Online abuse is becoming an increasingly pressing issue for democratic societies. Citizens play an important role in curtailing abuse as they often moderate online content through counter speech and by reporting abusive messages. However, we know little about when citizens actually perceive negative comments directed at politicians as being abusive, and the factors shaping these perceptions are also understudied. In this study, we therefore investigate how citizens perceive criticism, insults, threats and sexist remarks directed at politicians on social media. Based on a survey experiment with 2,000 Danish citizens, we show that citizens’ assessments of the abusiveness of such remarks are not only affected by the content of the messages, but also by political ideology, political trust and gender. Surprisingly, partisanship does not seem to substantively affect perceptions of abuse. Our study provides novel insights into what exactly citizens consider to be abusive behaviour on social media.

The year 2000 in Swedish politics could be described as relatively quiet. Despite one significant ministerial casualty, the minority Social Democratic government stayed in office. The political temperature was medium to low, in part because no elections were held and the next parliamentary election is scheduled for September 2002.

The main issues dominating national politics during 1999 were yet another leadership change in the Conservative People’s Party, the internal struggle for power in the Progress Party resulting in the return of the founder of the party, Mogens Glistrup, as de facto leader of the party with his old position as campaign leader, the election to the European Parliament and finally the passing of the annual state budget.

Family‐friendly practices in parliaments are central to the recruitment and retention of diverse representatives. Yet, instituting such reforms raises questions about public reactions, something little tested in current work. A conjoint experiment in the United Kingdom tests if the public punish MPs for taking time off their elected roles for a baby. And, importantly, asks who pays the price? Against expectations, MPs who take parental leave are not punished by the public. Voters prefer MPs who are parents, even when they take leave. Crucially, this preference is contingent upon MP sex. Women MPs who take parental leave are consistently the preferred choice over their male counterparts. When the ‘costs’ of parenthood are emphasised, women MPs receive a parenthood benefit, while men MPs do not. The findings align with the recent positive bias for women in electoral choice experiments and lend further support to implementing family‐friendly policies in politics.

Voters in rural and peripheral areas have increasingly turned away from mainstream parties and towards right‐wing populist parties. This paper tests the extent to which political decisions with adverse local effects—such as school and hospital closures—can explain this electoral shift. I theorize that political decisions such as these substantiate a perception of a disconnect between “ordinary” people and the politicians in power in day‐to‐day experiences. Using data on 315 school closures and 30 hospital closures in Denmark from 2005 to 2019 in a generalized difference‐in‐differences design, I find that mayors lose about 1.6 percentage points of the valid votes in areas where they close a school. Furthermore, I find that right‐wing populist parties increase their support in both local and national elections when a local school or hospital is closed. These findings provide insight into the electoral consequences of political decisions with adverse local effects and thus contribute to our understanding of the rise of right‐wing populism.

Have concerns about equal rights and equal chances crowded out economic equality as a priority of left parties? Despite the increased importance of inequality in political science, this contentiously fought debate has been standing on shaky empirical foundations. While voter's equality preferences are well understood, parties’ equality emphases remain uncharted territory. This research note assesses whether the Left has replaced its emphasis on economic equality with a focus on equal chances and equal rights. Based on a new dataset of 300,000 party statements, we use online crowd‐coding to map the equality trajectories of left parties in 12 OECD countries from 1970 to 2020. We examine if trade‐offs between economic and non‐economic aspects of inequality have come to dominate left parties’ equality profiles. Distinguishing social democratic, green and far‐left parties, we refute a meritocratic or ‘woke’ crowding out of redistribution. Yet, Social Democrats have indeed forsaken the once complementary link between economic equality and equal rights in favour of a weak trade‐off.

The huge quantitative literature on postwar social spending almost entirely neglected war as a possible explanatory factor of social spending dynamics. Given the mass carnage and the enormous social needs caused by the Second World War, this is quite astonishing. This article examines for the first time, whether, and in what ways, the Second World War affected cross‐national differences in public social spending of 18 Western welfare states over the course of the Golden Age. Using panel regressions, it is found that the war strongly affected social spending until the late 1960s. The evidence demonstrates that the Second World War is not simply a temporal watershed structuring different phases of welfare state development, but rather a crucial factor for understanding cross‐national differences in welfare efforts and social expenditure dynamics in the postwar period.

Many scholars have investigated the relationship between ideological orientations and mass participation, and there is also a growing number of studies comparing political attitudes and behaviour between electoral winners and losers. This article seeks to bring together these two strands of literature with respect to political participation, focusing on the interaction between citizens’ winner/loser status and ideological distance from their government. Analysis of data from 34 countries highlights the importance of this interactive effect: while previous works suggest that losers have a greater propensity to take part in political activities, it is shown here that this relationship holds true only when losers occupy a position along the left‐right spectrum distant from the government. Furthermore, while the hypothesised interactive effect is empirically confirmed for turnout, the magnitude of its impact is much greater for more costly modes of participation such as contacting, campaigning and protesting

The climate crisis looms but support for fuel taxation is low. How to boost support? The obvious way is to make the connection to the climate crisis explicit. Many observers fear, however, that policy myopia renders this strategy ineffective: As the consequences of the climate crisis are long‐term and insecure, people are loath to pay for costly countermeasures in the short term. We look at policy distraction as a second potential drag. We argue that climate crisis‐induced support for fuel taxation can also be undermined by other salient events which divert attention. To test our argument, we conduct a large‐scale survey experiment with more than 21,000 respondents in 17 European countries. Our results show that a simple climate crisis prime raises support for fuel taxation by 12 percentage points. The effect decreases but remains substantial when stressing the long time horizon of the climate crisis. It almost disappears when other current crises (COVID‐19 and Russian military aggression) are mentioned. Thus, distraction by concurrent events is a serious impediment to mobilising support for fuel taxation.

Bram Peper resigned as Minister of Home Affairs and Relations with the Dutch Antilles on March 13, after he had been accused of illegitimate declaration of expenses in the years 1982–1998, when he was burgomaster (mayor) of Rotterdam. Peper denied the accusations, but felt he had to resign in order to defend himself. His expenses had been investigated by a committee of the Rotterdam city council. The public prosecutor also investigated Peper’s behaviour, but decided in December that there was no reason to prosecute him.

Modern democracies are dependent on regular elections and citizens’ legitimacy beliefs. Studies have shown that repeated electoral defeats are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with democracy and political trust. However, previous studies have only considered one type of legitimacy belief at a time, never in comparison. What is more, all previous work is based on observational studies and has not been able to identify any causal effects of losing repeatedly. Building on previous work and classic theories of political legitimacy beliefs, we argue that repeatedly losing in elections represents a form of long‐term exclusion from democratic power that has additional negative effects on people's legitimacy beliefs because they lose faith in the system and start questioning its evenhandedness. We support our predictions using six‐wave panel data and test our hypothesis a total of 16 times within the same context. The findings show that repeated losers are never less satisfied with democracy but that an additional electoral loss leads to lower levels of political trust. The findings have important implications for the meaning of different indicators of legitimacy beliefs but also for electoral research and the underpinnings of stable democracies.

Accidental escapes of pathogens from laboratories continue to cause outbreaks in the community today, posing significant risks to the general public, animal communities and the environment. These incidents, as well as the uncertainties surrounding the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, highlight the need to consider unnatural origins as part of emerging outbreak surveillance and detection. Identifying recurring patterns and distinctive factors of laboratory-associated disease outbreaks can aid in successfully preventing and mitigating these occurrences. Seventy incidents of laboratory-associated leaks that led to outbreaks in the wider public have been reported (Supplementary Appendix S1). Seven renowned cases that have been comprehensively studied were selected for review: (i) 1955 Polio vaccine incident in western USA, (ii) 1977 H1N1 influenza virus re-emergence in China and the Soviet Union, (iii) 1979 Anthrax release in Sverdlovsk, Soviet Union, (iv) 1995 Venezuelan equine encephalitis epidemics in Venezuela and Colombia, (v) 2003–4 SARS-CoV-1 escapes from Singapore, Taiwan and China, (vi) 2007 Foot-and-Mouth disease virus outbreak in Pirbright, England and (vii) 2019 Brucella leak in Lanzhou, China. These outbreaks were selected because data on their geographical spread, genetics, phylogeny, epidemiological factors (including attack rates, infectious dose, time, location and season of spread) and governmental and institutional responses to the incidents had been previously analysed and published. Thematic analysis of these lines of evidence revealed seven recurring insights described in historically confirmed laboratory-associated outbreaks: unusual strain characteristics, peculiar clinical manifestations or affected demographics, unusual geographical features, atypical epidemiological patterns, delayed government action and communication to the public, misinformation and disinformation spread to the public and biosafety concerns/incidents predating the event. The outbreaks exhibited between 13 and 19 retrospectively identified indicators. These indicators were used to develop preliminary risk criteria intended to support structured, hypothesis-generating assessment of outbreaks, rather than to establish origin.