Sophia Moreau, in her important book, offers an insightful account of (one strand of) the wrong of discrimination based on the evil of subordination. My symposium contribution seeks to clarify the structure of Moreau's account of subordination and its normative and axiological status. On one plausible view, subordination is fundamentally bad or wrong. On another view, subordination is a distinctive social phenomenon, which is bad or wrong only derivatively. I will outline each view, and consider the implications each has for certain issues central to Moreau's book.

Sophia Moreau's wide-ranging and nuanced book defends a pluralist view of wrongful discrimination. I argue three points. First, I argue that Moreau's account of deliberative freedom does not provide a distinct ground for objecting to discrimination. Second, I argue that there is not as wide a gap between her view and expressivism as she makes there out to be. Third, there is an intriguing gap in the argument that deserves further exploration: Moreau never provides us with an account of when and why social subordination is wrong.

Given any commutative Noetherian ring R and an element x in R, we consider the full subcategory $\mathsf{C}(x)$ of its singularity category consisting of objects for which the morphism that is given by the multiplication by x is zero. Our main observation is that we can establish a relation between $\mathsf{C}(x), \mathsf{C}(y)$ and $\mathsf{C}(xy)$ for any two ring elements x and y. Utilizing this observation, we obtain a decomposition of the singularity category and consequently an upper bound on the dimension of the singularity category.

Evidence shows that talking with patients about psychotic experiences can be beneficial. The key question is therefore: which psychological methods can help patients most? This editorial presents ten principles for the design and development of effective psychological treatments. These principles are perceptible characteristics of successful interventions.

In Faces of Inequality, Sophia Moreau puts forward a pluralistic theory of how discrimination wrongs people. I approach Moreau's ideas not as a legal philosopher or theorist, but as an empirical and socio-legal scholar of equality law. In this commentary, I pick up on five provocations that emerge for me from Moreau's work: on reasonable accommodations, on comparison in equality law, on the public/private divide, on the justification of discrimination, and on discrimination as a personal wrong. While Moreau's work is grounded in the common themes or shared features that emerge from equality laws across jurisdictions, I consider what these themes mean for the uncommon ground, drawing on exceptional developments in discrimination law in some Australian jurisdictions, and our experience with the “exceptional” protected characteristic of age.

Gorerite, ideally CaAlFe11O19 is a new mineral and M-type hexaferrite of the magnetoplumbite group. It was found in ferrite-rich segregations of esseneite–gehlenite–wollastonite–anorthite melted rock of the ‘olive’ subunit of pyrometamorphic rocks located near Hatrurim Junction in the Negev Desert, Israel. Within these ferrite-rich segregations up to 100 μm in size, platy crystals of gorerite up to 50 μm in size intergrow with hibonite, hematite, maghemite, magnesioferrite, dorrite, barioferrite and andradite, forming aggregates. Additionally, small crystals of gorerite occur within magnesioferrite. Importantly, gorerite did not crystallise directly from the melt. Instead, it emerged through a reaction involving earlier crystallised hibonite and an iron-enriched melt, resulting in the partial or complete replacement of hibonite by gorerite. Gorerite appears grey in the reflected light (R = 18–23%), displaying distinct bireflectance: dark-grey perpendicular to Z and light-grey parallel to Z. Its Raman spectrum exhibits only one strong band at 700 cm–1, which shifts to higher frequencies with increasing Al content. Gorerite crystallises in the P63/mmc space group, with lattice parameters a = 5.8532(4) Å, c = 22.7730(2) Å and V = 675.67(7) Å3 with Z = 2. It exhibits a structure characterised by an intercalation of triple spinel-like S blocks and rock-salt type R blocks along the hexagonal c-axis.

As part of a parasitological survey, several specimens of two new monopisthocotylean species, Neotetraonchus celsomanueli sp. nov. and N. peruvianus sp. nov. (Dactylogyridea, Dactylogyridae), were collected from the gill filaments of the Peruvian sea catfish Galeichthys peruvianus (Siluriformes, Ariidae) off Puerto Pizarro, Tumbes region, Peru. Neotetraonchus celsomanueli sp. nov. is characterised by an MCO with a T-shaped distal end and an accessory piece that is ribbed and expanded proximally with a worm-shaped termination. Neotetraonchus peruvianus sp. nov. is typified by its MCO, which has a sledgehammer-shaped distal end and an accessory piece with a claw-shaped distal end. Additionally, N. peruvianus sp. nov. is characterised by its jellyfish-shaped onchium. A partial 28S rDNA sequence was obtained from N. celsomanueli sp. nov., and a phylogenetic analysis was conducted. This analysis revealed the phylogenetic position of Neotetraonchus celsomanueli sp. nov. within a clade comprising monopisthocotylean parasites of diadromous and marine ariid catfishes, including Hamatopeduncularia spp., Chauhanellus spp., Thysanotohaptor Kritsky, Shameem, Kumari & Krishnaveni, 2012, and Neocalceostomoides spinivaginalis Lim, 1995. This finding brings the number of known Neotetraonchus species to seven and represents the first described Neotetraonchus species infecting marine catfishes from Peru.

In this Reply to Critics, I respond to essays by Professors Alysia Blackham, Jessica Eisen, Pablo Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Dale Smith, Iyiola Solanke, and Daniel Viehoff on the theory of wrongful discrimination developed in my book, Faces of Inequality. Among the topics I discuss are: the relationship between equality and discrimination, the role of social subordination in my theory of wrongful discrimination, and methodology in discrimination theory.

In Faces of Inequality, Sophia Moreau offers a pluralist theory of discrimination, according to which discriminatory conduct involves one or more of (at least) three types of wrong. She claims, further, that each of these wrongs represents a failure to treat some people as the equal of others. I argue that this further claim is mistaken. I also suggest that there may be no need for a pluralist theory of discrimination to identify a property that is shared by the different types of wrong recognised by the theory (beyond the fact that each is present in cases of wrongful discrimination).