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Not so fast, and not so easy: Essentialism doesn't emerge from a simple heuristic
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2014
Abstract
Cimpian & Salomon's (C&S's) proposal comes unstuck on precisely the claim that inherence is an heuristic, able to deliver simple, shallow outputs that are right most of the time. Instead, the inherence heuristic delivers outputs that imply it is not an heuristic after all, and is simply too fast and too easy a mechanism to do the job of explaining categorisations.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014
References
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Target article
The inherence heuristic: An intuitive means of making sense of the world, and a potential precursor to psychological essentialism
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Author response
Refining and expanding the proposal of an inherence heuristic in human understanding