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Why we assume it's all good: The role of theory of mind in early inherent feature inferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Karen Bartsch  and
David Estes
Karen Bartsch
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071-3415. bartsch@uwyo.edu http://www.uwyo.edu/psychology/faculty/bartsch.html estes@uwyo.edu http://www.uwyo.edu/psychology/faculty/estes.html
David Estes
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071-3415. bartsch@uwyo.edu http://www.uwyo.edu/psychology/faculty/bartsch.html estes@uwyo.edu http://www.uwyo.edu/psychology/faculty/estes.html
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Abstract

Cimpian & Salomon's (C&S's) characterization of a domain-general inherence heuristic, available to young children, underplays the importance of our early interest in and recognition of agency, intentionality, and mental life. A consideration of the centrality of desires, goals, and agency in our earliest reasoning suggests an alternative, perhaps complementary, account of our tendency to be satisfied with the status quo.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 5 , October 2014 , pp. 482
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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