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Seeing for ourselves: Insights into the development of moral behaviour from models of visual perception and misperception
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2018
Abstract
Parallels from visual processing support Doris's cognitive architecture underlying moral agency. Unconscious visual processes change with conscious reflection. The sparse and partial representations of vision, its illusions, and hallucinations echo biases in moral reasoning and behaviour. Traditionally, unconscious moral processes are developed by teaching and reflection. Modern neuroscience could bypass reflection and directly influence unconscious processes, creating new dangers.
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Target article
Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency
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