The first decade after the end of revolutionary events in Gilan (1920–21) was a period of active attempts by the Bolsheviks, Communist International, and Communist Party of Iran to gain a solid social foothold in Iran. This article, based mainly on Russian archival sources, focuses on the dynamics of the Communist International and Communist Party of Iran guidelines, attempts and features of their implementation, and the relationship between Iranian communists and the Bolshevik and Communist International leadership. This study demonstrates that the main Red efforts between 1922–25 aimed at building an inter-class coalition, in which cooperation with Reza Khan became only a part of these broader efforts. Their failure led the Reds to return to a previously tested course of fomenting agrarian revolution in Iran and repeated fiascos. Throughout this period, the Communist Party of Iran’s leadership did not simply execute directives but instead took an active role in the decision-making process, involved the Bolsheviks in internal party struggle, and challenged high-ranking functionaries of the Communist International.

Since Aristotle, the aim of cosmopolitans has been to develop a science of politics based on concepts, theories and empirical generalisations which travel beyond the national boundaries of any particular political system. Indeed, it can be argued that this is the sine qua non of any mature science. Developments which should lead towards a more cosmopolitan political science include the growth of regional and international organisations, the professionalisation of the discipline, and technological developments which expedite global communications. The international exchange of data, scholars and publications should facilitate the ability of political scientists from different countries to share a body of knowledge, methodological approaches, and intellectual concerns.

Income and political attitudes are powerfully correlated in cross-sectional data, yet research based on panel data finds at most a weak correlation. In this paper, we examine this puzzling pattern by exploring the long-term evolution of attitudes over the life cycle. We evaluate the predictions of five different explanations on the relationship between attitudes and income experiences. These explanations focus on, respectively: socialization, anticipation, myopic self-interest, learning and status maximization. We employ accelerated longitudinal design models using data on core political values that span up to sixteen years from the British Household Panel Survey. Our findings reconcile the mixed evidence in the literature: the correlation between income and political attitudes, strong in cross-sectional studies but weak in short panel studies, emerges because attitudes crystallize – slowly but systematically – as income evolves over the life cycle. This pattern is most consistent with the learning explanation.

This paper examines subject expression in heritage Vietnamese, focusing on its variation in a diasporic, cross-generational context, using corpus data from 45 speakers in Canberra, Australia. While subject expression has been widely studied in other languages, little is known about its use in languages like Vietnamese, which has an “open-class” pronominal system. Results show that although the rates of unexpressed subjects remain stable, the linguistic conditions underlying this variable have undergone change: first-generation speakers are least likely to drop second-person subjects, while second-generation speakers are least likely to drop first-person subjects. Both patterns contradict expectations given the pragmatic constraints of pro-drop in Vietnamese. We further interpret this as potentially a form of community bricolage to re-establish a more equal cross-generational relationship in a diaspora setting. Ultimately, we present a case of pragmatic change driving grammatical choices, thereby also highlighting that contrary to the traditional description, Vietnamese subject expression is perhaps not so “radical” after all.

The revival of Confucianism in China reflects an effort to infuse soft power with moral authority and signals an attempt to turn ethical credibility into political legitimacy amid strategic ambition. This study examines the reception of China’s Confucian moral diplomacy in Southeast Asia, a region shaped by diverse ethical and religious traditions. Drawing on data from the sixth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, the analysis explores how Confucian social ethics and political values affect perceptions of China’s influence at domestic, regional, and global levels, and how these relationships vary with democracy, economic ties, and territorial disputes. The results show that moral integrity, not cultural familiarity, sustains acceptance. Social ethics foster approval only when China’s actions demonstrate reciprocity and sincerity, whereas political Confucianism, rooted in hierarchy and competence, gains traction under conditions of stability and cooperation. Across contexts, Confucianism functions less as a cultural export than as a moral framework guiding how publics interpret conduct. The findings reveal a broader transformation in international politics, suggesting power now depends more on the integrity of behaviour than on the allure of culture.

The campaign for the European elections began very early. The reason was not a particular interest in Europe, its monetary unification symbolised by the Euro or any prospect about the future of the European Union. The European Parliament was not at stake. In fact, the importance of the election held in June 1999 came from its place in the French electoral calendar. Coming after the 1995 presidential election, the 1997 general elections and the 1998 local elections, the European election was not only a new test of the balance of political forces (plural left/moderate right and extreme right), but a new challenge for the right wing camp as well.

The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections produced a record proportion of women MEPs overall (37 per cent). Yet, these results vary widely across countries and parties. This article aims to explain these variations, evaluating not only who the elected representatives of the 8th EP are, but also how they got there. Are the paths to the EP the same for women and men? Are there gender differences in terms of MEPs’ political experience? A unique dataset listing more than 700 elected MEPs and their background, party and country characteristics is used to empirically examine who makes it to the EP and through which route. The results of the analysis suggest no significant gender differences in the pathways to the EP. Yet, parties matter: more women were elected to the 8th EP from left‐wing than from right‐wing or ‘new’ parties, and both men and (especially) women representing right‐wing parties tend to be politically more experienced than their fellow MEPs from other types of parties. Furthermore, it is found that men are more likely than women to be promoted straight from party office to the EP, suggesting that some pathways to the EP are less open to women than others.

For decades, scholars have argued that low and declining political trust affect citizens’ support for democratic and undemocratic reform. While some theorized that low political trust induces alienation and support for non‐democratic decision making, others argued that it pushes critical citizens to support reforms aimed to reinvigorate democracy. Yet, empirical tests of these expectations remained sparse and inconclusive. This paper employs panel data from the Netherlands (covering 3 waves in 3 years) to test these diverging theories simultaneously. We employ the random effects within‐between (REWB) model to differentiate between the effects of structurally low and declining political trust. Our results suggest that low and declining trust both diminish support for representative democracy, enhance support for direct democratic decision making and do not affect support for authoritarianism. These findings cast doubt on the understanding of political distrust as a determinant of political alienation. Rather, they support theories of critical citizenship and stealth democracy.

Across established democracies, citizens express high levels of support for decision making via referendums. What drives these preferences remains yet unclear. In this article it is argued that, first, process preferences are less stable than previously assumed but vary substantially across policy proposals. Second, it is suggested that instrumental considerations play an important role in shaping citizens’ preferences for referendums. Specifically, citizens who favour the policy proposal or believe that they hold a majority opinion are expected to express more support for the use of referendums. An original survey was designed and conducted in the Netherlands (N = 1,289) that contains both between and within respondent variation across a range of policy proposals. The findings support these arguments: Both the desire for a specific policy change and the perception of being in the majority with one's policy preference relate to support for the use of referendums across policy proposals, levels of governance, and between and within respondents. This study contributes to a better understanding of process preferences by showing that these preferences have a non‐stable component and that instrumental considerations play an important role in citizens’ support for referendums.

Despite the voluminous literature on the ‘normalisation of protest’, the protest arena is seen as a bastion of left‐wing mobilisation. While citizens on the left readily turn to the streets, citizens on the right only settle for it as a ‘second best option’. However, most studies are based on aggregated cross‐national comparisons or only include Northwestern Europe. We contend the aggregate‐level perspective hides different dynamics of protest across Europe. Based on individual‐level data from the European Social Survey (2002–2016), we investigate the relationship between ideology and protest as a key component of the normalisation of protest. Using hierarchical logistic regression models, we show that while protest is becoming more common, citizens with different ideological views are not equal in their protest participation across the three European regions. Instead of a general left predominance, we find that in Eastern European countries, right‐wing citizens are more likely to protest than those on the left. In Northwestern and Southern European countries, we find the reverse relationship, left‐wing citizens are more likely to protest than their right‐wing counterparts. Lessons drawn from the protest experience in Northwestern Europe characterised by historical mobilisation by the New Left are of limited use for explaining the ideological composition of protest in the Southern and Eastern European countries. We identify historical and contemporary regime access as the mechanism underlying regional patterns: citizens with ideological views that were historically in opposition are more likely to protest. In terms of contemporary regime access, we find that partisanship enhances the effect of ideology, while ideological distance from the government has a different effect in the three regions. As protest gains in importance as a form of participation, the paper contributes to our understanding of regional divergence in the extent to which citizens with varying ideological views use this tool.

Partisan preferences usually stand out as the major driving force behind voters' expectations about election outcomes. Apart from partisan preferences, however, purely individual‐level factors appear to be only weakly associated with forecasting ability. Some studies argue that we need to move from the strictly personal sphere to the interpersonal one to better understand the underpinnings of individuals' forecasting ability. This paper leverages data from 77 elections at the district, municipal, regional, and/or national levels in 10 different countries to assess the impact of social networks and social interactions on the accuracy of citizens' electoral expectations. The results cast doubt on the capacity of social interactions to influence citizens' forecasting skills.

The assignment of ministerial portfolios to parties is one of the most contested and consequential processes in coalition politics. Accordingly, a great deal of scholarship has investigated how many portfolios different parties obtain in coalition negotiations as well as which parties are assigned which portfolios. However, to our knowledge, no one has ever examined how voters perceive the outcomes of this process – perceptions which must be fundamental to any assessment of policy responsibility in systems with coalition government. This article uses original survey data from four Western European countries to examine voter perceptions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios across parties. In addition to describing the extent to which voters know this distribution, the article also examines whether their perceptions are consistent with a number of different heuristics that voters might use to infer characteristics of the cabinet portfolio distribution. The results suggest that many voters use party role and size heuristics to infer the number of portfolios allocated to different parties as well as an ‘importance rule’, a ‘topical affinity rule’ and a ‘historical regularity rule’ to infer which parties hold which portfolios, but also that a significant number of voters have direct knowledge (not inferred using heuristics) of which parties hold which ministries.

The effect of globalisation on social spending is one of the most intensely studied issues in the political economy literature. Until recently, conventional wisdom held that globalisation leads governments to expand social spending to compensate workers for increasing risk exposure. The latest research shows, however, that globalisation has become strongly associated with spending cutbacks since the late 1980s. This article adds to this research by arguing that the negative impact of globalisation is conditioned on the capitalist system in different countries. In coordinated market economies (CMEs), employers are dependent on the willingness of the workforce to invest in specific skills and therefore become supportive of extensive social spending. Not so in liberal market economies (LMEs), where employers are much less dependent on social spending because the workforce in general invests less in specific skills. Employers in LMEs are therefore likely to use increasing globalisation as a means to push through retrenchment, whereas employers in CMEs are not. This argument is tested in a time‐series cross‐section regression analysis, which clearly supports it.

A crucial aspect of elite dominance in modern democracies concerns the degree to which different political elites share similar career paths and shifts between different elite positions. Similarity in career paths and transfers across elite positions are crucial aspects of elite dominance in modern democracies. This paper argues that there are limits to elite career similarity and sector transfer because of varying recruitment criteria and reputational cargo across different political elite groups. We argue that career similarity and transfers across elite positions are lower when recruitment criteria are exclusive. We also argue that acquired reputation may be a career liability limiting transfers into other elite groups. Empirically, we examine career trajectories and transfers across elite groups by mapping the full career of Members of the Parliament, top bureaucrats and interest group leaders in Denmark. We demonstrate that within the Danish political elite, career paths are relatively distinct and transfer few. Career distinctiveness and lack of elite transfers are especially pronounced for the bureaucratic elite, which is guarded by stricter recruitment criteria and on guard against reputations that might taint its image as a pure merit civil service. In contrast to other studies, our results suggest that the shutters between elite sectors are relatively closed. However, the few individuals passing through these most exclusive revolving doors may have a significant political impact.

The 2014–2019 European Parliament (EP) contained an unprecedented number of Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). These changes reflected a growing politicisation of European integration in which conflicts between those opposing the process and those favouring it became more pronounced. Using a unique time series of surveys of the European parliamentarians, we examine how far the policy preferences of the MEPs responded to this politicisation. MEPs' preferences over general policy questions as well as European Union (EU)‐specific issues have traditionally been described by a multi‐dimensional space: with a left‐right dimension, incorporating both economic and socio‐cultural issues, distinct from a pro‐/anti‐Europe dimension. We find that the political space in the EP evolved in the 2014–2019 parliament, with MEPs' preferences more strongly aligned along a single dimension, which captures economic, socio‐cultural, and EU integration issues.

Central theories of public policy imply that lobbying is demand‐driven, meaning highly responsive to the levels of access that political gatekeepers offer to interest organizations. Others stress drivers at the supply side, especially the severity of disturbances which affect an organization's constituency. We test these central arguments explaining lobbying activities in a comparative survey experiment conducted in 10 polities in Europe. Our treatments vary the severity of two types of external threats faced by interest organizations: (1) barriers that restrict their access to decision‐makers and (2) disturbances that compromise an organization's interests. We operationalize these threats at the demand and supply side of lobbying based on an (at that point) hypothetical second wave of COVID‐19. Our findings show that while severe access barriers trigger a flight response, whereby groups suspend their lobbying activities and divert to protest actions, higher disturbances mobilize groups into a fight mode, in which organizations spend more lobbying resources and intensify different outside lobbying activities. Our study serves novel causal evidence on the important dynamic relationship between policy disturbances, political access and lobbying strategies.