This chapter shows that the CBD regime contains provisions on benefit-sharing, consent-like rights, and the recognition of indigenous and community conserved areas (ICCAs) that help implementing Indigenous rights to land, natural resources, cultural rights, FPIC, and self-determination, and complement protection thereof in the context of biodiversity protection. This contribution also argues that the CBD regime gives rise to four new categories of collective rights of Indigenous Peoples that are not (fully) protected under IHRL: the right to benefit-sharing, the right to genetic resources, the right to traditional knowledge (TK), and biocultural rights. These rights bear a good potential for additional protection of collective rights because they apply to situations that would otherwise not be covered under IHRL, illustrative being the entitlement to genetic resources. In terms of the theoretical contribution of these rights, this chapter demonstrates that the CBD legal framework contributes to reinforcing legal pluralism, by assessing Indigenous Peoples’ entitlements to TK and, indirectly, to genetic resources in light of Indigenous customs, practices, and procedures. The chapter concludes that Indigenous Peoples’ rights protected under the CBD framework do not perfectly coincide with the categories of environmental rights due to their main object and substantive nature.

When municipal elections favored republican candidates in 1931, King Alfonso XIII went into exile, and politicians declared a republic, polarizing Spanish society further. Republican programs included ambitious social, economic, and cultural initiatives to improve lives, but the government was faction-ridden from the start. Increasing street violence and several revolts persuaded a cadre of army officers to launch a coup in April 1936 that became a civil war when the government refused to yield. The Spanish Civil War, marked by atrocities on both sides, pitted right-wing Nationalists, led by General Francisco Franco, against an increasingly left-wing Republic. It ended after hundreds of thousands of deaths with Franco in power, tens of thousands of Spaniards in exile, and Spain isolated during the Second World War, supposedly neutral but sending troops to fight Soviet Russia in support of Nazi Germany. The postwar period brought misery, widespread hunger, and continued isolation that was only eased during the anti-Soviet Cold War of the 1950s. The following decade brought an economic boom and the relaxation of certain aspects of the dictatorship. By the time of Franco’s death in 1975, Spaniards were poised to enter a new epoch but wary about what it might bring.

The determination with which Indigenous peoples aim at protecting their traditional territories from environmental degradation emanates from their deepest spirituality and religious beliefs. The most effective means they have to avoid the deterioration of Indigenous territories is traditional ecological knowledge, which has already been recognized as critical in the combat against the environmental crisis. This traditional knowledge is an inextricable, constituent part not only of these peoples’ right to a healthy environment, but also of their right to freedom of religion or belief, all of which shows how in Indigenous worldviews traditional practices and knowledge systems are intertwined with belief systems. In spite of this, there is a worrying lack of understanding and operationalization of these peoples’ freedom of religion or belief, which hinders, in turn, the full realization of their environmental rights. With that in mind, and through an inductive approach, this chapter aims at exploring this connection while assessing the threats Indigenous religious identities and cultural survival are currently exposed to as a consequence of environmental degradation, so as to provide critical guidelines on the way forward, which must necessarily build on securing the full and effective participation of Indigenous peoples in environmental action and policy-making.

The Coda takes stock of the book’s argument for the distinctiveness of persuasion among its lexical and cognitive others in Romantic writing. It responds to some common misconceptions about the malleability of persuasion and considers its implications for our lives among others today, in political and professional community. The chapter suggests that one response to our civic polarizations, as well as to professional anxieties about the methods and future of literary studies, might well be the self-conscious and flexible mode of persuasion countenanced by Romantic writers at a moment of comparable entrenchments and attacks on the value of a creative and critical imagination. Rather than assume synonymy between persuasion and conviction, in other words, and dismiss them both as either so much domineering or else so much boundless subjectivism, we might consider the continuing value of the kind of judgment under uncertainty characteristic of persuasion as it was reimagined in Romantic writing.

The chapter-length Introduction establishes the historical and philosophical contexts for the Romantic reimagining of persuasion. A section on David Hume’s skeptical views on “perswasion” and the influential response to them by the Scottish rhetorician and minister George Campbell draws important terminological distinctions and delineates key features of the inquiries and reimaginings addressed in the chapters that follow. The main features of the concept of malleable persuasion are described and differentiated from adjacent concepts in works by Lord Byron, Edmund Burke, and Mary Shelley, among others. The book is situated in relation to major lines of scholarship on Romantic cultures of controversy, secular casuistry, and the histories of belief and skepticism. The chapter ends by addressing the distinctly literary dimensions of persuasion, including the role of reading in its representation and elicitation, and the formal resources involved across genres.

Chapter 1 delineates the overlapping new paradigms of persuasion elaborated by Thomas De Quincey and William Hazlitt in response to George Campbell and David Hume, and considers their implications for the genre of the periodical essay. Against Campbell’s definition of persuasion as an emotional supplement to rational conviction, De Quincey and Hazlitt, in their essays of the 1820s and 1830s, formulate the alternative of a self-consciously partial and flexible way of holding and forming beliefs. De Quincey’s performance of such persuasion in “On Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts” makes apparent the problem of anything-goes judgment that leads him, in his “Rhetoric” and “Style” essays, to restrict persuasion to “subjective” domains like rhetoric and poetry. Hazlitt, by contrast, in his late-career essays on belief, opinion, and controversy, endorses malleable persuasion in all domains of dispute and theorizes its unique affinity with imaginative literature.

This Chapter is devoted to aspects of the traditional morphological typology, and looks at Baker’s (1996) proposals for polysynthesis and Huang’s (2015) “deep” analyticity, concluding that these two morphological types are determined by the incidence of syntactic head movement.

The chapter responds to movements in international human rights law to articulate Indigenous rights to the environment. Specifically, the chapter draws upon critical Indigenous literature to identify Indigenous concerns regarding international human rights approaches. The analysis provides a brief background on prevailing international law approaches to Indigenous environmental rights, along with an overview of Indigenous critiques of international law for Indigenous peoples. The chapter extends the analysis to international human rights. The analysis reviews of jurisprudence in international law that extends international human rights to protect Indigenous rights to the environment. The analysis follows such review with a critique drawn from the commentaries of Indigenous scholars who view the existing international human rights system as being problematic for Indigenous peoples. The analysis finds that while international human rights law presents potential opportunities to protect Indigenous rights to environment, Indigenous critics still see human rights approaches as being problematic for Indigenous peoples.

This article examines Mapuche law (az mapu) through the lens of socio-environmental rights and explores its role in a transmodern discussion of legal pluralism. Challenging Western legal norms, the authors assert that Indigenous resistance is a fundamental right undermined by liberal positive law. They trace the colonial history of Indigenous peoples in Abya Yala and Wallmapu, advocating for alternative conceptions of justice and law to address entrenched asymmetries and colonial violence originating in the conquest of America. A transmodern framework is offered to envision Indigenous rights beyond Eurocentric colonial metaphysics. Within Latin America and Abya Yala, proponents of positive law confront a critical juncture regarding Indigenous rights, their existence, and revival. The dynamics of az mapu in Wallmapu are analyzed via transmodernity and legal pluralism, revealing the interconnected dimensions of environmental justice essential in the early twenty-first century. Ultimately, the authors link the Indigenous rights debate to the broader climate crisis—marked by eco- and ethnocidal threats such as global warming—and propose a decolonial understanding of justice. This approach reconfigures human-nature relationships and emphasizes that the severe socio-environmental crisis demands responses grounded in contextual rights like Mapuche az mapu and its intrinsic bond with itrofillmogen (all living things).