The phenomenon of populism and its relationship with modern democracy has gained considerable attention in recent years. This article aims at advancing our understanding of how populism affects different models of democracy and tests the proposed arguments empirically. Building on a large scholarly literature on populism and democracy, we take stock of existing arguments and theorize which democratic models may be affected by populism in a positive or negative way. Moreover, we move beyond the normative debate and analyse the effect of populism in power on different models of democracy empirically. We do so by merging data on populist governments in Europe and Latin America from 1995 until today with the Varieties of Democracy dataset, which enables us to capture the relationship between populism and different democratic models in these regions. Despite mixed‐theoretical expectations, our results suggest a rather negative impact of populism on the electoral, liberal and deliberative models of democracy.

When do politicians debate each other in parliament, and when do they prefer to avoid discourse? While existing research has shown MPs to unilaterally leverage the dialogical nature of legislative debates to their advantage, the circumstances facilitating actual discursive interaction have so far received less attention. We introduce a new framework to study the emergence of discourse in political debates. Applying this framework, we expect ideological differences and government–opposition dynamics to shape politicians' choices about seeking or avoiding discourse. To test these hypotheses, we draw on an original dataset of all 14,595 attempted and successful interventions (Zwischenfragen) – extraordinary, voluntary discursive exchanges between speakers and MPs in the audience – in the German Bundestag (1990–2020), extracted using an annotation pipeline developed specifically for this study. We find that MPs separated by diverging preferences seek discourse with one another more often than their ideologically aligned counterparts. At the same time, these exact attempts do less frequently result in discursive interactions. When considering government–opposition dynamics in this process, we observe very similar patterns: Attempts to initiate discourse are particularly common among opposition MPs facing government speakers, and we find tentative evidence suggesting that government actors are most likely to avoid these invitations to discursive interaction. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of elite behaviour in public environments.

A serious challenge facing Western democracies is the falling propensity of successive cohorts of citizens to vote. Over the last 50 years, newly eligible voters – particularly from poorer backgrounds – have become less likely to vote in their first elections, and more likely to develop habits of non‐voting. This trend has prompted greater interest in policies with the potential to increase first‐time voter turnout, such as lowering the voting age or compulsory political education. Despite a growing academic interest in volunteering as a means of youth political expression or route to civic revival, however, the promotion of youth volunteering has not been seriously considered as a potential tool to help address generational turnout decline.

An extensive literature argues that volunteering can increase first‐time voter turnout, but it is hindered by the limited use of panel data and failure to account for confounding and selection effects. It has not, moreover, considered the potential for the effects of childhood volunteering to be conditional on prior political socialisation, particularly the influence of parents, which is necessary to assess its potential to reduce turnout gaps reflecting socio‐economic status. This study uses the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study and structural equation modelling to overcome these limitations and examine the impact of childhood volunteering on the turnout of newly eligible voters. It shows that for most young volunteers there is no significant benefit, but for the children of politically disengaged parents, volunteering does have a significant, positive effect.

This article analyses the institutional and contextual factors that facilitate the election of political newcomers as heads of government in democratic regimes. Using data from 870 democratic elections between 1945 and 2015, it is found that political newcomers are more likely to be successful in presidential systems, in new democracies and when party systems are weakly institutionalised. The election of politically inexperienced candidates is also related to governmental performance. Political newcomers are more successful when the economic performance of the government is bad and when the government engages in high‐level corruption.

A growing body of research theorizes that partisanship can undermine democracy as citizens prioritize their political interests over abstract norms and values. We argue that crises might counteract intense partisanship by giving citizens clarity on the threats posed by rule of law violations. Examining the differential application of a law – a breach of democratic norms – we draw on an experiment embedded in representative surveys of Germany, the United States, Hungary and Poland to examine citizens’ sense of appropriate punishment for elites’ violation of a municipal mask‐wearing ordinance. We find evidence of partisan bias in citizens’ willingness to support punishment in all four countries. But, in the two consolidated democracies, we find that concern about the Covid‐19 crisis diminishes partisan biases in punishment preferences: citizens who are most concerned about the crisis also model the most consistency in their willingness to hold copartisans into account.

The theoretical perspective behind détente is elaborated. While avoidance of war is the major goal, cooperation, tension-reduction and improvement of domestic societies are the major means. Cooperation includes trade, legal commitments, functional cooperation within IGOs and routine diplomacy. Tension reduction includes less verbal conflict, less defense expenditures, a slower arms race and possibly multipolarization. Improvement of domestic socieities refers to stability, egalitarianism and democracy within nations. All those détente-related propositions about means-ends-relationships are scrutinized from a quantitative international politics perspective. In general, propositions receive little or no support. A tentative explanation why is suggested by reference to an alternative theoretical framework. It is argued that détente neither affects the security dilemma nor territorial problems nor ideological dissens enough to overcome still irreconcilable conflicts of interest. As long as there are such conflicts of interest, meaningful victory has to be ruled out by deterrence in order to avoid war. While deterrence may help us to survive in the short run, it guarantees doom in the long run. So, there is some true insight behind the drive for détente. Nevertheless détente may prove counterproductive, because it might promote multipolarization and finally nuclear proliferation. While we badly need something better and safer than deterrence, détente doesn't seem to be the solution to our problems of survival.

What happens to the proposals generated by participatory processes? One of the key aspects of participatory processes that has been the subject of rare systematic analysis and comparison is the fate of their outputs: their policy proposals. Which specific factors explain whether these proposals are accepted, rejected or transformed by public authorities? In this article contextual and proposal‐related factors are identified that are likely to affect the prospect of proposals being implemented. The explanatory power of these factors are tested through multilevel analysis on a diverse set of 571 policy proposals. The findings offer evidence that both contextual and proposal‐related variables are important. The design of participatory processes affects the degree of implementation, with participatory budgeting and higher quality processes being particularly effective. Most significant for explaining outcomes are proposal‐level, economic and political factors: a proposal's cost, the extent to which it challenges existing policy and the degree of support it has within the municipality all strongly affect the chance of implementation.

The Internet is playing an increasingly important role in shaping citizens’ political experience. We turn to it to consume political news and, in some countries, to even cast our ballots at parliamentary elections. Leading the way in embracing Internet voting (i‐voting) is Estonia where nearly half of the ballots cast during the 2019 parliamentary election were submitted online. Using original data from the 2019 Estonian Candidate Study, this paper explores the relationship between how candidates campaign and their electoral performance. It finds greater use of both offline and online campaign tools to contribute to higher vote shares as candidates win more traditional and i‐votes. These positive effects are similar in size, in terms of candidates’ overall electoral performance as well as their ability to attract different types of votes. The results show not only that individual‐level campaigns continue to matter, but that online campaigns have become as important as offline campaigns for candidates, and voters’ political activity often transcends the medium through which they receive political communication.

Past research has often attributed electoral backlash to structural economic change to a lack of compensation and interest group representation for affected groups. Is that backlash then mitigated in contexts where both of these conditions are fulfilled? I argue that perceived economic deprivation fuelling political disengagement as well as disappointment with the issue‐owning party are important factors contributing to such a backlash. Using the case of Germany, I empirically analyse the electoral repercussions of a coal phase‐out in the presence of compensation for affected groups as well as active involvement of labour and business interests in political decision‐making. By employing a series of staggered difference‐in‐differences models, I investigate whether the closures of coal plants and mines between 2007 and 2022 affected voting behaviour at the municipal level. I find that these closures resulted in an asymmetric backlash in the form of lower vote shares for the issue owner, the Social Democratic Party and higher abstention rates in affected municipalities. With the significant politicisation around fossil fuel‐based energy generation, these findings have important implications for the remaining coal phase‐outs worldwide.

Previous scholarship suggests that rising inequality in democracies suppresses trust in institutions. However, the mechanism behind this has not clearly been identified. This paper investigates the proposition that income inequality leads to increased democratic distrust by depressing perceptions of external efficacy. Based on time‐series cross‐sectional survey data from the European Social Survey, we find that changes in income inequality have a negative effect on changes in political trust and external efficacy. Causal mediation analysis confirms that inequality affects trust through lower efficacy. Further analyses show that this efficacy‐based mechanism does not depend on political orientation. As a direct effect remains among left‐wing respondents, our empirical results indicate that inequality affects trust via both a mechanism of substantive output evaluation and a process‐based evaluation that measures of external efficacy can capture. These findings highlight the empirical and theoretical relevance of this so far neglected mechanism and provide a potential solution for the puzzle that inequality depresses trust also among those for whom inequality is not politically salient.

Various analytic and simulation models designed to integrate the political and economic sectors are surveyed, stressing the interacting links going from the economy to the polity through the popularity function and in the reverse direction through the government's reaction function. Partial politico-economic models concentrate on a particular trade-off between goals, in particular between inflation and unemployment. The models of total politico-economic interdependence study the interrelationship of the economy as a whole with the polity. They are studied theoretically and by simulation techniques. Ongoing research by the authors indicates that such models can be applied empirically; as an example an already existing econometric model of the German economy is extended by an endogenous government sector.

Individual legislators can be important agents of political representation. However, this is contingent upon their responsiveness to constituency requests. To study this topic, an increasing number of studies use field experiments in which the researcher sends a standardized email to legislators on behalf of a constituent. In this paper, we report the results of an original field experiment of this genre with the members of the German Bundestag. Supplementing previous research, we explore whether constituency requests in which voters mention a personal vote intention (rather than a partisan vote intention) increase legislators’ responsiveness, and how this treatment relates to electoral system's incentives. We find that legislators treated with a personal vote intention were more likely to respond (67 per cent) and respond faster than those treated with a partisan vote intention (59 per cent). However, we also show that the treatment effect is moderated by electoral system incentives: it is larger for nominally‐elected legislators than for those elected via a party list. Our results suggest that electoral system's incentives matter for legislators’ responsiveness only when constituents explicitly signals an intention to cast a personal vote.

A content analysis of the 1965 platforms of all Belgian political parties provides a determination of the policy objectives for the next legislature so that a survey can be made of the completely, partially, and nonrealized objectives at the end of a two-legislature (1965–1968 and 1968–1971) period according to government and opposition parties, according to party strength – which was in this period congruent with the duration of participation in the government – and according to the distinction made between the parties qualifying for government and the non-elitist opposition parties. The degree of realization is established for the total number of platform planks, for the number of specific items per party, and according to the degree of importance and social repercussion of the distinct planks that could be realized. Although respectively in office for six, four, and two years, the CVP/PSC, the BSP–PSB and the PVV/PLP realized approximately the same number of planks. The nonelitist opposition party Volksunie realized a smaller but still considerable number of objectives. So did, but to a lesser extent, the other structural or antisystem opposition parties, RW, FDF and KPB–PCB. The interpretation of these results may lie in the loss of distinctiveness in the government–opposition model in a multi-party system, the elitist consensus in Belgium which is shared by the three main parties, the function of the pressure party strategy and the conducting of opposition in dynamic terms of action.