I offer two interpretations of independence between experts: (i) independence as deciding autonomously, and (ii) independence as having different perspectives. I argue that when experts are grouped together, independence of both kinds is valuable for the same reason: they reduce the likelihood of erroneous consensus by enabling a greater variety of critical viewpoints. In offering this argument, I show that a purported proof from Finnur Dellsén that groups of more autonomous experts are more reliable does not work. It relies on a flawed ceteris paribus assumption, as well as a false equivalence between autonomy and probabilistic independence. A purely formal proof that more autonomous experts are more reliable is in fact not possible – substantive claims about how more autonomous groups reason are required. My alternative argument for the value of autonomy between experts rests on the claim that groups that triangulate a greater range of critical viewpoints will be less likely to accept hypotheses in error. As well as clarifying what makes autonomy between experts valuable, this mechanism of critical triangulation, gives us reason to value groups of experts that cover a wide range of relevant skills and knowledge. This justifies my second interpretation of expert independence.

This paper argues for two propositions. (I) Large asymmetries of power, status and influence exist between economists. These asymmetries constitute a hierarchy that is steeper than it could be and steeper than hierarchies in other disciplines. (II) This situation has potentially significant epistemic consequences. I collect data on the social organization of economics to show (I). I then argue that the hierarchy in economics heightens conservative selection biases, restricts criticism between economists and disincentivizes the development of novel research. These factors together constrain economics’ capacity to develop new beliefs and reduce the likelihood that its outputs will be true.

The Fontan Outcomes Network was created to improve outcomes for children and adults with single ventricle CHD living with Fontan circulation. The network mission is to optimise longevity and quality of life by improving physical health, neurodevelopmental outcomes, resilience, and emotional health for these individuals and their families. This manuscript describes the systematic design of this new learning health network, including the initial steps in development of a national, lifespan registry, and pilot testing of data collection forms at 10 congenital heart centres.

Do increasing, and increasingly diverse, immigration flows lead to declining support for redistributive policy? This concern is pervasive in the literatures on immigration, multiculturalism and redistribution, and in public debate as well. The literature is nevertheless unable to disentangle the degree to which welfare chauvinism is related to (a) immigrant status or (b) ethnic difference. This paper reports on results from a web-based experiment designed to shed light on this issue. Representative samples from the United States, Quebec, and the “Rest-of-Canada” responded to a vignette in which a hypothetical social assistance recipient was presented as some combination of immigrant or not, and Caucasian or not. Results from the randomized manipulation suggest that while ethnic difference matters to welfare attitudes, in these countries it is immigrant status that matters most. These findings are discussed in light of the politics of diversity and recognition, and the capacity of national policies to address inequalities.

A surface-energy/mass-balance model with an explicit calculation of meltwater refreezing and superimposed ice formation is applied to midre Lovénbreen, Spitsbergen, Svalbard. The model is run with meteorological measurements to represent the present climate, and run with scenarios taken from global climate model predictions based on the IS92a emissions scenario to represent future climates. Model results indicate that superimposed ice accounts for on average 37% of the total net accumulation under present conditions. The model is found to be highly sensitive to changes in the mean annual air temperature and much less sensitive to changes in the total annual precipitation. A 0.5˚C decade–1 temperature increase is predicted to cause an average mass-balance change of –0.43 ma–1, while a 2% decade–1 increase in precipitation will result in only a +0.02 ma–1 change in mass balance. An increase in temperature results in a significant decrease in the size of the accumulation area at midre Lovénbreen and hence a similar decrease in the net volume of superimposed ice. The model predicts, however, that the relative importance of superimposed ice will increase to account for >50% of the total accumulation by 2050. The results show that the refreezing of meltwater and in particular the formation of superimposed ice make an important positive contribution to the mass balance of midre Lovénbreen under present conditions and will play a vital future role in slowing down the response of glacier mass balance to climate change.

We argue that widely accepted elitist and “clientelist” models of immigration policy in the United States unduly minimize popular pressure on policy-making. These models portray majority opinion in ways that fail to recognize divergence between the public’s abstract goals for immigration policy and its support for the concrete policy changes needed to achieve them. As a result, they obscure many important instances in which immigration policy accords with public preferences despite counter-pressure from elites and organized lobbies. We demonstrate this point by identifying and explaining gaps between generalized attitudes and beliefs about specific policies in the domains of both legal and illegal immigration, showing that status quo legal admissions policies are not starkly at odds with majority preferences and that, contrary to interpretations of most commercial polling on the topic, majorities reject specific aspects of legalization programs that organized lobbies insist on as components of a “grand bargain” to overhaul an immigration system widely viewed as “broken.” Appreciating the nuance in mass opinion toward immigration policy helps explain policy stagnation that confounds elitist models and suggests that forging ahead with immigration reform will require persuading the public and not only successful bargaining among elites and interest groups.

FRANCE IS A COUNTRY IN WHICH PAST POLITICAL BATTLES ARE IN the forefront of the minds of those who are engaged in contemporary conflicts. The March 1977 elections in the 36,383 communes of metropolitan France could evoke memories of 1877 and 1947. The thirtieth anniversary of the Gaullist landslide of 1947 was directly concerned with local elections as such, while 1877 recalled the defeat of President MacMahon's attempt to impose his choice of government a century ago, which finally settled the struggle between Left and Right over the regime of the Third Republic. Anticipation that the regime established by General de Gaulle would be put to the searching test of a clash between the President and a Left-wing Assembly majority converted in some people's minds the March 1977 local clections into a prologue to this decisive national confrontation.

Abstract. The relationship of national identifications to preferences about immigration is a subject of empirical controversy. The hypothesis we explore here through a comparison of Canada and the United States is that the normative content of national identity—how people define the meaning of patriotism in their country—mediates the relationship between national pride and sentiment about immigration and multiculturalism. How political elites construct what citizens should be proud of matters. In comparisons based on the 2003 International Social Survey Program's “National Identity Module,” Canadians seem more divided than Americans over their nationality and generally less chauvinist. Canadians are more receptive to maintaining the current level of immigration and see newcomers as less threatening to economic and cultural values. The relationship between identification with the country and support for immigration and multiculturalism diverges sharply between the countries: where in Canada the relationship is positive, in the US it is negative.

Résumé. Le lien entre l'identification à la nation et les préférences quant à l'immigration est un sujet de controverse. À travers une comparaison du Canada et des Etats-Unis, l'hypothèse que nous explorons ici est que le contenu normatif de l'identité nationale, c'est-à-dire le sens donné par la population au patriotisme envers leur pays, joue un rôle intermédiaire dans la relation entre la fierté nationale et les sentiments vis-à-vis l'immigration et le multiculturalisme. La façon dont les élites politiques construisent ce en quoi les citoyens devraient être fiers revêt donc une importance particulière. À titre comparatif, en se basant sur le « Module Identité Nationale » du International Social Survey Programme de 2003, les Canadiens semblent plus divisés que les Américains sur la signification de leur identité nationale et, de façon générale, sont moins chauvins. Les Canadiens sont également plus réceptifs à l'idée de maintenir l'immigration à son niveau actuel et voient les nouveaux arrivants comme étant moins menaçants pour leurs valeurs économiques et culturelles. La relation entre l'identification au pays et le support pour l'immigration et le multiculturalisme diverge nettement entre les deux pays. Alors qu'au Canada la relation est positive, aux Etats-Unis elle est négative.