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On properly characterizing moral agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Blaine J. Fowers
Affiliation:
Department of Educational and Psychological Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124. bfowers@miami.edu aanders8@yahoo.com samantha.lang718@gmail.com www.blainefowers.com
Austen R. Anderson
Affiliation:
Department of Educational and Psychological Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124. bfowers@miami.edu aanders8@yahoo.com samantha.lang718@gmail.com www.blainefowers.com
Samantha F. Lang
Affiliation:
Department of Educational and Psychological Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124. bfowers@miami.edu aanders8@yahoo.com samantha.lang718@gmail.com www.blainefowers.com

Abstract

Doris (2015b) develops a theory of moral agency to avoid a skeptical challenge arising from psychology studies indicating that (im)moral behavior is caused by trivial situational factors. His theory is flawed in attending only to situational influences on behavior and neglecting individual differences such as moral identity and virtue. A focus on individual differences in resilience to influence from trivial situational factors defangs the skeptical challenge and offers a better account of moral agency.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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