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Motivational whack-a-mole: Foundational boxes cannot be unpacked

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2025

Ezgi Ozgan Open the ORCID record for Ezgi Ozgan [Opens in a new window]  and
Jedediah W. P. Allen Open the ORCID record for Jedediah W. P. Allen [Opens in a new window]
Ezgi Ozgan
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey ezgi.ozgan@bilkent.edu.tr jallen@bilkent.edu.tr
Jedediah W. P. Allen*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey ezgi.ozgan@bilkent.edu.tr jallen@bilkent.edu.tr
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

The proposed “black-box” problem and its solution are drawn from the same substance-oriented framework. This framework's assumptions have consequences that re-create the black-box problem at a foundational level. Specifically, Murayama and Jach's solution fails to explain novel behavior that emerges through an organism's development. A process-oriented theoretical shift provides an ontological explanation for emergent behavior and eliminates the black-box problem altogether.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 48 , 2025 , e38
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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