There has been recent discussion of a puzzle posed by emotions that are backward looking. Though our emotions commonly diminish over time, how can they diminish fittingly if they are an accurate appraisal of an event that is situated in the past? Agnes Callard (2017) has offered a solution by providing an account of anger in which anger is both backwards looking and resolvable, yet her account depends upon contrition to explain anger's fitting diminishment. My aim is to explain how anger can fittingly diminish even when there is lack of contrition. I propose a permissivism about fittingness by showing that both anger and compassion are fitting responses to blameworthy behaviour. I argue that anger is rendered fitting because it accurately appraises the behaviour, whereas compassion becomes fitting as a valuational response to what the behaviour reveals about the lived experience of the offender. I then respond to some worries my account raises, and I clarify details of my account to show that it is not unrealistic to the way some of our anger actually does diminish. I end with a proposal that our anger can fittingly diminish through the act of forgiveness when compassion is not a forthcoming affective response.

Using trade policy to achieve foreign policy objectives, such as stable international relations, has a long history, from Kant to the founders of the GATT. Punishing enemies and rewarding ‘friends’ by granting or withholding market access is also not new, and sanctions or blockades are a venerable form of trade policy used as foreign policy. A more recent form is influencing the domestic policy of another country with non-commercial provisions in trade agreements. All these tools are based on linkage, on the assumption that a desired outcome can be achieved by interventions that would increase or decrease trade. The latest instance is so-called ‘friend-shoring’, which would in principle isolate enemies, although it will be difficult in practice and risks undermining multilateralism. The cost of these interventions is susceptible to economic analysis, even if the conclusion is that it is worth paying. Influenced by Alan Winters who referred to national security as a motivation for agriculture protection as a ‘so-called non-economic objective’ or SNO, I argue that using a trade policy tool for a foreign policy purpose as if there is no cost is a SNO job, an attempt to justify an intervention aimed at one objective by framing it as being valuable for another.

This paper considers a model with general regressors and unobservable common factors. An estimator based on iterated principal component analysis is proposed, which is shown to be not only asymptotically normal, but under certain conditions also free of the otherwise so common asymptotic incidental parameters bias. Interestingly, the conditions required to achieve unbiasedness become weaker the stronger the trends in the factors, and if the trending is strong enough, unbiasedness comes at no cost at all. The approach does not require any knowledge of how many factors there are, or whether they are deterministic or stochastic. The order of integration of the factors is also treated as unknown, as is the order of integration of the regressors, which means that there is no need to pre-test for unit roots, or to decide on which deterministic terms to include in the model.

We explored the transmission mechanisms of corporate fraud and its punishments within social network communities. Using fraud triangle theory and trust triangle theory, we hypothesize four transmitting channels of how fraud commission and detection are affected by peers’ fraud and punishment. Based on Chinese listed corporations from 2008 to 2018, we first construct and detect interlocked social network communities with a community-detecting algorithm, and then examine hypotheses using a bivariate probit model with partial observability. Our findings indicate that peer-concealing and -hinting effects exist within social network communities. The peer-concealing effect decreases the likelihood of being detected when committing fraud, for those with more and closer fraudulent peers. The peer-hinting effect increases the likelihood of being detected when committing fraud, for those with more and closer punished peers. There is no evidence to support peer-contagion and vicarious-punishment effects. Thus, an improved understanding of the transmission mechanism of corporate fraud commission and detection within communities is provided to prevent and detect corporate fraud. In addition, stakeholders and regulators should be aware of the deviant subculture and social distancing in social network communities.

In contrast to the well-known stories of the embryotoxic drug, thalidomide, in countries where it was responsible for large numbers of birth defects, there is limited information on its history in India. Its presence before 2002, when the country issued the first marketing licence for a thalidomide-containing preparation, is assumed to be negligible. This article challenges this view by showing that the drug entered the Indian subcontinent through the former Portuguese territory of Goa around 1960. We examine the subsequent development of its distribution, use and regulation in India from the mid-1960s up to the present situation. Colonial legacies are a crucial explanation for the early appearance of thalidomide on the Indian subcontinent. They also influenced its re-emergence as drug for treating leprosy reactions in India after 1965. We identify key actors in this process: the original German producer that delivered thalidomide free of charge, European doctors who worked for international non-governmental organizations, the World Health Organization (WHO), which supported clinical trials and later discouraged the use of the drug, and finally the Indian state institutions that limited its distribution and later quickly opened the way for the private sector to produce and market thalidomide and its analogues. Finally, we discuss the risk of thalidomide-induced birth defects by casting a critical look on the present state of regulatory provisions and the monitoring of birth defects in India.

With a modified formalization of Heckscher–Ohlin theory as the basis of a novel econometric specification, this paper uses worldwide data over three decades to estimate how the effects of greater openness on industrialization vary among countries with differing endowments of land relative to labour. The results confirm the theoretical prediction that greater openness reduces manufactured output shares in land-abundant countries, while increasing them in land-scarce countries. The implications of these results for trade and development policy are debatable.

The UK's Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) conducts economic assessments of the ramifications of trade remedies, the Economic Interest Test (EIT). Such assessments are not mandated by the World Trade Organization but are conducted by certain trade remedy investigating authorities, including those of Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and New Zealand. The EIT is a mandatory part of the UK trade remedy system and is arguably more transparent than similar interest tests conducted by other trade remedy investigating authorities. However, stakeholder participation remains a challenge and the TRA is working on ways to improve participation. To date, the TRA has completed 11 EITs in its trade remedy cases, with a further ten live cases. These cases cover different products, markets, and countries, across which the likely positive and negative impacts of trade remedy differ. This paper invites experts to review the TRA's EIT methodology.

We analyse the ‘indirect effects’ of Brexit on African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries’ exports that use the UK as a platform to access the EU market and vice versa. First, we use the EORA26 multi-region input–output database for 186 countries and 26 sectors to characterize the ACP domestic content embedded in bilateral trade between the UK and the EU. Second, we apply the GTAP-VA module to carry out a simulation of how the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement will impinge on 121 countries and 65 products. The results suggest that while ‘indirect effects’ on ACP countries’ exports may exist, their economic magnitude is small in aggregate because ACP countries supply only small amounts of inputs used in UK–EU bilateral trade. Our simulations also show that these effects may be offset by the likely increase in ACP domestic content in exports because of TCA friction, mainly towards the UK.

This scoping review aimed to explore international evidence on the impact of Food Policy Groups (FPGs) on local food systems, in urban and rural regions of high-income countries. Peer-reviewed and grey literature were searched to identify thirty-one documents published between 2002 and 2022 providing evidence on the impact of FPGs. Activities spanned domains including increasing food equity (e.g. strengthening school meals programmes); increasing knowledge and/or demand for healthy food (e.g. food literacy programmes with children and adults); increasing food access (e.g. enhancing local food procurement); environmental sustainability (e.g. promoting low-waste food items on café menus); economic development (e.g. ensuring local businesses are not outperformed by large food distributors); and increasing food system resiliency (e.g. establishment of local produce schemes). Most FPGs reported conducting activities that positively influenced multiple food system domains and reported activities in urban areas, and to a lesser extent in rural areas. Our study highlighted a range of qualitative and quantitative evaluation strategies used to measure FPGs’ impact on local food systems. Our recommendations focus on regular and systematic evaluation and research surrounding the impact of FPG activities, to build the evidence base of their impact. Ideally, evaluation would utilise comprehensive and established tools. We recommend exploring the establishment of FPGs across more regions of high-income countries, particularly rural areas, and forming partnerships between FPGs, local government and universities to maximise implementation and evaluation of activities.

This essay aims to review and clarify an emerging consensus among philosophers of time: that belief in the passage of time is not a matter of illusion but rather the result of a variety of cognitive error. I argue that this error is best described in terms of psychological projection, properly understood. A close analysis of varieties of projection reveals how well this phenomenon accounts for belief in dynamic temporal passage and the objective becoming of events. A projectivist account of belief in the passage of time is, in actuality, already predominant in contemporary philosophy of time; but the language of illusion still used by many theorists is hampering recognition of the nature of the solution as well as the recent progress towards consensus.