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To kill a bee: The aptness and moralistic heuristics of reactive attitudes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Hugo Viciana ,
Antonio Gaitán  and
Fernando Aguiar
Hugo Viciana
Affiliation:
Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados, CSIC, Plaza Campo Santo de los Mártires, 7, 14004, Cordoba, Spain. hviciana@iesa.csic.es faguiar@iesa.csic.es www.hugoviciana.net
Antonio Gaitán
Affiliation:
Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid, 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid) España. agaitan@hum.uc3m.es
Fernando Aguiar
Affiliation:
Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados, CSIC, Plaza Campo Santo de los Mártires, 7, 14004, Cordoba, Spain. hviciana@iesa.csic.es faguiar@iesa.csic.es www.hugoviciana.net
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Abstract

Although we are sensitive to the advantages of reactive attitudes as a starting point, we are concerned that confusion on the level of analysis can easily plague this type of account. We argue that what is needed here is a serious appraisal of the effects on the promotion of values of moralistic responses toward different types of agency.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e62
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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