Backlash has become commonplace against elected officials across the United States. This is especially true for reform prosecutors, who seek to move away from traditional, tough-on-crime approaches to prosecution. How do prosecutors make sense of backlash to reform policies? How do prosecutors respond to attempts to limit their discretion, remove them from office, or otherwise inhibit their power? We draw on 68 interviews with prosecutors from 33 states and find that reform prosecutors report a chilling effect of backlash, which has pushed some out of office and forced others to carry out reforms under personally and professionally fraught conditions.

In recent decades, support for the far right has surged in many countries. One common explanation for this is that far-right support is a backlash against left-wing governments and their policies. We investigate the causal effect of the partisan make-up of governments on the electoral results of far-right parties. Evidence from over-time comparative data and a quasi-experimental analysis based on a regression discontinuity design in Spain indicates that far-right parties benefit electorally when the current government is on the left. In further analyses, we employ a novel regression discontinuity design (RDD)-based sampling strategy to examine original individual-level survey data from Spanish municipalities close to the discontinuity cutoff. These data show that the likely mechanism underlying the backlash effect is an ideological shift to the right among the electorate when left-wing parties govern. Overall, the far right benefits more when the mainstream left governs than when the mainstream right does.

Elite ideological polarization is rising in Western democracies. Is this elite ideological polarization associated with mass ideological polarization? I argue that when a party adopts a more extreme position, the masses polarize via two mechanisms. In‐partisans should follow the party and adopt a more extreme ideological stance while out‐partisans should backlash and move in the opposite direction. To test these expectations, I exploit a real‐world sudden party polarization when the Labour Party of the United Kingdom suddenly shifted to the left under new leadership. Using British Election Study Internet Panel data, I find limited evidence that elite polarization leads to mass polarization. Overall, neither in‐partisans followed the party, nor out‐partisans backlashed to it. Only ideologically out‐of‐touch in‐partisans adjusted their ideological stance to match their party, indicating the effectiveness of partisan cues, nonetheless. These findings provide insight into how the masses react to increasing party polarization, alleviating pundits' concerns that the masses are blind followers and bound to polarize if political parties polarize.

Does a large influx of asylum seekers in the local community lead to a backlash in public opinion towards foreign populations? We assess the effects of asylum seeker presence using original survey and macro‐level municipality data from Austria, exploiting exogenous elements of the placement of asylum seekers on the municipality level. Methodologically, we draw on entropy balancing for causal identification. Our findings are threefold. First, respondents in municipalities receiving asylum seekers report substantially higher exposure on average, but largely without the stronger contact that would allow for meaningful interaction. Second, hostility towards asylum seekers on average increased in areas that housed them. Third, this backlash spilt over: general attitudes towards Muslims and immigrants are less favourable in contexts with local asylum seeker presence, while vote intention for the main anti‐immigration party is higher. Our findings go beyond existing work by examining contact directly as a mechanism, by showing a backlash effect in the medium term, and by focusing on a broad set of attitudinal and behavioural measures. Our results point to a need to design policy interventions that minimise citizen backlash against rapid migration inflows.

Within the UN, there is a divide between NGO networks with differing stances on gender equality and women’s rights. Feminist and feminist-informed NGOs push for extensive women’s rights, including reproductive rights and protection against discrimination. In contrast, conservative NGOs uphold traditional gender roles and family structures, strongly opposing reproductive rights like abortion. Studies have examined these NGOs’ stances and advocacy tactics, but a detailed comparative analysis of their views of the UN – their key battleground – is missing. The paper addresses this gap by assessing how each group evaluates the UN’s legitimacy and identifying the underlying sources of legitimacy beliefs. By combining computational and qualitative text analysis, it reveals several trends: the UN is central in the discourse of both groups of NGOs, although it appears more in feminist NGOs’ communications, and feminist groups generally evaluate the UN’s legitimacy more positively. This positivity peaks when the UN actively supports feminist objectives and collaborates with these NGOs. Conservative NGOs, on the other hand, positively evaluate the UN when they can align the UN’s foundational texts with their views and when they garner support from conservative states. Their most negative evaluations occur when they believe the UN uses deception to promote progressive policies.

How does right-wing terrorism affect electoral support for populist radical right parties (PRRPs)? Recent research has produced contrary answers to this question. We argue that only high-intensity attacks, whose motives and targets mirror PRRPs’ nativist agenda, are likely to generate a media backlash that dampens electoral support for PRRPs. We test this argument by combining high-frequency survey and social media data with a natural and survey experimental design. We find that right-wing terror reduced support for the radical right party Alternative für Deutschland after one of the most intense nativist attacks in recent German history. An analysis of all ninety-eight fatal right-wing attacks in Germany between 1990 and 2020 supports our argument. Our findings contribute to an understanding of how political violence triggers partisan detachment and have important implications for media responsibility in the aftermath of terrorist attacks.

Globally, prejudicial attitudes toward women persist. By taking anti-discriminatory stances, value-oriented organizations – e.g., political parties and religious denominations – can tap into group identities to shape their members’ attitudes. We know much less about the role of organizations that are not inherently value-oriented – such as sports teams – in accomplishing the same. Yet, as various campaigns by sports teams worldwide indicate, this is precisely what non-value-oriented organizations increasingly attempt to do. Can football team fandom be leveraged to promote gender-egalitarian attitudes? We address this question with data from a national survey in Brazil and a survey experiment conducted in partnership with a major Brazilian football club. We find that while football team identity is salient and may be leveraged to change displayed social attitudes, the Club’s anti-sexism campaign inadvertently increased men’s expressed prejudice toward women in football – although it may have also improved institutional trust among women.

Norm contestation has become an established research programme in International Relations. However, scholars have yet to scrutinise the form and effect of radical contestation. I argue that radical contestation is a disruptive form of contestation, distinguished by (1) the extensive scope that attacks a specific norm and wider normative order, institutions, and actors sympathetic to the norm, and (2) high emotional intensity in animating contestation. To bring these features of radical contestation together, I use insights from the study of emotions and backlash movements to advance a new ‘emotional backlash’ framework and explain the construction, mobilisation, and outcome of radical contestation. I subsequently apply this framework to analyse the emotional backlash against Rohingya refugees during Covid-19. Cultivated by resentment, the emotional backlash against the Rohingya contests refugee protection norms and extends to radically challenge human rights advocates, United Nations agencies, and the larger humanitarian and cosmopolitan principles. In doing so, backlash supporters aim to restore a society without refugees and their sympathisers, and instead to promote racism as a ‘normal’ organising principle. By capturing radical contestation, this contribution steers norms scholarship towards a new research terrain and highlights the implications that the backlash has for the international refugee regime.

In recent times, several international courts (ICs) have faced resistance from their member states. A recurring narrative used to justify states’ backlash against ICs has been that ICs are increasingly overreaching and essentially interfering with states’ sovereignty. This article explores what backlash over sovereignty actually entails, highlighting a diverse set of political agendas and strategies. The article first develops an analytical matrix of three forms of sovereignty politics – by design, as a shield and as reprisal – to capture different aspects of sovereignty politics. This framework is then used in an empirical analysis of four African states that, within a four-year time-period, all withdrew their declarations granting direct access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Court) for NGOs and individuals from those states. In all cases, sovereignty was claimed as the reason for withdrawal but as we demonstrate, the cases vary. Overall, we find that resistance against the African Court does not necessarily emerge from a challenge to a principled concept of sovereignty, but from sitting governments’ narratives of what human rights ought to be, who ought to invoke them, and when. In other words, sovereignty arguments work mainly to safeguard member states from the authority of the African Court where state practices collide with international commitments to human rights. This takes on a distinct rhetorical framing that utilizes and evokes a set of different meanings of sovereignty, for example that the Court is outside its delegated competences or the issue is inside a vague notion of internal affairs. By using these legal-rhetorical strategies, member states seek to avoid having to address directly the challenges being brought against them at the IC.

The social and political contexts in many countries are affected by dangerous trends and forces of populism. Populist hostility is most observable in connection with issues of immigration, where it functions as a pretext for scrapping legal protections in increasingly hostile immigration laws. What is particularly insidious about these developments is the claim, articulated by some theorists, that the popular resentment and backlash against immigrants and refugees are justified. That populists are hostile towards immigrants and human rights laws, the claim seems to go, is the fault of the legal norms and institutions that allow in the immigrants and protect them. This article challenges those approaches and argues that legal constraints on popular biases towards immigrants are necessary and need to be defended against popular moralism. It is also argued that although community values are important, they should not be considered as trumps against the rights of immigrants and refugees.