In their target article, Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) outline a new heuristic describing individuals' tendency to explain observed patterns as a function of their constituents' inherent features. C&S develop an important and interesting area for future inquest into the cognitive biases underpinning human judgement. However, we believe that certain areas of their model are underspecified. In particular, we contend that the model should be extended to include further specification of the computational mechanisms through which the heuristic system adapts in the face of information that challenges inherent notions.
As the authors note, it is a well-established finding in social psychology that the human mind has a tendency to prefer “the path of least resistance” (sect. 2.2, para. 10). Acting as cognitive misers, people are reluctant to expend cognitive resources by engaging in effortful processing and look to simplify social perception through the use of cognitive shortcuts (Fiske & Taylor Reference Fiske and Taylor1991). However, the appeal of heuristic efficiency is not absolute: although such systems can be adaptive when cognitive resources are limited, they leave us vulnerable to error. Accordingly, C&S acknowledge that the grip of the inherence heuristic on perceivers' judgements is not inescapable. They accept that intuitive judgements of causality can be blocked before they are generated. Furthermore, they outline how individual variability in cognitive style and ability, as well as developmental stage, may moderate tendencies to block the operation of the heuristic. They also accept that judgements arising from the heuristic can be rejected or revised after they have been generated – enabling potential bias and error to be corrected. However, the authors do not elaborate on how intuitions supplied by the heuristic can be revised in the face of challenging evidence. Here we outline a general mechanism through which systematic revisions to heuristic judgements can be made and consider how such revisions can reciprocally impact the cognitive foundations of the inherence heuristic.
Clues to the specification of the updating mechanism can be found in C&S's own application of inherence to essentialism in intergroup relations. As C&S discuss, the belief that differences between social groups are deep and immutable is associated with “stronger endorsement of stereotypes (e.g., Bastian & Haslam Reference Bastian and Haslam2006; Levy et al. Reference Levy, Stroessner and Dweck1998, see also Yzerbyt et al. Reference Yzerbyt, Corneille and Estrada2001), greater acceptance of racial inequities (Williams & Eberhardt Reference Williams and Eberhardt2008), and more blatant prejudice towards members of minority groups (e.g., Keller Reference Keller2005; see also Haslam et al. Reference Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst2002)” (sect. 4.1, para. 2). This role of inherence in forming and maintaining essentialist beliefs provides a point of synthesis with a recent, related model from the intergroup-relations domain which focuses precisely on what is lacking in C&S's model: a mechanism for how heuristic systems adapt in the face of information inconsistent with intuitive judgements.
We (Crisp & Meleady Reference Crisp and Meleady2012) have argued that whereas people are disposed to think heuristically about social category boundaries (system 1), they must also possess the computational mechanisms to enable them to bypass this system when it is necessary to update and revise these representations (system 2). Without such a mechanism, heuristic systems would be inherently maladaptive. Thus, when information that challenges extant category representations is encountered (e.g., positive and/or counter-stereotypical outgroup behaviours), an inconsistency resolution process is engaged in which individuals inhibit the operation of category-based heuristic thinking in favour of higher-order, generative ways of thinking. This results in a creative, individuated impression of the individual encountered.
Notably, the results of studies supporting the brain-as-muscle metaphor demonstrate that, just as with physical exercise, repeatedly “working out” the brain literally improves its processing power. For example, tasks designed to train working memory improve fluid intelligence and are accompanied by reduced blood flow to areas necessary to complete previously cognitively demanding tasks (Jaeggi et al. Reference Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides and Shah2011). Similarly, the results of longitudinal studies demonstrate improvements in inhibitory power with repeated exertion (Muraven et al. Reference Muraven, Baumeister and Tice1999). Accordingly, we argue that repeatedly encountering information that challenges existing preconceptions will train a disposition towards a more systematic, analytic cognitive style, lessening a general reliance on heuristic systems (Crisp & Meleady Reference Crisp and Meleady2012; Crisp & Turner Reference Crisp and Turner2011).
A central claim by C&S is that the inherence heuristic underlies essentialist beliefs, which, in turn, are well established to contribute to intergroup biases. In line with the general principles embodied in the diversity-based model of social cognition outlined above, we contend that specification of the inherence heuristic should be extended. Specifically, the model could fruitfully incorporate a mechanism to account for how information that challenges intuitive inherent notions could lead to a lesser reliance on the inherence heuristic in the judgemental domains specified. In short, C&S tell us about individual differences in peoples' tendency to adopt this heuristic, but not how those individual differences arise. As the authors state, “The more favorably one is disposed toward engaged, open-minded thinking; the less one is susceptible to the influence of intuitive heuristics” (sect. 2.2.5.1, para. 3). The model should therefore consider how the repeated engagement of an updating mechanism may reciprocally shape the cognitive infrastructure that underlies reliance on the inherence heuristic. An addendum to the model such as that outlined above would enable us to predict when and how generalized resistance to the inherence heuristic could lead to these individual differences.
Providing greater specification of how heuristic systems can be updated is critical because it may answer an important, yet unaddressed, question arising from C&S's proposition: How do we tackle these biases inherent to human social cognition? This is a fundamental question, because if C&S are correct in their assertion that an inherence heuristic lies at the core of multiple (problematic) biases in human judgement, we must seek ways to mitigate these biases in critical areas such as the environment, health, equality, and economics.
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In their target article, Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) outline a new heuristic describing individuals' tendency to explain observed patterns as a function of their constituents' inherent features. C&S develop an important and interesting area for future inquest into the cognitive biases underpinning human judgement. However, we believe that certain areas of their model are underspecified. In particular, we contend that the model should be extended to include further specification of the computational mechanisms through which the heuristic system adapts in the face of information that challenges inherent notions.
As the authors note, it is a well-established finding in social psychology that the human mind has a tendency to prefer “the path of least resistance” (sect. 2.2, para. 10). Acting as cognitive misers, people are reluctant to expend cognitive resources by engaging in effortful processing and look to simplify social perception through the use of cognitive shortcuts (Fiske & Taylor Reference Fiske and Taylor1991). However, the appeal of heuristic efficiency is not absolute: although such systems can be adaptive when cognitive resources are limited, they leave us vulnerable to error. Accordingly, C&S acknowledge that the grip of the inherence heuristic on perceivers' judgements is not inescapable. They accept that intuitive judgements of causality can be blocked before they are generated. Furthermore, they outline how individual variability in cognitive style and ability, as well as developmental stage, may moderate tendencies to block the operation of the heuristic. They also accept that judgements arising from the heuristic can be rejected or revised after they have been generated – enabling potential bias and error to be corrected. However, the authors do not elaborate on how intuitions supplied by the heuristic can be revised in the face of challenging evidence. Here we outline a general mechanism through which systematic revisions to heuristic judgements can be made and consider how such revisions can reciprocally impact the cognitive foundations of the inherence heuristic.
Clues to the specification of the updating mechanism can be found in C&S's own application of inherence to essentialism in intergroup relations. As C&S discuss, the belief that differences between social groups are deep and immutable is associated with “stronger endorsement of stereotypes (e.g., Bastian & Haslam Reference Bastian and Haslam2006; Levy et al. Reference Levy, Stroessner and Dweck1998, see also Yzerbyt et al. Reference Yzerbyt, Corneille and Estrada2001), greater acceptance of racial inequities (Williams & Eberhardt Reference Williams and Eberhardt2008), and more blatant prejudice towards members of minority groups (e.g., Keller Reference Keller2005; see also Haslam et al. Reference Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst2002)” (sect. 4.1, para. 2). This role of inherence in forming and maintaining essentialist beliefs provides a point of synthesis with a recent, related model from the intergroup-relations domain which focuses precisely on what is lacking in C&S's model: a mechanism for how heuristic systems adapt in the face of information inconsistent with intuitive judgements.
We (Crisp & Meleady Reference Crisp and Meleady2012) have argued that whereas people are disposed to think heuristically about social category boundaries (system 1), they must also possess the computational mechanisms to enable them to bypass this system when it is necessary to update and revise these representations (system 2). Without such a mechanism, heuristic systems would be inherently maladaptive. Thus, when information that challenges extant category representations is encountered (e.g., positive and/or counter-stereotypical outgroup behaviours), an inconsistency resolution process is engaged in which individuals inhibit the operation of category-based heuristic thinking in favour of higher-order, generative ways of thinking. This results in a creative, individuated impression of the individual encountered.
Notably, the results of studies supporting the brain-as-muscle metaphor demonstrate that, just as with physical exercise, repeatedly “working out” the brain literally improves its processing power. For example, tasks designed to train working memory improve fluid intelligence and are accompanied by reduced blood flow to areas necessary to complete previously cognitively demanding tasks (Jaeggi et al. Reference Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides and Shah2011). Similarly, the results of longitudinal studies demonstrate improvements in inhibitory power with repeated exertion (Muraven et al. Reference Muraven, Baumeister and Tice1999). Accordingly, we argue that repeatedly encountering information that challenges existing preconceptions will train a disposition towards a more systematic, analytic cognitive style, lessening a general reliance on heuristic systems (Crisp & Meleady Reference Crisp and Meleady2012; Crisp & Turner Reference Crisp and Turner2011).
A central claim by C&S is that the inherence heuristic underlies essentialist beliefs, which, in turn, are well established to contribute to intergroup biases. In line with the general principles embodied in the diversity-based model of social cognition outlined above, we contend that specification of the inherence heuristic should be extended. Specifically, the model could fruitfully incorporate a mechanism to account for how information that challenges intuitive inherent notions could lead to a lesser reliance on the inherence heuristic in the judgemental domains specified. In short, C&S tell us about individual differences in peoples' tendency to adopt this heuristic, but not how those individual differences arise. As the authors state, “The more favorably one is disposed toward engaged, open-minded thinking; the less one is susceptible to the influence of intuitive heuristics” (sect. 2.2.5.1, para. 3). The model should therefore consider how the repeated engagement of an updating mechanism may reciprocally shape the cognitive infrastructure that underlies reliance on the inherence heuristic. An addendum to the model such as that outlined above would enable us to predict when and how generalized resistance to the inherence heuristic could lead to these individual differences.
Providing greater specification of how heuristic systems can be updated is critical because it may answer an important, yet unaddressed, question arising from C&S's proposition: How do we tackle these biases inherent to human social cognition? This is a fundamental question, because if C&S are correct in their assertion that an inherence heuristic lies at the core of multiple (problematic) biases in human judgement, we must seek ways to mitigate these biases in critical areas such as the environment, health, equality, and economics.