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Puritanical moralism may signal patience rather than cause self-control

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2023

Tore Ellingsen Open the ORCID record for Tore Ellingsen [Opens in a new window]  and
Erik Mohlin
Tore Ellingsen
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden gte@hhs.se; https://sites.google.com/site/tellingsensse/
Erik Mohlin
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden erik.mohlin@nek.lu.se; https://sites.google.com/site/karlerikmohlin/
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Abstract

We argue that people may resist temptations not only with the aim of acquiring more self-control, but also because they want to convince others that they are patient and already possess self-control.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e303
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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