This article examines the identities of three sub-ethnic and ethnographic groups in Georgia – Adjarians, Megrelians, and Tushetians – and their relationship to the Georgian nation in political and ethnic terms. Drawing on fieldwork conducted between 2022 and 2023, the study explores how these groups navigate their distinct cultural markers, such as religion, language, and traditions, while engaging with the broader national identity. Using the theoretical framework of nationalization, the analysis explores four key themes: the salience of ethno-cultural differences, the transformation of sub-ethnic identities, the politicization of ethno-cultural markers, and the groups’ historical narratives emphasizing their contributions to Georgian-ness. The findings highlight the link between local identities and national integration. The findings contribute to broader theoretical debates on nationalization by demonstrating that the integration of sub-ethnic groups is not a unidirectional process of homogenization, but a dynamic negotiation of diversity and unity.

This article examines recent developments in three key areas of nationalism research that integrate emotions into theoretical frameworks and empirical analysis. First, it explores studies that revisit historical nation-building through the lens of the history of emotions. Second, it discusses how the “affective nationalism” literature has shifted the focus of banal nationhood reproduction from mental representations to emotions. Third, it reviews efforts to theorize the emergence of intense national emotions in certain periods and their role in political mobilization and change. The article highlights critical advancements across these areas, particularly in linking emotions to meaning through narratives, expanding research from national centers to the frontiers, and challenging the illusion of national harmony by emphasizing power dynamics and dialectical change. The conclusion suggests future research directions, including investigations of national emotions within diasporic communities and digital networks.

During World War I, national pride in France fostered solidarity and increased patriotism. However, after the war, the principles of self-determination and nationality reignited debates among young regionalists about federal reorganization in France and Europe. Federalism was seen as a way to promote peace in Europe and to protect national minorities within the state. This movement crystallized in 1927 when representatives from Alsace, Corsica, and Brittany established the Central Committee of National Minorities in France (CCMNF). The CCMNF advocated for self-determination and international federalism, suggesting that a federation of peoples could replace the modern state system. This structure would let each nationality decide its political status and cultural development. While the CCMNF marked a milestone in uniting minorities around federalist ideas, its efforts were slowed by the 1929 economic crisis and a resurgence of political tensions. This article examines the rise of regionalist federalism in 1920s France and its connection to the broader post-war discussions on self-determination. By placing this movement within the larger national debates on reorganizing the French state, it highlights federalism’s potential as a transformative framework for addressing political and cultural diversity.

This article focuses on unilateral sovereignty referendums pursued by territorial autonomies. Due to their unilateral character, such referendums are unlikely to gain external recognition and, as a result, fail to effect or prevent any de jure change in sovereignty. However, they are still pursued despite these constraints, suggesting that they serve purposes other than formal changes in sovereignty. To explain this phenomenon, the article proposes a framework of seven potential motivations. The framework is examined through the case of Gagauzia’s 2014 referendums, which addressed two key issues: Moldova’s foreign alignment and Gagauzia’s deferred independence. The analysis follows three referendum stages — proposal, initiation, and implementation — focusing on the dual leadership of the executive and legislative branches. Drawing primarily on newspapers affiliated with these branches, the study finds empirical support for three key motivations: advancing the individual and collective political interests of autonomy leadership, strengthening Gagauzia’s ties with its patron (Russia), and empowering the territorial autonomy vis-à-vis the parent state (Moldova). This article contributes a framework of motivations for unilateral sovereignty referendums tailored specifically to territorial autonomies, going beyond existing explanations developed for all polities. It also provides a detailed account of one of the most significant political events in Gagauzia’s history.

Golden Dawn (GD), Greece’s most prominent far-right political organization, strategically utilized antisemitism as its core ideological principle rather than a marginal prejudice or rhetorical device. This article argues that antisemitism served primarily as an epistemological conspiratorial framework central to GD’s ideological worldview, providing a coherent interpretive lens through which all political, economic, and social phenomena were explained as elements of a singular Jewish-orchestrated plot. Drawing on qualitative discourse analysis of over 10,300 GD publications spanning 1993 to 2020, the study illustrates how this epistemological master frame enabled the party to unify diverse domestic and international issues, from foreign policy tensions and immigration debates to economic crises, under a consistent antisemitic narrative. Additionally, by explicitly employing Holocaust denial, endorsing Nazi symbolism, and openly propagating antisemitic conspiracies, GD deliberately violated post-Holocaust European norms. This normative transgression was integral to the party’s identity, positioning it in overt defiance of mainstream moral and political boundaries. The article thus demonstrates how GD’s antisemitism functioned not merely as a rhetorical provocation but as the foundation of a comprehensive ideological system that consciously challenged established European taboos. These findings also suggest broader implications for understanding the role and adaptability of conspiratorial antisemitism and normative transgression in other extremist ideologies beyond the Greek context.

This article deals with the domestic politics of Estonia and Latvia after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. It studies the cases of the Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) and Latvia’s National Alliance (NA). This piece concentrates on the cases of EKRE and NA with an interest in these parties’ formation processes, outlooks on identity politics, their stances vis-à-vis the EU and developments in international politics, and their relations with other political actors in Estonia and Latvia.

EKRE and NA anchor their ideological prerogatives in the longer trajectories of ethno-nationalism in Estonia and Latvia. However, whereas NA transformed into a party of the national conservative right, open to cooperation with centrist and centre-right partners, EKRE has remained a party of the radical right with a staunchly anti-systemic rhetoric and agenda. This particularity is largely to account for NA’s convergence with Latvia’s major parties on the increased securitisation of relations with Russia and EKRE’s divergence towards a rhetoric that urges a prioritisation of the national interest and a “pro-peace” stance vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine.

When a country sees multiple mass mobilisations over time, what accounts for variation in where protest occurs across the different protest waves? This article examines the case of mass protests in Ukraine 1990-2004, exploring how the emergence and development of activist networks aligns with changes in the geospatial dispersion of protest over time. It draws on archives and interviews with activists made available by The Three Revolutions Project, and newspaper reports from Ukrainska Pravda, Korrespondent.net and Radio Svoboda, utilising protest event analysis, along with QGIS software to visually represent findings. The article presents novel empirical findings on the geospatial scope of protest events across Ukraine from 1990 onwards, and demonstrates some of the ways in which regional activist networks expanded, developed, and sought cross-cleavage collaboration, aiming to facilitate increasing nationwide mobilisation. It provides valuable context for understanding subsequent Ukrainian mobilisation, such as the 2013-14 Euromaidan protest, and ongoing resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

This article discusses the modalities of visual necropolitics in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Drawing on the concepts of necropolitics (Mbembe 2003), visual necropolitics (Deprez 2023), and insights into everyday forms of violence and subjugation, this article argues that the necropolitics of Russia’s war on Ukraine manifests itself in the form of physical but also social death. Relying on the method of visual semiotic analysis, it identifies two key modalities of visual necropolitics: manipulation of representations and a forceful imposition of a new identity. In doing so, it contributes to the literatures on necropolitics of war and the lived experiences of peoples and communities living under occupation.

This article explores the strategic (mis)use of historical memory by populist political actors, focusing on George Simion, leader of the Romanian radical-right party Alliance for the Unity of Romanians. Through a detailed case study of the Valea Uzului Cemetery controversy, the research examines how populist movements construct and disseminate exclusionary historical narratives to mobilize affective publics, reinforce nationalistic ideologies, and generate political support. Drawing on qualitative analysis of Facebook comments and posts, the study investigates how memory is weaponized to polarize public opinion and elevate a simplified, antagonistic vision of history. The Valea Uzului case exemplifies how war cemeteries and commemorative practices can be transformed into symbolic battlegrounds for political gain. The digital environment serves as a key vector for radicalization, emotional amplification, and narrative reinforcement. Ultimately, this research highlights the critical role of memory in populist politics and the power of social media in shaping historical perception. It calls for further comparative investigation into how such mnemonic strategies impact democratic processes, interethnic relations, and the broader politics of remembrance in contemporary Europe.

The subject of this study comprises how Turkey’s EU membership is seen by HDP-supporter Kurdish voters in Turkey, as a non-EU country that has on-hold negotiations but still an ostensible vision for membership. There is a dearth of literature regarding Kurdish voters’ views on the EU, and this study, employing the focus group method, aims to address this gap by providing insights into the perspectives of Kurdish voters who support the HDP on Turkey-EU relations and their attitudes toward the EU. The study employs focus group methodology to assess whether the independentist demands that began to spring in Europe are also becoming popular among Kurdish voters. The primary finding derived from the focus group study indicates that the interviewees exhibited limited interest in both the EU negotiations and the EU’s handling of the Kurdish issue, and that the EU accession process failed to evoke significant enthusiasm among the interviewees. Meanwhile, developments pertaining to the Kurdish population in Syria and Iraq have generated a significantly higher level of enthusiasm when compared to the negotiations with the European Union.

This article focuses on perceptions and attitudes of ethnic minorities toward nation-building processes in Kazakhstan. It provides important insights on how ethnic minorities position and perceive themselves after more than thirty years of nation-building. The article draws on a survey (N=4,000) and semi-structured interviews conducted in 17 regions of Kazakhstan. It concludes that despite some variations in perceptions toward civic and ethnic identities, in general, ethnic minorities positively evaluate the nation-building processes in Kazakhstan. The evidence suggests that ethnic identity continues to play an important role in self-identification of ethnic minorities, while civic identity is important to a limited degree. The study also shows that there is variation across different ethnicities in terms of salience of ethnic and civic identities.

In a longue durée study of the European context from 1918 to the present day, this article critically assesses alternative modalities of self-determination proposed by two non-state, transnational actors – the Congress of European Nationalities (1925–1942) and the Federal Union of European Nationalities (established 1949). Situating the activism of these organizations within an international system that has prioritized state determination over the self-determination of peoples, the study charts their attempts to renegotiate dominant statist paradigms of minority protection and human rights, using ideals and frameworks of European integration as a guide. The analysis shows that although the rise of the European Union after 1945 created an environment far more propitious than the one that existed between the two World Wars, transnational activism has faced consistent limitations on its effectiveness, arising not just from the external machinations of states but also from internal divisions within the organizations concerned. In this respect, the study also sheds light on an enduring tension between collective and individual concepts of self-determination within contemporary Europe, demonstrated most recently by the Federal Union of European Nationalities’ failed European Citizens’ Initiative on a “Minority Safepack” during 2013–2021.

Following the 2020 Karabakh War, the emerging geopolitical realities compelled Iran to recalibrate its South Caucasus policy, prompting a shift away from its longstanding posture of neutrality. Despite the potential for Tehran to engage in cooperation through proposed regionalist projects by other actors, a significant shift towards regionalism in Iran’s approach to the South Caucasus remains elusive. This article delves into two primary sets of factors to understand the reasons behind this absence of regionalism in Iran’s foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. The first set encompasses general approaches in Iran’s foreign policy and the impact of domestic political dynamics on their development. It discusses Iran’s perceived impossibility of aligning with the South Caucasus states, the absence of a robust neighborhood policy, and Iran’s strategic isolation in the region, attributed to its unique political system and the ideological stance of its ruling elite. The second set examines external dynamics, including constant international pressure on the Islamic Republic, Iran’s deep-seated ideological and security attachment to the Arab Middle East, and the fluctuating nature of Tehran’s relations with the West. Collectively, these factors significantly limit Iran’s capacity to craft a coherent strategy for regional integration in the South Caucasus.

To what extent does refugee protection in Western Europe depend on the ethno-religious and gender identity of asylum seekers? This article examines how selective humanitarianism, shaped by the identity of asylum seekers and migrants, shapes their protection status. It offers an analysis of Germany’s response to Yezidi refugees, in comparison with that of France, in the wake of the genocidal campaign carried out by the Islamic State in 2014. Drawing on fieldwork that includes interviews with Yezidi refugees and stakeholders in Germany, we argue that contemporary asylum regimes operate through three interrelated mechanisms: the securitization of certain groups, selective humanitarian exceptions, and neoliberal selection criteria. The Yezidi experience illustrates how these mechanisms generate hierarchies of protection, wherein even recognized victims of genocide must meet increasingly economic thresholds to secure lasting refuge. While specialized programs for women survivors represent important humanitarian innovations, they often exclude male family members, thereby producing new forms of vulnerability. Struggling to align with dominant narratives of economically valuable migrants, Yezidis encounter a renewed form of liminality in Europe.

Studies investigating motivations for political participation in receiving-state politics among immigrant groups typically follow a traditional approach to understanding the process behind political engagement. In this work, the authors argue that this approach is insufficient if we want to understand the motivations of diasporic groups, notably in cases in which they are geographically close to home and influenced by both origin and receiving-state politics. This study examines the motivations for political party engagement among members of Bosnian diaspora in Austria and elucidates the links between political party membership and receiving-country political opportunity structures which formally result in political detachment from homeland politics. It does so through twenty-five interviews with Bosnian members of Austrian political parties conducted in fourteen cities in Austria. The article focuses on motivations for engagement in political parties which result in detachment from homeland politics and an identification with receiving-state politics. The findings reveal that pre-migratory experiences of war and membership in diasporic associations do not drive the motivations for engagement. Instead, their participation evolves from motives that are embedded in local experiences, while motives related to origin-state opportunity structures are negative or feebly present.

This article examines institutional fragmentation among key organisations in charge of Biafra’s struggle for independence since the year 2000. The article argues that contrary to the mainstream explanations, which attribute the split to the differences in tactics between organisations (Duruji 2012) or their relations with the state (Kalyvas 2008; Cunningham 2014), organisational cohesion is largely absent due to the struggle for power and resources among the leaders in charge of the organisations. Supported by the in-depth interviews with key informants, we treat Biafran secessionist organisations as business models through which leading politicians act as political entrepreneurs and engage in predatory rent-seeking practices to maximise profits and power through the institutions that represent the collective struggle.