate analyses and multi-voxel pattern analyses, and we discuss their potential and limitations to understand information processing in the brain. Third, we introduce the use of functional MRI adaptation as a means to measure neural selectivity.

Chapter 12 covers selected advanced data analysis methods for EEG and MEG data. In time-frequency analysis, two relevant techniques, the Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT) and the Wavelet Transform (WT), are explained in a flat language.

Phase analysis begins with the calculation of phase, which is made easy with graphical representations. The nature of the phase signal is explained using simple circular statistics. This makes phase synchronization and functional network analysis easy to understand.

In addition, event-related analysis of phase signals (Inter-trial Phase Coherence) is introduced to complete the family of event-related brain response analyses.

In addition to correlation-based phase synchronization analysis, autoregression analysis is introduced as a method of causality inference.

This chapter explains the physical and biological principles behind the main imaging methods that measure hemodynamics, including Blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) functional MRI, arterial spin labeling fMRI, positron emission tomography (PET), and functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Molecular neuroimaging is also covered in the discussion of PET and MRS.

The conclusion outlines key points in the book. On a Kantian-Kierkegaardian account, thought experiments lead to presentations that justify calling a thought experiment an experience, though not an empirical or sensory one. Without a sensible object, we can nevertheless have givenness, or presence, but not existence. Cognition, for that reason, is not necessarily truthful: although object-directed, cognition on its own does not justify belief in any particular object’s existence. My conclusion that thought experiments provide cognition rather than knowledge echoes Michael Stuart’s claim that thought experiments increase understanding. Cognition is a common basis for knowledge in Kant, but it is not the same thing as knowledge. The conclusion also draws implications for how we understand faith (religious belief) in Kierkegaard and how thought experiments make sense of the complexity of reality.

Rationalist accounts of thought experiment in epistemology offer an alternative to the more predominantly empiricist approaches in philosophy of science. In this chapter, I will pose a Kantian critique of recent rationalist accounts of intellectual intuition. Some epistemologists have recently argued that intellectual intuitions can provide prima facie justification for judgments. In this chapter, I highlight some promising elements of recent rationalist accounts, especially the proposal that there can be nonsensory presentations analogous to empirical perceptions. If they are right, then thought experiments can provide new experiential content even without empirical confirmation. However, I also draw attention to Kant’s objections to the possibility of purely intellectual intuitions.

Kierkegaard and Ørsted were not just contemporaries but personally knew each other. In this chapter, I argue that Kierkegaard probably learned the term Tankeexperiment from Ørsted. This chapter contextualizes Kierkegaard’s use of “imaginary construction” (Experiment) in his work as a whole, including his well-known uses of paradoxes. I will show how the core elements of Ørsted’s account – thought experiment as a method of variation, the need for free and active constitution, and the use of thought experiments for facilitating genuine thought – are echoed in Kierkegaard’s discussions. Along the way, I will describe some decisions on how to translate Experiment and Tankeexperiment that are unfortunate in some ways and fortuitous in others, as I will explain. In these ways, Kierkegaard indirectly takes up Kant’s proposal that “construction” (i.e., Experiment in Danish) is a means of achieving cognition.

Kierkegaard’s book Repetition, along with his descriptions of the book in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, offer a more positive characterization of thought experiments than we find in earlier works. This chapter argues that imaginary construction has a positive aim of identifying underlying continuities. I identify some similarities between Ørsted’s pursuit of invariants and Kierkegaard’s. One new addition in Kierkegaard’s discussions is the role of exceptions. An exception is a case that falls outside a rule without breaking it. Exceptions can neither establish a rule nor refute its necessity, but they can turn attention to the principles and their limits as well as further determine their scope and content. A further similarity between Kierkegaard’s work and Ørsted’s is the fact that variation must be active and free.

This chapter explains why cognition (Erkenntnis) is its own kind of cognitive good, apart from questions of justification. I argue against reducing the work of thought experiments to their epistemological results, such as their potential to provide prima facie justification. As an apparatus for cognition, a thought experiment enacts the three core elements of Ørsted’s Kantian account: (1) it is a tool for variation; (2) it proceeds from concepts, and (3) its goal is the genuine activation or reactivation of mental processes. Cognition has two components: givenness and thought. I will show in this chapter how givenness and thought are both achieved through thought experiments.

Kant’s distinction between different uses of judgments – determining and reflecting – sheds light on two areas of recent debates about thought experiments as a method: (1) the question of bizarre cases and (2) the problem of missing context. On the question of bizarre cases, I show how a Kantian explains why it is sometimes acceptable for thought experiments to be far-fetched. For philosophical problems that call for reflecting judgment (i.e., the creation or discovery of new concepts), bizarre cases can be particularly effective. The problem of bizarre cases is closely related to the problem of missing context, which is another common objection to their use. The problem is that readers are often left to fill in background context that might be relevant for how they evaluate the thought experiment scenario. I will argue that missing context is a problem only if readers evaluate scenarios based on their prior knowledge and familiar experience. If instead, as I claim, the fictional case makes a new presentation possible, the additional context may be irrelevant and might distract from the presentation the thought experiment is designed to recreate.