Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-5ngxj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-18T06:18:27.694Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Manipulation, oppression, and the deep self

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Manuel R. Vargas
Manuel R. Vargas*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093. mrvargas@ucsd.edu http://vargasphilosophy.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This essay considers various kinds of manipulation cases (local and global, dispositional and situational), and how Doris's Deep Self-style theory of responsibility fares in light of them. Agents acting with preferences adaptively formed under oppression are an especially interesting challenge for this sort of view, and the article considers what options may be available to Doris and others.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e61
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Bratman, M. E. (2007) Structures of agency: Essays. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Doris, J. M. (2015b). Talking to our selves: Reflection, ignorance, and agency. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elster, J. (1983) Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischer, J. M. & Ravizza, M. (1998) Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frankfurt, H. (1971) Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 68(1):5–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khader, S. (2011) Adaptive preferences and women's empowerment. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKenna, M. & Pereboom, D. (2016) Free will: A contemporary introduction. Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mele, A. (2009) Moral responsibility and history revisited. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12(5):463–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sripada, C. (2015b) Self-expression: A deep self theory of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 175(5):1203–232.Google Scholar
Vargas, M. R. (forthcoming-b) The social constitution of agency and responsibility: Oppression, politics, and moral ecology. In: The social dimensions of responsibility, ed. Oshana, M., Hutchinson, K. & Mackenzie, C.. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Watson, G. (1975) Free agency. Journal of Philosophy 72(8):205–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar