National innovation systems (NISs) have been important in the literature since the 1990s for highlighting the institutional performance of economies and promoting economic development. Inclusion in systemic innovation activities is an emerging area of research. However, the definition of inclusion within innovative activities remains unclear and is associated with numerous forms and characteristics depending on the context visited. Our work highlights the conceptual gap that exists around the notion of inclusive innovation by characterising three forms of inclusion in relation to innovation activities. We thus set out, in the form of a typology, three distinct framings which enable us to identify three different levels associated with specific institutional mechanisms and forms of inclusion. This typology makes it possible to identify appropriate innovation policies, depending on how inclusive innovation is characterised (low, medium, and high). It also helps to clarify the inclusive nature of innovation in NIS approaches.

This paper derives career lessons for economists by examining the unusual career of Brian J. Loasby in terms of Loasby’s own key ideas. Loasby’s early career ran into difficulties after he chose to become a postgraduate for lifestyle rather than career reasons, with his insufficiently ambitious reference standards resulting in unduly narrow search for both options and new connections. His eventual success came because of a path-dependent process whereby he developed an organizing framework that was conducive to finding problems and making intellectual connections. It was a process in which making personal connections also had a key role, though some intellectual connections that he earlier failed to make resulted from trusting other people. In the market for contributions to knowledge, his way of branding and positioning his work in relation to management decision-making and the growth of knowledge gave it a wider appeal than would have been the case if he had aligned himself with a particular school of thought or ‘heterodox economics’ in general.

Precarious work, the problems it poses in terms of labour standards/regulation, and remedies to this, have sparked considerable attention from researchers and policy-makers over the past three decades. This paper examines industrial relations (IR) legislation introduced by the Australian Labor government elected in 2022, and which, amongst other things, has addressed precarious work. These initiatives are placed in historical context, noting how essentially similar problems shaped IR regulation a century earlier. The article also examines the more immediate precursors to the legislation, by reviewing state and federal inquiries into precarious work and related issues in Australia from the 1990s onwards. Placing the new legislation into historical context enhances our understanding of the law and surrounding policy debates. The Albanese federal Labor government package of industrial relations laws introduced between 2022 and 2024 marked a paradigm shift from earlier measures. While these reforms are rooted in Australian institutions, law and industrial relations history, they provide an alternative policy template for addressing the problems wrought by neoliberalism on labour standards, especially if accompanied by synergistic reforms in other areas, such as immigration and economic policies promoting manufacturing.

Extant theory proposes that stakeholders reward organizations that behave ethically and punish those that don’t. Taken at face value, this dynamic implies that organizations prioritizing ethical concerns should have competitive advantages augmenting performance. Unfortunately, hoped-for advantages often fail to materialize. Examining this difficult reality, we explore how pluralistic ethical standards manifest in ways that are not obvious because they are often locally and temporally attached to stakeholder groups. Further, we adopt a resource-based view of organizations and draw on literature related to dynamic capabilities and stakeholder theories to argue that ethics-related organization-level behavior can only lead to sustainable competitive advantages when there is continued competence across present and future-oriented systems. As a whole, our work provides a useful theoretical framework for addressing the pragmatic difficulties associated with enacting universal ethical principles in unique situations.

How does a role—whether in business, law, government, or some other institution—change what is morally permissible or obligatory? Here I present three options and argue for the third. On the balancing model, a role simply gives its occupant additional normative reasons, to be weighed against all other normative reasons. On the shielding model, a role comes with its own moral code, blocking the force of all role-external reasons. On the filtering model, a role selectively filters its occupant’s reasons for action, creating obligations or permissions to act on a narrowed range of considerations. I argue that the filtering model offers a superior analysis of the ethics of roles, including the concepts of professional integrity and discretion. I focus on three difficult cases: a nuclear safety regulator, a criminal defense lawyer, and a corporate lobbyist. I conclude by discussing the implications of the filtering model for business ethics.

The trade war with China has cost US producers and consumers hundreds of billions of dollars since 2018. Yet relatively few US businesses took action to oppose it. This study reports the results of an elite survey experiment on business political activity toward trade policy. Researchers presented business managers with information about the input costs of the new tariffs to their bottom line—information that most subjects acknowledged that they lacked—and invited them to take political action to express support or opposition to these tariffs. The results suggest that the novel information on economic costs did not significantly increase managers’ propensity to contact members of Congress, donate to political campaigns, sign petitions, or join social media groups. We also found that the firm’s political culture (liberal or conservative) did not significantly influence the effectiveness of the treatment. However, descriptive analysis showed that firm political culture was strongly related to the company’s support for the trade war, suggesting that these preexisting political beliefs were resistant to new information provided in our experiment even if that information could affect the company’s bottom line.

In this article, we consider the future of work in Australia’s renewable energy industry sectors through a consideration of the evolving political and economic context that will continue to shape it in years to come. We are particularly concerned about the quantity and quality of jobs, how these jobs will be realised, who secures them, and who will provide them. Further complicating matters, the debate is being carried out in the context of generalised skill shortages and recruitment difficulties. This article draws on and develops arguments we have put forward recently. Our focus in this article has been on the political economy of work and employment in Australia, especially implications of the polycrisis and associated geopolitics, the militarisation of industrial policy, renewable industries, regional development, just transitions, and the future of work and workers. In developing our argument, we consider Australia’s focus on ‘Renewable Energy Industrial Zones’ in an era of the ‘new state capitalism’, the impact of the US Biden Administration’s Inflation Reduction Act particularly and new geopolitics generally, and the dominance of multinational corporations in renewable industries.

We briefly describe the structure of a regulatory system that alleviates many of the problems that arise when elected officials delegate rulemaking authority to government agencies. These problems include principal-agent issues, monopoly provision, information asymmetry, and tragedy of the commons. This structure better aligns the incentives of regulators with those of legislators and with the well-being of the public. We intend the solutions and process structure presented here not to serve as a collection of proposed changes but as guideposts for those hoping to make any part of the regulatory system better attuned to the needs of the populace.

Amidst the global ascent of financial technologies (FinTech), Argentina presents a critical case for examining how these platforms shape debt relations among marginalized households. Employing a mixed-methods approach, this article draws on quantitative data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina and the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, alongside qualitative findings from a case study conducted in Buenos Aires’ largest slum. The article conceptualizes FinTech as an integral part of the lower tiers of the credit market, functioning as a mechanism for extending debt. The findings reveal that FinTech platforms do not displace existing credit sources but instead operate alongside them, providing new channels for debt that deepen financial dependence. FinTech’s role in marginalized communities, therefore, is less about banking the unbanked and more about reconfiguring access to unsecured debt, allowing for immediate consumption amidst financial instability. The article in this way contributes to the literature on FinTech by offering an understanding of FinTech’s embeddedness in everyday financial practices, showing how marginalized users engage with FinTech as a tactical response to their socio-economic conditions, exercising agency within constrained circumstances shaped by debt and financial precarity.

Employees’ organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) is an important determinant of organizational effectiveness; hence, scholars and practitioners are particularly interested in the factors, mechanisms, and conditions that promote such behaviors. Guided by the ability–motivation–opportunity framework, we draw on the social cognitive theory of moral thought and action to conceptualize a model that delineates the role of ethics-oriented human resource management (HRM) systems in promoting OCBs through the mediating role of employees’ moral attentiveness. We also refer to the job demands–resources theory to describe the moderating role of work-family balance in the indirect relationship between HRM systems and OCBs. The findings of an experiment involving 157 working adults (Study 1) and a three-wave field survey of 328 employees (Study 2) converge to support the hypothesized direct and indirect (via moral attentiveness) relationships between ethics-oriented HRM systems and OCBs as well as the first-stage moderating role of work-family balance.

This study investigates the barriers that hinder the non-leading Brazilian higher education institutions (HEIs) in repositioning within the digital landscape based on dynamic capabilities. In-depth semi-structured interviews with top managers at six non-leading HEIs show that the main barriers include uncertainty about the traditional HEI future in the digital scenario, lack of strategic tools to reposition the HEIs, lack of knowledge about the cost-benefit of an institution’s digitization, lack of knowledge on how to implement changes, and lack of information on if an HEI should (or not) meet all the new stakeholder needs. These barriers prevent HEIs from successfully adapting to the digital era. Methodologies and tools are required to guide strategic decisions, perform digitization’s cost-benefit analysis, and implement changes that meet stakeholders’ evolving demands. By overcoming these barriers, HEIs can effectively implement dynamic capabilities, transforming the challenges of the digital age into opportunities for growth and innovation.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China play a critical role in national economic development and the country's positioning on the global stage. Chinese SOEs have undergone substantial transformations from traditional government-run entities to a variety of corporate forms exhibiting different levels of state involvement. Despite their substantial influence, the internal diversity of SOEs – from wholly state-owned to mixed-ownership – has not been thoroughly examined. This paper provides an overview of SOEs' critical roles in the Chinese economy, the relationship between SOEs and privately owned enterprises (POEs), and the challenges of SOEs in different stages of Chinese economic development. It then introduces five research papers that explore the institutional, strategic, and organizational perspectives on how SOEs manage the dual pressures of state and market logic, respond to policy adjustments, tackle leadership challenges, and navigate current global trends such as digital transformation, technological innovation, and environmental sustainability. In this paper, we provide important implications for policy and managerial practices and highlight a future research agenda for the heterogeneity of Chinese SOEs, and how SOEs respond to these challenges in the evolving geopolitical landscape, adapt their strategies, and manage relationships with foreign governments and enterprises under such conditions.

In 2020 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) revisited a spectrum allocation decision it made in 1999. The Agency found that frequencies set aside for specific technologies used by vehicles – Intelligent Transportation Services (ITS) – had been left largely unused. It crafted new rules, shifting 45 MHz of the 75 MHz allocation to newly designated wireless services focusing on Wi-Fi applications, while leaving the remaining (40% of bandwidth) reserved for ITS. The FCC decision was premised on a cost–benefit analysis performed by the agency, supported by two similar studies submitted by outside interests. Yet, upon examination, the cost–benefit calculations prove stunningly uncompelling. In their economic logic, their understanding of existing market data and their use of FCC policy, fundamental errors render net benefit estimates irrelevant to decision-making. In particular, the value of marginal products (VMPs) as well as the opportunity costs of rival allocations are ignored. These failings are stunning, both on their own and given that the FCC, in its reallocation, critiqued its 1999 decision as socially unproductive – and yet deployed just the same basic methodological format, relying on FCC administrative determinations to select favored business models for supplying wireless services.

Nearly 100 years ago, economist John Maynard Keynes predicted that, by today, technological advancements would allow the workweek to dwindle to just 15 hours, or 3 hours per day, and that the real problem of humanity would be filling their time with leisure. Although much has changed in the world of work since this prediction, such a drastic change has not taken place. In this article, several industrial-organizational psychology scholars discuss why this is the case. Why do we continue to work as much as we do, and how might that change? More fundamentally, what do these trends, contra Keynes’ prediction, tell us about the nature of work itself? We use this discussion to propose several research directions regarding the nature of work and how it might change in the future. We depict the phenomenon of working hours as multilevel in nature, and we consider both the positive and negative possible implications of working less than we do now.

Quantitative easing (QE) has been a favourite tool of central banks in their post-financial crisis monetary policy apparatus. Social science literature has interpreted QE as a shift away from performative governance characterising pre-crisis monetary policy. With reference to the Bank of England’s experience, I offer a reinterpretation of QE as a performative intervention in the conditions of financial markets, as an attempt to alter the state of financial markets away from dysfunctionality and towards efficiency. I claim that, following the financial crisis, the model of complete and efficient markets – a mainstay in central banking prior to the crisis – was transformed from a real-world approximation to a ‘performative object’ to be achieved. In deploying the balance sheet, central banks attempt to performatively enact complete and efficient markets. The article rejects the claim of discontinuity between pre-crisis and post-crisis monetary policy, arguing that QE is a continuation of inflation targeting though with important innovations. While pre-crisis performativity relied on central bankers’ communicative framing of market expectations, QE is performative via the ontological shaping of financial markets, driven by epistemic models. The article relies on a set of 51 interviews with central bankers and financial market participants and a corpus of documents.

On 1 March 2018, President Trump declared a 25% tariff on certain steel imports by invoking Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. The tariff pitted two of America’s most storied and interconnected industries, steel and auto producers, against one another and made allies out of longtime bitter political opponents on Capitol Hill. Later that same year, President Trump doubled down on the steel tariff when he initiated a Section 232 investigation on auto and auto parts imports. The auto industry blasted the proposal, while steel offered its strong support. This paper examines the congressional response to President Trump’s proposed auto tariff. Specifically, we explain why 159 MCs signed a letter opposing the tariff. After controlling for other factors, such as district interests and campaign contributions, we find that ideology matters more than party affiliation on whether legislators signed the auto letter. We also find the second dimension of the DW-NOMINATE score to matter, suggesting the strong presence of intra-party cleavages. Our findings highlight the complex nature of trade policy as a domain of bipartisan agreement amidst broader political polarization and at a time when traditional party platforms on the issue are rapidly changing.

Global disruption, technological advances, and population demographics are rapidly affecting the types of jobs that are available and the workers who will fill those jobs in the future of work. Successful workers in the dynamic and uncertain landscape of the workplace of the future will need to adapt rapidly to changing job demands, highlighting the necessity for lifelong learning and development. With few exceptions, industrial-organizational (I-O) psychologists have tended to take an organization-centered perspective on training and development; a perspective that promotes worker development as a means to organizational success. Hence, we call for a broadening of this view to include a person-centered perspective on workplace learning focused on individual skill development. A person-centered perspective addresses lifelong learning and skill development for those already in the labor force, whether they are working within or outside of organizations (e.g., gig workers), or those looking for work. It includes the most vulnerable people currently working or seeking work. We describe the factors affecting the future of work, the need to incorporate a person-centered perspective on work-related skill learning into I-O research and practice, and highlight several areas for future research and practice.

This essay is in celebration of the contributions of Mario Rizzo. I argue that among contemporary economists in the Austrian School of Economics tradition it is Rizzo that advanced, more than his contemporaries, the scientific research program of rational choice as if the choosers were human beings; the dynamic subjectivism and the agony of choice and social interaction; the causal processes and the institutional dynamics that make up a complex social order; and the role of law, politics and civil society in shaping commercial life. In making this argument, I attempt to arbitrage the contributions of two essays of Rizzo’s: ‘Law Amid Flux’ and ‘The Genetic-Causal Tradition and Modern Economic Theory’.

Safety villages are interventions that aim to boost children's knowledge and behaviour regarding risk-taking behaviours and their consequences via an experiential learning approach. In safety villages, children experience scenarios involving risks that resemble real-life situations. We investigated the extent to which desirable learning outcomes from a single-session safety village visit are visible outside the safety village context. In a well-powered quasi-experimental preregistered field study, we compared students (aged 11–13) who received experiential safety education to a control group of students who had not yet received the education on three important learning outcomes: Knowledge-application, risk-taking behaviour and general risk-taking tendencies. Data were collected outside of the safety village environment, before or after the visit, and without explicit reminders of the visit. Results show students who received experiential safety education outperformed those who did not yet receive experiential education on knowledge-application and reduced risk-taking behaviours. We found no differences on general risk-taking tendencies. These results show a single visit to a safety village visit can reduce risk-taking of risks that were experienced in the village, but not general risk-taking tendencies. Theoretical and policy implications are discussed.

While environmental concerns are increasingly driving firms’ strategic decisions, insights into why firms make heterogeneous environmental investments are limited. Taking an institutional view, we explore the effect of institutional complexity resulting from multiple but incongruent institutional logics within an organization on firms’ environmental investments. Using China's mixed-ownership reform as a research context, we identify a unique condition in which institutional complexity arises as the privatization process results in two coexisting but incongruent institutional logics – namely, state and financial logic. We further propose that privatization plays both enabling and constraining roles in state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) strategic decisions about environmental investments, depending on the relative dominance of each institutional logic, resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship between privatization and environmental investments. Moreover, we examine the moderating effects of CEO background characteristics and firms’ external environmental context to uncover how these factors influence the relative dominance of state or financial logic in privatized SOEs, thereby reshaping SOEs’ environmental investments. Analyses of multisource panel data from Chinese listed SOEs from 2013 to 2020 support our theoretical propositions. The findings contribute to the literature on how institutional factors affect firm environmental practices and provide new insights to better understand the influence of institutional complexity on firm strategic actions.