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Purity is not a distinct moral domain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2023

Dolichan Kollareth Open the ORCID record for Dolichan Kollareth [Opens in a new window]  and
James A. Russell
Dolichan Kollareth
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA. dollychank@gmail.com james.russell@bc.edu
James A. Russell
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA. dollychank@gmail.com james.russell@bc.edu
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Abstract

Purity violations overlap with other moral domains. They are not uniquely characterized by hypothesized markers of purity – the witness's emotion of disgust, taint to perpetrator's soul, or the diminished role of intention in moral judgment. Thus, Fitouchi et al.'s proposition that puritanical morality (a subset of violations in the purity domain) is part of cooperation-based morality is an important advance.

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Open Peer Commentary
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e308
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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