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This paper publishes the editio princeps of an Early Dynastic IIIb tablet from Nippur, which contains a unique yet fragmentary Sumerian narrative about the storm god Iškur’s captivity in the netherworld, from which he appears to be rescued by Fox. While the incomplete state of preservation prevents a reconstruction of the plot, individual motifs can be traced across the entire cuneiform corpus, allowing for a preliminary case study of continuity and change over more than two millennia of Mesopotamian mythological literature.
Anth. Pal. 11.418 is traditionally attributed to Trajan. The distich mocks a man’s large nose and is a typical example of a scoptic epigram. Even though the attribution to Trajan looks suspicious, scholarship has been inclined to accept his authorship. However, it is possible that the poem was written about the emperor instead, which would also explain the misattribution. This hypothesis, if correct, sheds light on the surprising opening anecdote of Plutarch’s Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata (172E), which is dedicated to Trajan.
Over the past few decades, the historiography of international trade in late medieval Europe has been greatly influenced by the New Institutional Economics. Central in this perspective is the claim that economic outcomes were primarily determined by so-called institutions, or the rules of the economic game. The present article contributes to this debate by exploring the explanatory factors that impacted upon the choice of the main commercial markets in the Low Countries between 1384 and 1433. More specifically, it assesses the role of institutional frameworks in the decisions made by three important trading groups, the Hanse, the Genoese and the Portuguese, to base most of their trade either in the county of Flanders or in the competing counties of Holland and Zeeland. The article first compares the commercial privileges in which governments set out many of the rules that shaped the activities of foreign traders in these two areas and then considers the mechanisms that allowed merchants to resolve commercial conflicts. The overall conclusion is that institutions alone cannot explain the choice of markets by foreign merchants in the Low Countries during this period.
This article supports Livineius’ deletion of τϵ καὶ ϕλέγϵι in Soph. Aj. 714 πάνθ’ ὁ μέγας χρόνος μαραίνϵι by means of a comparative examination of tragic quotations in Stobaeus’ Anthology, where Aj. 714 is quoted without τϵ καὶ ϕλέγϵι (1.8.24).
Using a data set of nicknames of elite athletes compiled from the mainstream British sporting press and media, this article explores grammatical patterns in the way we create hypocoristic nicknames like Hughesie, Robbo and Macca. It outlines the purpose of nicknames and their particular role in sport, and provides an analysis of the predictable morphological and phonological rules that apply to a type of nickname categorised here as ‘transparent’. It offers some initial observations on the social distribution of particular nickname variants and on the potential for creativity and playfulness inherent in transparent nicknaming processes.
Vaporwave provides a hauntological reflection on the capitalist excesses of the 1980–1990s, a moment that Francis Fukuyama declared as The End of History. To this task, Vaporwave replays the most memorable hooks of pop songs, commercial jingles and elevator Muzak, within visual scenographies of abandoned malls and virtual realities, dotted by Miami palms and Tokyo neon. However, these decades hold another significance for Eastern Europeans, who remained haunted by their own ghosts, not of ideology, but of identity. This article contrasts Vaporwave to Hardvapour, a violent mutation that does not avoid Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, but accelerates towards it. To this task, Hardvapour collectively identifies as having Eastern European origins, and fixates on the political volatility of the region, including the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, inviting comparisons with Baudrillard's theories about the unreality of the media-military complex. Despite their different agendas and aesthetics, both Vaporwave and Hardvapour are haunted by ghosts of time, and a disappearing territoriality, architectural and geographic.
This article critiques the anthropocentric tendencies in machine listening practices and narratives, developing alternative concepts and methods to explore the more-than-human potential of these technologies through the framework of sonic fiction. Situating machine listening within the contemporary soundscape of dataveillance, the research examines post-anthropocentric threads that emerge at the intersection of datafication, subjectivation and animalisation. Theory and practice interweave in the composition of a music piece, The Spiral, enabling generative feedback between concept, sensation and technique. Specifically, the research investigates the figure of a mollusc bio-sensor between science fact and fable, as the (im)possible locus of musicality. This emergent methodology also offers new insights for other sound art and music practices aiming to pluralise what listening might be.
Frieman (2024) observes in her own, highly metaphorical language that one can offer an unbounded number of interpretations to explain the distribution of archaeological remains in time and space. These interpretations offer different perspectives that can inform action—in Frieman's case an explicitly feminist understanding of the past informing the present. She provides two brief examples from the literature, suggesting that each embodies present-day biases: the distribution of Bronze Age swords relative to the provenance of ornamentation sets in Denmark and Germany, and the ‘Egtved Girl’, a Bronze Age burial of a young person of undetermined sex clad in a bronze-decorated tunic, associated with jewellery and the cremated remains of a child. Interpretations previously advanced for the first example include a patrilocal residence system wherein male warriors brought to their natal homes women ornamented with objects from their own homelands; from this interpretation we hypothesise the presence of patriarchal chiefdoms. The second example, the Egtved individual, has been characterised as a foreign bride, isotope analyses suggesting an itinerant life in the months prior to death. As each interpretation lingers in the literature, it becomes a certitude on which researchers build. Alternative interpretations go unimagined. But Frieman argues for the need for multiple, culturally complex interpretations that emerge from the gaps in the evidence, or the ‘unproofs’.
In this paper, I explore what Robert Clewis, in The Origins of Kant’s Aesthetics, suggests is an ‘analogy’ between humour and beauty. I do this by focusing on Kant’s concept of wit (Witz), which is central to both reflective judgement and humour. By exploring the concept of Witz as a distinctive kind of cognitive activity, I believe a case can be made that the origin of Kant’s mature aesthetic theory in the Critique of the Power of Judgement and his discovery of the principle of taste were, in part, a result of Kant’s thinking about Witz. I therefore share Clewis’s puzzlement about why, in the third Critique, humour, arguably the art of Witz, is not considered to be a beautiful art. I conclude by suggesting a possible reason why Kant thought that a judgement of humour is different from a judgement of beauty.