A joint Senate-Chamber special ‘political renewal’ committee was installed in order to discuss and put forward reforms of the electoral system, the introduction of instruments of direct democracy, etc. It established a very long list of possible reforms, and the discussions evolved quite slowly. In the meantime, the government decided, on its own, to implement a 50% reduction of the weight of list votes in determining the order in which individual candidates from the list are to be elected for elections at all levels. This reform was the result of a compromise between the Liberals, who wanted a more drastic reform, and the Socialists and Greens who were not clearly in favour of such a reform. The distinction between effective and substitute candidates’ lists was also abandoned. This reform was first implemented for the October local elections. The Council of Ministers also put forward a constitutional reform ensuring the presence of at least one member of each gender in the federal and subnational Cabinets.

Environmental issues are an important aspect of party competition and voters’ political preferences. Yet political behaviour research often considers environmental attitudes as a component of a broader ‘second-dimension’ and either subsumes it into this or omits it. Using data from the fifth wave of the European Values Study, we demonstrate through factor analysis that environmentalism loads as a separate dimension across Western Europe, that environmentalism has somewhat different social predictors and that it has important associations with party preference that differ from those of other second dimension issues. Our findings have crucial implications. Firstly, not accounting for environmentalism in studies of political behaviour misses an important part of the picture. Secondly, subsuming environmentalism into a broader ‘cultural’ dimension may lead to incomplete conclusions about both social predictors and the electoral consequences of political attitudes and values. Thus, allowing for a separate environmental dimension opens up novel perspectives on political representation in Western democracies.

Coalition policymaking concerns not only who decides what in which jurisdiction but also when, how speedy and in what rhythm. Due to the limited time budget and shadow of future elections, parties in charge of respective ministerial portfolios have to strategically organize their policy agendas to trade off between policy and electoral incentives in the face of coalition partners who monitor and control ministerial autonomy. However, despite the burgeoning literature on coalition governance, the temporal dimension of ministerial agenda control is less well understood. I advance this research by proposing a model to directly account for the influence of time budgets on timing decisions of ministers in policy initiation. In this model, I distinguish between different timing strategies of policy initiation a ministerial party may possibly adopt and identify in equilibrium a conditional postponing strategy by which ministers facing high scrutiny of coalition partners will postpone bill initiation till the end of the term. The empirical examination lends support to my argument and further demonstrates that the timing strategy of ministers can also be influenced by coalition conflict and policy saliency of bills.

Several scholars in the United States have recently addressed an increased partisan animosity between Democrats and Republicans, and have termed this phenomenon ‘affective polarisation’. This surge in partisan affective polarisation is perceived to be highly problematic, as it has been found to have a negative impact on the functioning of the party system and even society at large. The aim of this article is to study the concept of affective polarisation in European party systems. It introduces the Affective Polarisation Index (API) that allows for measuring and comparing levels of affective polarisation also in multiparty systems. This novel measure is applied to 22 European democracies and the United States between 2005 and 2016. The results indicate that affective polarisation is acutely present in European party systems, as partisans are often extremely hostile towards competing parties. The most affectively polarised countries are in Central Eastern and Southern Europe where the degree of affective polarisation is notably higher than it is in the United States, while Northwestern European countries are more moderate in terms of partisan feelings. Further analysis reveals that affective polarisation is significantly correlated with ideological polarisation, but the relationship between the two appears to be conditional: in some Western European political systems ideological polarisation does not lead itself to strong interparty hostility, while in Central Eastern Europe a high degree of affective polarisation can be present even in ideologically centrist party structures. These findings validate the claim that ideological and affective polarisation are two distinct aspects of polarisation, and that the latter also merits additional attention.

Members of ethnic and racial minorities across North America and Europe continue to face discrimination, for instance, when applying for jobs or seeking housing. Such unequal treatment can occur because societies categorize people into groups along social, cultural, or ethnic and racial lines that seemingly rationalize differential treatment. Research suggests that it may take generations for such differences to decline, if they change at all. Here, we show that a single gesture by international soccer players at the World Cup 2018 – followed by an extensive public debate – led to a measurable and lasting decline in discrimination. Immediately after the galvanizing event, invitation rates to view apartments increased by 6 percentage points for the migrant group represented by the players, while responses to the native population did not change noticeably. We demonstrate that anti‐immigrant behaviour can disband rapidly when the public receives messages challenging the nature of ethnic and racial categories while sharing a common cause.

Women are not a demographic minority, but they certainly are a minority in politics. Most legislative bodies across the world are still overwhelmingly male. Female candidates cite lack of resources as one of the main deterrents to run. Using data on candidates encompassing twenty‐eight elections in sixteen countries between 2006 and 2017, we examine the role of electoral institutions, partisanship and candidates’ political profile in mitigating – or aggravating – the gender resource gap. We find that female candidates systematically avail of significantly lower campaign budgets. This is true across different electoral systems and on the left as well as on the right. The gap is larger in size among incumbents. It is also wider in parties that use voluntary quotas and put forward more female candidates. Moreover, the budget composition of male and female candidates varies considerably. Male candidates tend to use higher proportions of their own resources, while female candidates rely on proportionally higher party contributions, that are, however, smaller in size.

Recent research suggests that emotions are a central motivation for radical right voting. One emotion that has gained particular interest is nostalgia: Radical right politicians use nostalgic rhetoric, and feeling nostalgic is associated with radical right support. However, while nostalgia is widely and frequently experienced, previous work differentiates personal contents of nostalgia (e.g., childhood) from group‐based contents (e.g., traditions) and suggests that only the latter is related to the radical right. But why does nostalgia, and specifically its group‐based content, matter? In the present paper, I argue that nostalgia evokes implicit comparisons between the past and the present. Using relative deprivation theory, I posit that group‐based nostalgia makes people subjectively evaluate society's present as worse than its past. In turn, this temporal group‐based relative deprivation is associated with attempts to restore the past through radical right voting. Personal nostalgia, instead, does not evoke equivalent experiences of personal relative deprivation and is, therefore, unrelated to radical right support. In preregistered analyses of representative panel data from the Netherlands, I show that group‐based nostalgia is more consistently related to radical right support than personal nostalgia. In subsequent exploratory analyses, I test the relative deprivation argument and find that group‐based relative deprivation does indeed mediate the relationship between group‐based nostalgia and radical right voting: People who long for the group‐based past are more likely to feel dissatisfied with the government and, in turn, consider voting for the radical right. In studying this mechanism, I connect recent work on emotional and relative deprivation explanations to radical right voting.

In the context of a general policy-based theory of how parties behave in democratic governments, a specific hypothesis on party factional behaviour is proposed and tested for the post-war period in 20 democracies. The hypothesis is that reshuffles (replacements and transfers of individuals between ministries) are more frequent where Prime Ministers have more freedom of action and decline where they have less freedom. As Prime Ministerial power is greatest in single-party governments, these are expected to produce more reshuffles – an expectation strongly confirmed by the evidence.

A first-order Gaussian autoregressive model is considered. The exact finite-sample joint density of the minimal sufficient statistic is derived, for any value of the autoregressive parameter. This allows us to derive explicitly the exact density of the autocorrelation coefficient and its Studentized t-ratio, whose densities were available only in the asymptotic case and not for all values of the parameter and the statistic. This article also demonstrates how to solve a general problem in statistical distribution theory (well beyond the specific case of autoregressive models), that of inverting confluent characteristic functions in multiple variables.

In March 2000, the Storting was to vote on two issues where the centrist mini-coalition headed by Mr. Kjell Magne Bondevik had a clear majority against it. In both cases, the development of the Fornebu IT centre and the gasfired power plant issue, one expected that Prime Minister Bondevik would show the Storting and the Norwegian people that the coalition would not let itself be pushed around. The Bondevik government had had a parliamentary majority against it since its formation on 17 October 1997, and Labour and the Conservatives could have joined forces to topple the Bondevik government at any time. In June 1998, Prime Minister Bondevik had also demanded a vote of confidence, but on this occasion the government was saved by the Progress Party and the Conservatives (See Yearbook 1999, p. 485). In March 2000, when Prime Minister Bondevik (KRF) called for a vote of confidence over the issue of building gas-fired power plants, his government fell. On 17 March, Mr. Jens Stoltenberg formed his first Labour government.

Do more rules improve overall policy performance? To answer this question, we look at rule growth in the area of environmental policy from an aggregate perspective. We argue that impactful growth in rules crucially depends on implementation capacities. If such capacities are limited, countries are at risk of ‘empty’ rule growth where they lack the ability to implement their ever‐growing stock of policies. Hence, rules are a necessary, yet not sufficient condition for achieving sectoral policy objectives. We underpin our argument with an analysis of the impact of a new, encompassing measure of environmental rule growth covering 13 countries from 1980 to 2010. These findings call for ‘sustainable statehood’ where the growth in rules should not outpace the expansion in administrative capacities.

Interest groups differ in the strategies they use to influence public policy. Some mainly try to gain access (i.e., have direct contact with decision makers), whereas others tend to ‘go public’ by launching campaigns that aim to mobilise the broader public. In this article it is argued that group type – namely the distinction between business associations, professional associations and citizen groups – is a major determinant of the choice of strategy. The effect of group type, however, is conditional on the group's endowment with material resources and the issue context: the differences across group types are largest for resource‐rich associations and associations active in distributive policy fields. Original data from surveys of national associations in five European countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland, Latvia and Spain) enable the assessment of this argument. The theoretical expectations are supported, with the results having relevance for the normative evaluation of political systems and the positive study of interest group influence.

The country’s financial situation, industrial and party relations, and the Government’s eleven-year old bid to join the European Union formed the web of national politics during the year 2000.

The starting point for the 1999 election campaign was more than interesting. The polarization between SPS and SVP, which were both winners of the election in 1995 with a gain of 3 points each, was noticeable in the cantonal parliamentary elections between 1995 and 1999 and also became apparent in some of the voting of the last few years. The other two government parties (CVP and FDP) intended to correct their results of 1995 – the worst since the introduction of proportional representation in 1919 – and the opposition parties, which in 1995 won approximately a quarter (26%) of the votes, had to fight particularly hard for media attention. In addition, the political campaigners were faced with the effects of a fractionalized party system, even compared to international standards, with electoral volatility and an unstable, low participation rate. However, the state of the media system, the federal party structures and proportional representation, which made image campaigns for top candidates inappropriate, account for the fact that the election campaign did not take on American proportions. Furthermore, professionalization and the financial resources of the parties were important factors as well. Only the SVP managed to conduct a well-aimed, consistent election campaign that was visible nationally as well as locally.

Cyclone Alfred disrupted dialysis services across South-East Queensland. Digital tools, including real-time surveys and AI-assisted analysis, were used to evaluate impact and guide immediate improvements. This low-cost, tech-enabled response demonstrated how agile methods can support disaster resilience and inform planning for vulnerable patient groups during extreme weather events.

How do political parties respond to external shocks? Using an original survey of political parties across Europe conducted in June 2020 and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data on partisan ideological positioning, we argue that the pre‐existing ideological stances of Europe's political parties shaped their response to emerging Covid‐19 policy issues, including the tension between economic normalization and containment, legal versus voluntary enforcement and the role of science in policymaking. We find that party ideology powerfully predicts how parties, both in government and in opposition, responded to the pandemic.

While a multitude of studies have investigated the link between opinion and policy, we have little knowledge of how and when organised interests affect this linkage. We argue that the alignment of organised interests affects opinion–policy congruence by influencing the weight decision‐makers attach to citizen preferences. Moreover, we propose that alignment between majorities of groups and the public matters the most when status quo bias must be overcome for the public to obtain its preferred policy. We test our theoretical claims drawing on a comprehensive media content analysis of 160 policy issues in Germany and Denmark. Our results present a more sceptical picture of the ability of groups to suppress the opinion–policy linkage than the one frequently presented in the academic literature and public debate. We find that the capacity of groups to affect whether policy is congruent with the majority of the public is restricted to situations where the public supports a change in the status quo. In these cases, policy is less likely to end up reflecting public opinion if the majority of interest groups do not support the public position. In cases where the public is supportive of the policy status quo, the position of interest groups does not affect the likelihood that policy will eventually reflect the preferred position of the public. Our findings expand existing knowledge of organised interests in the study of policy representation and have important implications for understanding democratic governance.