When reporting on election results, the media declare parties as election ‘winners’ or ‘losers’, which has important consequences for voter perceptions and government formation. This article investigates news coverage of parties’ electoral performance in proportional representation systems, in which election results are often less clear‐cut compared to majoritarian systems. It tests the extent to which news coverage of parties’ electoral performance is based on objective measures or on party ideology. Its focus on the aftermath of the 2019 European Parliament election allows holding the electoral context constant across the 16 countries under study. Results from a Heckman selection model show that alongside a party's status as plurality winner and changes in electoral support, parties with radical socio‐cultural policy positions are both more likely to be covered and declared election winners in the news. These results have important implications for citizens’ attitudes and perceived party legitimacy in democratic societies.

Recent studies of welfare state attitudes in the knowledge economy find very high generalized support for generous welfare state policies, both among the working and the middle classes. Has class become irrelevant as a predictor of social policy preferences? Or do we simply mis‐conceptualise today's class conflict over social policy? To what extent has it changed from a divide over the level of social policy generosity to a divide over the kind of social policy and – more specifically – over the relative importance that should be given to different social policies? Answering these questions is not only relevant to understand welfare politics in the twenty‐first century, but electoral politics as well: only when we understand what working‐ and middle‐class voters care about, can we evaluate the role distributive policies play in electoral processes. We use original survey data from eight West European countries to show that middle‐ and working‐class respondents indeed differ in the relative importance they attribute to social investment and social consumption policies. Middle‐class respondents consistently attribute higher absolute and relative importance to social investment. We also show that this emphasis on investive policies relates to the middle class expecting better future economic and social opportunities than the working class. This divide in anticipated opportunities underlies a new kind of working‐ versus middle‐class divide, which contributes to transforming the class divide from a conflict over the level of social policy to a conflict over the priorities of social policy.

In many political systems, legislators serve multiple principals who compete for their loyalty in legislative votes. This article explores the political conditions under which legislators choose between their competing principals in multilevel systems, with a focus on how election proximity shapes legislative behaviour across democratic arenas. Empirically, the effect of electoral cycles on national party delegations’ ‘collective disloyalty’ with their political groups in the European Parliament (EP) is analysed. It is argued that election proximity changes the time horizons, political incentives and risk perceptions of both delegations and their principals, ‘punctuating’ cost‐benefit calculations around defection as well as around controlling, sanctioning and accommodating. Under the shadow of elections, national delegations’ collective disloyalty with their transnational groups should, therefore, increase. Using a new dataset with roll‐call votes cast under legislative codecision by delegations between July 1999 and July 2014, the article shows that the proximity of planned national and European elections drives up disloyalty in the EP, particularly by delegations from member states with party‐centred electoral rules. The results also support a ‘politicisation’ effect: overall, delegations become more loyal over time, but the impact of election proximity as a driver of disloyalty is strongest in the latest parliament analysed (i.e., 2009–2014). Furthermore, disloyalty is more likely in votes on contested and salient legislation, and under conditions of Euroscepticism; by contrast, disloyalty is less likely in votes on codification files, when a delegation holds the rapporteurship and when the national party participates in government. The analysis sheds new light on electoral politics as a determinant of legislative choice under competing principals, and on the conditions under which politics ‘travels’ across democratic arenas in the European Union's multilevel polity.

The characteristics of participatory institutions can be articulated in three main dimensions: input, process and output. The common assumption is that a dependency relationship exists, with process serving as a mediator between input and output. This paper puts the model to a rare empirical test drawing on a unique dataset of 70 Spanish advisory councils. Through a combination of exploratory factor and path analyses, we analyse the dimensionality of input, process and output and investigate the direct and indirect impact of inputs on process and outputs. Our analysis provides evidence that input factors have a direct impact on the output factor transparency, but their impact on effects on policy and participant satisfaction is mediated by the process factor deliberation. Further, the capacity of the public administration to steer the advisory council (wardship) mediates negatively the impact of input variables on transparency. The analysis provides a nuanced account of how different input and process design characteristics of participatory institutions have profound direct and indirect effects on their outputs.

For decades, political scientists have hotly debated longitudinal trends in political trust rates. An important undercurrent in the debate is that any decline in political trust might signal a legitimacy crisis. Yet, descriptive figures are unable to distinguish between two interpretations of these downward trends: (i) declines that can reasonably be expected as a reflection of declining political trustworthiness (i.e., procedural or output performance) and thereby reflect critical citizens who monitor their democratic institutions; and (ii) downward trends that are not warranted by democratic performance and thereby suggest a more fundamental disconnect between citizens and their democratic institutions.

This research note argues that residuals to multilevel models of political trust allow us to distinguish between these two types, and thereby provide a better understanding of trends in political trust. These residuals do not only reveal short‐term aberrations to the explanatory model (often reflecting short‐lived, country‐specific events), but also the extent to which a country's trust rate systematically underperforms in the middle‐ to long‐term. To the extent that declining trust rates are lower than explanatory models predict, the residuals express excessive distrust. To the extent that declining trust rates are in line with the explanatory models, the residuals reflect critical, monitoring citizenship.

We outline the approach of residual analyses as a tool to better understand trends in political trust. We illustrate the use of these residual analyses on a cross‐national, longitudinal data set (the Eurobarometer), covering 15 Western and Southern European countries between 1999 and 2019. While political trust rates fluctuate in all these countries, we only find evidence for a structural decline in two of these countries. In France and Spain political trust failed to recover in line with improving economic and institutional performance after the Great Recession. We then test the versatility of the tool to different conditions, including retests on an alternative set of countries (11 Central and Eastern European countries between 2004 and 2019) and an alternative dataset with different measures and time points (the European Social Survey).

Finally, we elaborate on the two main conditions under which residual analyses offer a useful tool to the trend debate in political trust research: (1) a firm understanding of the object‐driven determinants of political trust, and (2) a detailed coverage of country‐wave combinations to separate structural trends from short‐term fluctuations.

Does gender affect candidate selection and list placement under proportional representation (PR)? Existing research argues that PR systems have a positive effect on women's representation due to a more inclusive candidate selection process. However, analysing the actual process of candidate selection under PR before observing the final party list is challenging, and little is known about the preferences and strategies of party elites when selecting and ranking candidates. To address this lacuna, we conduct a novel two‐stage conjoint experiment with party elites in Austria, which allows us to differentiate between two distinct mechanisms in candidate nomination under PR: selection and ranking. Our findings indicate that women generally have an advantage with respect to selection but find themselves subject to same‐sex preferences when it comes to ranking on the list, for which they otherwise benefit from being low in supply. These findings have important implications for understanding patterns of female under‐representation in PR systems.

It was another eventful year in Polish politics: the ruling coalition collapsed (yet the PrimeMinister retained his office), the old President was reelected for another term, and new waves of popular unrest brought some old unresolved problems to the public’s attention.

Democracy is the most ambitious political project of the twentieth century, and the study of democracy has been one of the major preoccupations of modern political scientists. Stein Rokkan’s main concern was with the development of democratic mass politics in Europe. On this score, he found many lessons in the Norwegian experience. To Rokkan and to many other political scientists, a critical aspect of democracy was representation, the people’s ability freely to select representatives from their own ranks who would faithfully stand up for their interests. Before the advent of mass democracy, during the stage Robert Dahl(l97 1) calls competitive oligarchy, parliaments did not always represent all the people. Granting all adult citizens the freedom and authority to select these representatives was a precondition for the more inclusive democracy we now often take for granted. And when well-defined groups with distinctive interests suddenly became enfranchised, as did millions of European men and women during the first half of this century, the election of representatives who shared their most salient characteristics was a dramatic advance.

The COVID‐19 pandemic led to widespread fear among the population. Early studies suggested that this resulted in exclusionary attitudes and increased support for discriminatory policy measures. We still lack an understanding of the longer‐term, potentially erosive consequences that COVID‐19‐specific anxieties may carry for citizens' commitment to liberal democratic norms. In this research note, we present evidence from an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals' cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID‐19. We implemented this experiment in Hungary and Romania – two cases where illiberal attitudes are most likely to amplify under conditions of fear – a year and a half after the outbreak of the pandemic. The results show that our intervention is successful in elevating respondents' levels of worry, anxiety and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID‐19. However, these emotions do not carry secondary effects on individuals' levels of right‐wing authoritarianism, nationalism or outgroup hostility, nor do they affect preferences for specific discriminatory policy measures aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID‐19. We discuss these findings in light of the literature on the demand‐side determinants of democratic backsliding and the consequences of emotions on political behaviour.

The article examines the European Commission's use of its legal powers over mergers. It discusses and tests two views. One is that the ‘neoliberal’ Commission has ended previous industrial policies of aiding ‘national champion’ firms to grow through mergers and instead pursues a ‘merger‐constraining’ policy of vigorously using its legal powers to block mergers. The other is that the Commission follows an ‘integrationist policy’ of seeking the development of larger European firms to deepen economic integration. It examines Commission decisions under the 1989 EC Merger Regulation between 1990 and 2009. It selects three major sectors that are ‘likely’ for the ‘merger‐constraining’ view – banking, energy and telecommunications – and analyses a dataset of almost 600 Commission decisions and then individual merger cases. It finds that the Commission has approved almost all mergers, including by former ‘national champion’ firms. There have been only two prohibitions over 20 years in the three sectors and the outcome has been the creation of larger European firms through mergers. It explains how the Commission can pursue an integrationist policy through the application of competition processes and criteria. The wider implication is that the Commission can combine competition policy with achieving the ‘industrial policy’ aim of aiding the development of larger European firms.

Extensive media coverage of immigration, that is, media salience, has been thought to heighten anti-immigrant attitudes among native-born citizens by creating an information environment that portrays immigration as society's greatest problem. However, past empirical findings on the relationship between media salience and anti-immigrant attitudes have been mixed. Some studies have observed that media salience increases hostility towards immigrants, while others have found it has no significant influence. This study investigates the underlying reasons for these inconsistent findings and demonstrates the need to revisit the meaning of issue importance. It employs the concept of public issue salience, the perception that immigration is the most important problem or concern about immigration, to find evidence. It argues that when the immigrant issue is a pivotal point of political competition, the immigration issue signals conflicts, connoting negativity so public issue salience and anti-immigrant attitudes are closely related. On the other hand, in an environment where political elites reach a consensus, the immigration issue remains neutral so that they can be disentangled. The scope of media salience changes accordingly as well. This study chooses the United Kingdom and Germany for comparative research due to their similarities in immigration histories and the success of far-right parties as well as differences in their major political parties' reactions to the issue. I match individual-level longitudinal survey data to media article data and find clear country differences. In the United Kingdom, where political parties are polarized over the issue, public issue salience and anti-immigrant attitudes are closely related so that media salience heightens them. In Germany, where political elites across different ideologies hold welcoming stances, their relationship is moderate. Media salience merely increases the perceived importance and does not increase anti-immigrant attitudes. Contributions and implications are discussed with respect to political elites' role.

Zinc and manganese are essential nutrients for fetal growth and development. Since deficiency of maternal nutrition may lead to preventable adverse pregnancy outcomes, we aimed to examine the association of maternal dietary zinc and manganese levels with low birth weight (LBW). A nested case-control study was conducted in 605 cases and 7497 controls in Lanzhou, China. Eligible participants reported on their diet and characteristics during pregnancy. The relationship between dietary zinc and manganese intake and the risk of LBW was analyzed by unconditioned logistic regression and multivariate adjusted restricted cubic spline (RCS) model. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve was used to determine the optimal cut-off values of zinc and manganese. The dietary intake below the cut-off value was defined as the low level group, and greater than or equal to the cut-off value was defined as the high level group. Low dietary zinc (< 5.05 mg/d before pregnancy and < 7.36 mg/d during pregnancy) and manganese (< 2.66 mg/d before pregnancy and < 3.41 mg/d during pregnancy) intake was associated with increased risk of LBW and some subtypes. Both zinc and manganese have a nonlinear relationship with the risk of LBW (P<0.001). In addition, there was a synergistic effect of low zinc and low manganese intake on LBW risk. There were separate and interaction effects of zinc and manganese on the occurrence of LBW. Appropriate range of zinc and manganese intake may be beneficial to reduce the risk of LBW.

Research suggests that the rightist discourse on immigration appeals to left‐leaning citizens with lower levels of education. The opposite is, however, not true for right‐wing voters with lower educational levels, and this asymmetry leaves left‐wing parties at a disadvantage compared with the right on immigration and integration issues. Deliberative theory promises that discussion, information and reflection can promote a more balanced political discussion and a more enlightened citizen. This article assesses the extent to which deliberative polling increases the ideological awareness of citizens with lower educational levels. More specifically, it gauges the extent to which especially less well educated left‐wing voters – those whose attitudes research finds to be particularly out of tune with their ideological predispositions regarding immigration and integration – adjust their attitudes as a consequence of deliberate exposure to informational input and the presentation of two‐sided arguments. Use is made of unique data generated during the first European‐wide deliberative polling project, ‘EuroPolis’, held in 2009. The results indicate that less well educated left‐wing voters indeed have slightly more negative attitudes towards immigrants than leftist voters with secondary or post‐secondary educational levels. Turning to the micro‐mechanisms of attitude change in a deliberative setting, the analyses show that both levels of education and ideological predispositions play a role in the extent to which participants of the deliberative poll adjust their attitudes. In three out of four models, evidence is found that less well educated left‐leaning citizens are indeed most likely to adjust their attitudes on immigration and integration after being presented with a more balanced discussion of the topic.

The strong presence of large countries in World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement and the absence of very poor ones have raised concerns that increasing legalisation in the global trading system has not diminished discrimination against less powerful countries as much as expected. This article examines dispute initiations in all WTO member state dyads in 1995–2003 to shed more light on this issue. The analysis suggests that the main driver of dispute initiation is a gravitational one: larger economies and bigger traders are more likely to become involved in trade disputes primarily because their economies are more diversified, and also because greater market size makes them more attractive targets of litigation. While evidence is not found for discriminatory effects against countries with small legal capacity, the results of the article point to a more complex form of power bias – namely a preponderance effect. They suggest that disputes among country dyads including a much more powerful defendant than complainant or vice versa are dealt with outside the WTO. This finding is potentially worrying because it is, arguably, easier to reduce legal capacity differences than to reduce power differences.