This paper presents the details of lichens and mosses found on whale vertebrae substratum in the Admiralty Bay area, King George Island, Antarctica. Samples were taken in the coastal area at Hennequin Point, a relict of the Antarctic whaling era. The samples were collected from the upper surface of the whale bones found in the study area during the austral summer 2010–2011. A total of 15 lichen and two moss species were found. All species sampled are known in the Admiralty Bay area, both as pioneers and in more advanced succession stages in ice-free areas. These results suggest that the colonisation of whale bones is not new for Antarctic plants, but it is an additional substrate on which these plants can develop. A map showing the distribution of colonised bones and details of the usual substrata for the lichens and mosses found in this study are provided.

Reducing emissions of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) – in particular, black carbon and methane – is a promising option for slowing global and regional warming in the short term, while at the same time reducing local air pollution. This mitigation opportunity seems to be particularly relevant in the Arctic context. The article provides a comprehensive overview and a critical assessment of the state of international law and governance relevant to the reduction of SLCP emissions in the Arctic. The article demonstrates that current legal and governance regimes for reducing SLCP emissions in the Arctic are complex and fragmented, which raises questions about the scope for this option for climate change and air pollution mitigation to reach its full potential. Nevertheless, the article concludes that fragmentation in this policy domain is of a cooperative or synergistic nature and therefore not problematic, provided that greater harmonization of legal instruments and enhanced cooperation between institutions are achieved. It also suggests options for strengthening international law and governance on SLCPs. Although the focus of the article is regional, many of its conclusions are relevant for the global regulation of SLCPs.

The emperor penguin (Aptenodytes forsteri) is an iconic Antarctic species. George Robert Gray attributed the first description to Johann Reinhold Forster during James Cook's voyage of 1772–1775, attribution that persists to this day. Gray therefore honoured Forster in the emperor's scientific name—but he was almost certainly mistaken. Thaddeus von Bellingshausen in 1820 was probably the true first observer. Charles Wilkes in 1840 was next. James Clark Ross in 1841 made important observations and brought specimens home to the British Museum. Edward Wilson and others, in 1902–1903 and 1911 on the two expeditions of Robert F. Scott, discovered and investigated the first breeding colony, substantially advancing knowledge about this remarkable creature.

This paper explores the interaction of regularity and idiosyncracy in the formation of nominals. It treats both nominals whose formation is highly regular, such as red box, and nominals whose formation is rather idiosyncratic, such as the Big Mess Construction (bmc; so good a bargain) and the Binominal Noun Phrase Construction (bnpc; her nitwit of a husband). Both the bmc and the bnpc conform to productive patterns, but the proper place of those patterns in the grammar as a whole is not easy to identify. To rise to the challenge, we build on recent developments in Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar and the more formally inclined strands of Construction Grammar. Taking a cue from the treatment of clausal constructions in Ginzburg & Sag (2000), we develop a bi-dimensional hierarchy of nominal phrase types, in which the regular nominals inherit their properties from independently motivated higher types, while the idiosyncratic nominals are characterized by a mixture of inherited and inherent properties. The resulting treatment is sufficiently flexible to deal with the subtle interaction between the regular and the idiosyncratic, and sufficiently rigorous to be falsifiable. It is also compared with alternative treatments.

This article focuses on a novel English construction involving control and infinitival relatives. Examples such as this is John's book to read have a head noun (book) modified by an infinitival relative clause (to read) and a prenominal possessor (John's). I argue that there is a control relation between the prenominal possessor and the PRO subject of the infinitival relative. I show that this control relation bears the structural hallmarks of obligatory control whilst at the same time permitting PRO to be interpreted as arbitrary. I discuss these empirical facts in the context of a syntactic, Agree-based theory of control.

In today's age of restrictionism, a growing number of countries are closing their gates of admission to most categories of would-be immigrants with one important exception. Governments increasingly seek to lure and attract “high value” migrants, especially those with access to large sums of capital. These individuals are offered golden visa programs that lead to fast-tracked naturalization in exchange for a hefty investment, in some cases without inhabiting or even setting foot in the passport-issuing country to which they now officially belong. In the U.S. context, the contrast between the “Dreamers” and “Parachuters” helps to draw out this distinction between civic ties and credit lines as competing bases for membership acquisition. Drawing attention to these seldom-discussed citizenship-for-sale practices, this essay highlights their global surge and critically evaluates the legal, normative, and distributional quandaries they raise. I further argue that purchased membership goods cannot replicate or substitute the meaningful links to a political community that make citizenship valuable and worth upholding in the first place.

Debates on “rising powers” and a possible end to the liberal international order mostly focus on two kinds of actors: the hegemon (the United States), privileged by the power distribution of yesteryear, and rising powers (notably China). Europe's curious position brings to light some intriguing dynamics of the emerging world order—nuances needed to capture a more differentiated future. This essay traces the threats and opportunities to Europe presented by the emerging order in four domains. In terms of overall power (polarity) and economics, far-reaching change registers but is rarely designated as threatening. In contrast, change regarding values (human rights and democracy especially) triggers more alarm. Finally, in the domain of institutions, change elicited a relative lack of concern prior to 2016, but worries have grown since then. For Europe, peaceful change primarily demands that rising powers rearticulate rather than confront classical Western values because, in contrast to the United States, there is little sense of loss in Europe in relation to the global structures of power and economics.

In the early years of the twenty-first century the narrative of “emerging powers” and “rising powers” seemed to provide a clear and powerful picture of how international relations and global politics were changing. Yet dramatic changes in the global system have led many to conclude that the focus on the BRICS and the obsession with the idea of rising powers reflected a particular moment in time that has now passed. The story line is now about backlash at the core; and, with the exception of China, rising powers have returned to their role as secondary or supporting actors in the drama of global politics. Such a conclusion is profoundly mistaken for three sets of reasons: the continued reality of the post-Western global order; the need to understand nationalist backlash as a global phenomenon; and the imperative of locating and strengthening a new pluralist conception of global order.

While Russian leaders are clearly dissatisfied with the United States and the European Union, they are not inherently opposed to a liberal world order. The question of Russia's desire to change a liberal international order hangs on the type of liberalism embedded in that order. Despite some calls from within for it to create a new, post-liberal order premised on conservative nationalism and geopolitics, Russia is unlikely to fare well in such a world.