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Motivational constructs: Real, causally powerful, not psychologically constructed
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2025
Abstract
Murayama and Jach criticize the use of high-level motivational constructs in psychology, urging psychologists to “unpack” the black box. These constructs are alleged to be “psychological constructions” with no causal powers of their own. I argue that this view is mistaken, and that high-level motivational constructs are causal even when unpacked in terms of underlying computational, algorithmic, and implementational processes.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
A critique of motivation constructs to explain higher-order behavior: We should unpack the black box
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Author response
Response to the critiques (and encouragements) on our critique of motivation constructs