Voters show ambivalent attitudes towards political parties: They agree that parties are necessary, but they neither like nor trust them. Existing theories fall short of explaining this paradox because they pay little attention to public opinion research. In this paper, we develop a different argument using qualitative methods. We first integrate the literature on political parties and public opinion to sketch the contours of our theory before refining it using rich empirical insights from open-ended survey answers and focus group data. Our resulting model holds that voters evaluate political parties based on the functional and virtuous linkages. They consider parties necessary because they see them as fulfilling democratic functions, but they dislike them because they are seen as behaving in non-virtuous ways when fulfilling their functions. Besides proposing a new analytical model, we also contribute to the literature by methodologically illustrating how to develop data-based theories.

The problem of fair representation is studied in the case of cleavage according to one or two criteria. In the latter case we show that with minimal requirements of equity, a solution exists only if the two criteria are binary. This might explain an observed tendency to political bipolarization.

Aznar’s cabinet suffered many changes during 1999. These are linked with twomain issues: internal changes in the organisation of the Popular Party (PP) and the regional and European elections to be held in June. The first change took place at the beginning of the year, just before the national congress of the PP. Aznar appointed the Minister of Employment and Social Affairs as general secretary of the party, to replace the Vice-President of the Government, Alvarez Cascos, in that party post. The new general secretary elected in the 13th National Congress of the PP left the cabinet. The vacant ministry was given to M. Pimentel, who had been the State Secretary of Employment in the government. At the same time, President Aznar decided to introduce further changes in his cabinet. The Minister of Education was replaced; she had suffered the defeat in the parliament of an important education bill due to the opposition of one of the parties that supported the government, the Catalonian nationalist party (CiU).

How much do citizens support artificial intelligence (AI) in government and politics at different levels of decision‐making authority and to what extent is this AI support associated with citizens’ conceptions of democracy? Using original survey data from Germany, the analysis shows that people are overall sceptical toward using AI in the political realm. The findings suggest that how much citizens endorse democracy as liberal democracy as opposed to several of its disfigurations matters for AI support, but only in high‐level politics. While a stronger commitment to liberal democracy is linked to lower support for AI, the findings contradict the idea that a technocratic notion of democracy lies behind greater acceptance of political AI uses. Acceptance is higher only among those holding reductionist conceptions of democracy which embody the idea that whatever works to accommodate people's views and preferences is fine. Populists, in turn, appear to be against AI in political decision making.

Representation literature is rife with the assumption that politicians are responsive to voter preferences because their re‐election is contingent upon the approval of those voters, approval that can be won by furthering their desires or, similarly, that can be threatened by ignoring their wishes. Hence, scholars argue that the anticipation of electoral accountability by politicians constitutes a crucial guarantor of (policy) responsiveness; as long as politicians believe that voters are aware of what they do and will take it into account on election day, they are expected to work hard at keeping these voters satisfied. If, on the other hand, politicians were to think what they say and do is inconsequential for citizens’ voting behaviour, they may see leeway to ignore their preferences. In this study, we therefore examine whether politicians anticipate electoral accountability in the first place. In particular, we ask 782 Members of Parliament in Belgium, Germany, Canada and Switzerland in a face‐to‐face survey about the anticipation of voter control; whether they believe that voters are aware of their behaviour in parliament and their personal policy positions, are able to evaluate the outcomes of their political work, and, finally, whether this knowledge affects their vote choice. We find that a sizable number of MPs believe that voters are aware of what they do and say and take that into account at the ballot box. Still, this general image of rather strong anticipation of voter control hides considerable variation; politicians in party‐centred systems (in Belgium and some politicians in Germany that are elected on closed party lists), anticipate less voter control compared to politicians in more candidate‐centred systems (Canada and Switzerland). Within these countries, we find that populist politicians are more convinced that voters know about their political actions and take this knowledge into account in elections; it seems that politicians who take pride in being close to voters (and their preferences), also feel more monitored by these voters. Finally, we show that politicians’ views of voter control do not reflect the likelihood that they might be held to account; politicians whose behaviour is more visible and whose policy profile should therefore be better known to voters do not feel the weight of voter control more strongly.

How does the language of male and female politicians differ when they communicate directly with the public on social media? Do citizens address them differently? We apply Lasso logistic regression models to identify the linguistic features that most differentiate the language used by or addressed to male and female Spanish politicians. Male politicians use more words related to politics, sports, ideology and infrastructure, while female politicians talk about gender and social affairs. The choice of emojis varies greatly across genders. In a novel analysis of tweets written by citizens, we find evidence of gender‐specific insults, and note that mentions of physical appearance and infantilising words are disproportionately found in text addressed to female politicians. The results suggest that politicians conform to gender stereotypes online and reveal ways in which citizens treat politicians differently depending on their gender.

The personalization of politics includes electoral reforms that give voters more opportunity to select individual representatives as well as behavioural personalization among voters and politicians. Institutional research suggests that the latter is a function of the former, but it remains unclear whether the association between the two types of personalization is actually causal. In order to get empirical leverage on this question, we analyze local elections in Denmark, which feature within‐district and within‐party variation in the openness of party lists. Using detailed information on the behaviour of politicians and voters, we find that, once we take differences between districts and parties into account, the personalization of electoral rules has a negligible effect on behavioural personalization.

Though many empirical analyses on affective polarization demonstrate that women hold a higher level of affective polarization than men in industrialized democracies, a theoretical explanation for the gender difference is hardly discussed in the literature. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Module 3) and a causal mediation analysis model, we find that women's higher level of affective polarization in Western Europe is substantially and significantly explained by their stronger disapproval of populist radical right‐wing parties as well as their greater concern for issues around gender and the natural environment. On the one hand, the results confirm that the mediation role of issue politics found in the United States is also observed in Western Europe. On the other hand, the results imply that affective polarization in Western Europe is connected with the politics of the populist radical right.

While existing research provides evidence that globalisation sparks citizen demand for the welfare state in wealthy Western democracies, less is known about how globalisation affects public demand for welfare elsewhere. This study explores the link between globalisation and welfare preferences in postcommunist countries by examining workers at multinational corporations (MNCs). These workers have previously been found to have lower levels of job security, even in Western Europe. Additionally, in the postcommunist context, MNC employment also frequently offers better opportunities than other available jobs. This combination of risk and benefit creates higher demand for social insurance (such as unemployment insurance) because MNC workers have both higher job insecurity and higher costs of job loss (if the benefits of MNC employment make it difficult to find an equally good job). Original survey data from Ukraine shows that MNC workers experience greater insecurity and are paid more than other workers. They also express preferences for more expansive welfare programmes, prioritising those related to labour market insurance. This pattern of MNC workers’ experience and preferences is confirmed in cross‐national survey data from 30 peripheral economies, demonstrating that the compensation hypothesis has wider application than previously shown.

Scholars increasingly raise concerns about the alleged detrimental impact of affective polarization on citizens’ democratic attitudes. Yet, prior studies on the relationship between affective polarization and democratic support have yielded mixed results: Whereas some scholars report evidence that affective polarization erodes citizens’ support for democracy, others report null findings. In this research note, we posit that one relevant explanation for these mixed results is that the relationship between affective polarization and democratic support is not linear, but rather negatively curvilinear (i.e., an inverted U‐shape). Though extreme levels of affective polarization may harm citizens’ democratic commitments, a moderate amount of affective polarization can strengthen democratic support by heightening the political stakes and stimulating democratic involvement. Employing generalized additive modelling on data from the CNEP collected in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we show strong and robust support for this negatively curvilinear pattern. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the dynamics between affective polarization and democratic support, as well as for the recommended estimation strategies of future studies that aim to explore this relationship.

For the coalition government of the Independence Party and the Progressive Party the year 2000 was relatively plain sailing most of the time. Co-operation between the two parties has lasted since 1995 and it still bears the aura of stability and tranquillity. There are minor signs of coalition fatigue, especially in the Progressive Party, which tends to be overshadowed by its larger coalition partner. But the weakness of the opposition and the lack of obvious governmental alternatives make the position of the government fairly secure.

Little is known about the careers of parliamentarians after they leave parliament. We analyse the post‐parliamentary careers of German and Dutch parliamentarians over the last 20 years and document the presence of a persistent and substantial gender gap. This gap exists regardless of party, country or political position and persists even when the status of the pre‐parliamentary profession and achievement within parliament are controlled for. Aside from demonstrating our findings, we offer new insights into possible explanations for the dynamics behind them. Additionally, we show that parliament only serves as a stepping stone for a more successful career for a relatively small share of politicians: only 32 per cent of MPs obtain more attractive positions in the public or private sector after their legislative service.

The goal of this article is to understand which combinations of explanatory conditions account for the qualitative differences within forms of democratic breakdown (i.e., transition from democracy to a hybrid or authoritarian regime) and democratic regression (i.e., transition within democracy through a loss of democratic quality). The analysis focuses particularly on the specific features of those processes of change ending up with a transition from democratic rule, compared to those producing a simple loss of democratic quality within the democratic regime. Applying two‐step fuzzy‐set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), the study aims to integrate different types of explanatory factors, offering a fresh and comprehensive perspective on this phenomenon.

How does international migration impact the composition of the demos? Constitutional doctrines and democratic theories suggest contrasting responses: an insular one excludes both non‐citizen immigrants and citizen‐emigrants; a deterritorialised one includes all citizens wherever they reside; a postnational one includes all residents and only these. This article argues that none of these predicted responses represents the dominant pattern of democratic adaptation, which is instead a level‐specific expansion of the national franchise to include non‐resident citizens and of the local franchise to include non‐citizen residents. This is demonstrated by analysing an original dataset on voting rights in 31 European and 22 American countries, and outlining a level‐sensitive normative theory of citizenship that provides support for this pattern as well as a critical benchmark for current franchise policies. The findings can be summarised in two inductive generalisations: (1) Voting rights today no longer depend on residence at the national level and on citizenship of the respective state at the local level; (2) Voting rights do, however, generally depend on citizenship of the respective state at the national level and on residence at the local level. In the article, these are called the patterns of franchise ‘expansion’ and ‘containment’. The former supports the idea of widespread level‐specific expansion of the franchise and refutes the insular view of the demos. The latter signals corresponding level‐specific restrictions, which defeats over‐generalised versions of deterritorialised or postnational conceptions of the demos. In order to test how robust this finding is, cases are analysed where the dominant patterns of expansion have been resisted and where unexpected expansion has occurred. With regard to the former, the article identifies constitutional and political obstacles to voting rights expansion in particular countries. With regard to the latter, the article shows that even where national voting rights have been extended to non‐citizen residents, containment remains strong through indirect links to citizenship.