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In the most important funding decision in 20 years, the UK Supreme Court has declared in R. (PACCAR Inc. and others) v Competition Appeal Tribunal and others [2023] UKSC 28, [2023] 1 W.L.R. 2594 that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, a third-party funder’s litigation funding agreement (LFA) is a damages-based agreement (DBA) because third-party funders are offering “claims management services”. This decision, which overturned both the earlier Divisional Court and the Competition Appeal Tribunal decisions, and long-held industry and judicial understanding, has had an immediate impact upon UK litigation. Many LFAs will require immediate re-negotiation, given their non-compliance with the DBA legislation; but for some, the ramifications are much more serious. This article traces the legislation, soft law and law reform activity which preceded this momentous event; it suggests that a key principle of statutory interpretation which governed the outcome might arguably be re-evaluated in future case law; it discusses the possibility of legislative reversal; and it predicts the ramifications of the PACCAR decision upon (especially consumer) litigation unless reversed.
In 2014, Russia denied that its military was assisting separatists in eastern Ukraine, despite overwhelming evidence. Why do countries bother to deny hostile actions like this even when they are obvious? Scholars have argued that making hostile actions covert can reduce pressure on the target state to escalate. Yet it is not clear whether this claim applies when evidence of responsibility for the action is publicly available. We use three survey experiments to test whether denying responsibility for an action in the presence of contradictory evidence truly dampens demand for escalation among the public in the target state. We also test three causal mechanisms that might explain this: a rationalist reputation mechanism, a psychological mechanism, and an uncertainty mechanism. We do find a de-escalatory effect of noncredible denials. The effect is mediated through all three proposed causal mechanisms, but uncertainty and reputational concern have the most consistent effect.
The development of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship (MASS) is progressing rapidly within the maritime industry. Degree Two of MASS (MASS-DoA2), balancing human oversight and autonomous efficiency, will likely gain regulatory approval and industry acceptance. MASS-DoA2 possesses different control modes to adapt to various scenarios. However, the control-switching mechanisms among operators at shore control centres, autonomous navigation systems and number of seafarers onboard remain ambiguous, which poses a new risk that may significantly influence navigation safety. This study focuses on MASS-DoA2 and carries out a systematic review of autonomous ship guidelines. A questionnaire was designed based on the review findings, and a survey was carried out among captains and researchers in related fields. The review identified 11 control-switching scenarios with suggested takeover agents and the switching process and outlined the priority relationship between various takeover agents. Finally, a control-switching framework for MASS – DoA2 is proposed. It can serve as a theoretical framework for research on MASS's dynamic degree of autonomy and provide a reference for maritime regulatory authorities in establishing MASS – DoA2 control-switching mechanisms.
The case of clinical trials for convalescent plasma during COVID-19 illustrates important lessons for realizing public sector approaches to biomedical research and development. These lessons, centering on mission, transparency, and spillover effects, can be translated to wider efforts to develop a “public option” for clinical trials.
Although the idea that sexual violence is a “structural” problem is not new, the lack of specification as to what that entails blocks effective responses to it. This paper illustrates the concept of sexual violence as structural in the sense of containing a type of moral wrong called “structural wrong” and discusses its practical implications. First, I introduce a distinction between two types of moral wrongs—interactional wrongs and structural wrongs—and I argue that the moral problem of sexual violence includes both types, each of which calls for a different set of moral responses. Second, drawing on Iris Marion Young's social connection model of responsibility, I argue that recognizing the structural-wrong element of sexual violence does not reduce individual perpetrators’ responsibility for it. Instead, it implies that a broader group of agents are required to join collective actions to reform the social structure. I conclude by evaluating some preventive programs against sexual violence through the lens of structural wrongs and providing directions to advance them.
Do Nigerian political parties take left/right ideological positions? Perspectives in comparative politics see party competition in Africa's ‘third wave’ democracies as devoid of disagreement on class or economic grounds – and thus as ‘absent’ of left/right ideology. Yet, a dearth of disagreement among governing parties can also suggest ideological agreement or ‘convergence’. This article maps the development of the left/right cleavage in Nigeria's party system, examining the evolution of economic pledges in the manifestos of parties that took power across Nigeria's four attempts at electoral democracy. It finds that relative to the deeper levels of economic disagreement voiced in earlier periods, the governing parties of Nigeria's Fourth Republic are now largely unanimous in the enunciation of their economic visions. Evidence of such convergence troubles a strict insistence on either the polarisation or ‘absence’ of economic ideology among governing parties in Africa's largest electoral democracy.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has been roundly condemned in the West. NATO members have continued to supply Ukraine with weaponry while the EU, US and their allies have ensured that the Russian economy remains under the most extensive and intensive set of sanctions in history. Yet many leaders of countries in the global south have been far more hesitant to condemn Russian actions. Some have merely abstained in United Nations resolutions criticizing Russia, while others have remained neutral. This paper will endeavor to explain why the global south has such a different perspective from the global north on Russia’s war in Ukraine. I argue that this is a result of America’s withdrawal from the global south over the last two decades and Russia’s reemergence in many parts of the Middle East, Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia.
L’histoire de l’État marocain fut au centre des recherches de la nouvelle école de Rabat des années 1960 aux années 2000. Essentiellement écrit en arabe, cet héritage historiographique est souvent méconnu de la recherche internationale. Il permettrait pourtant de dépasser les lieux communs persistants qui entourent la monarchie marocaine. En reconstituant, depuis les sources nationales, les réalités sociales et culturelles cachées derrière le mot « Makhzen », les historiennes et les historiens marocains ont remis en cause le cliché colonial de relations expéditives et autoritaires que l’État aurait entretenu avec la société. Cet article propose ainsi de revenir d’une manière critique sur cette historiographie en présentant son contexte et les principaux visages qu’elle a donnés à l’État marocain, en repartant des méthodes et des sources déployées par plusieurs générations d’autrices et d’auteurs marocains en dialogue avec les travaux étrangers. Les dimensions économiques, administratives, idéologiques et spirituelles du Makhzen offrent des perspectives originales sur l’histoire de l’État en général. L’article entend ainsi mettre à disposition du public français les lignes fortes de cette école historique, tout en soulignant les chantiers de recherche qu’elle a laissés ouverts. Ce faisant, il propose une définition historiquement informée du Makhzen pour un public non spécialiste. Il souligne enfin et surtout la nécessité, dans la continuité des appels à la parité documentaire en matière de sources, du recours à la bibliographie arabophone pour écrire l’histoire du Maghreb.