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Authorship metrics are a key component of academic advancement. Given recent increases in the publication of collaborative, multiauthored articles, we examine patterns in the perceived gender of authors of peer-reviewed journal articles with five or more coauthors in 11 academic archaeology journals. Our results suggest consistent patterns in lead and last authors and in coauthors. Men are more likely to serve as both lead and last authors and to include far more men than women as coauthors on their publications. We consider the ways gender homophily, friendship networks, and other forms of often unintentional exclusion may have a negative impact on the careers of women and members of other marginalized communities in archaeology and propose recommendations to address these issues within the field. In addition to greater individual reflexivity around coauthorship decisions, we encourage the development of clear guidelines on author ascription by archaeological organizations and publishing outlets and advocate that institutions adopt both total publication and fractional publication counts as measures of individual productivity.
Machiavelli assigns a complicated role in his political theory to the concept of the beneficium (or benefizio in Machiavelli’s Italian) in order to describe the benefits that the power of the state can bring; and this chapter focuses on one philosophical language which is used throughout the Italian Renaissance to discuss this idea and which comes to shape Machiavelli’s own thinking decisively. That language is classical in origin; and it is intimately associated with one text in particular: Seneca’s On Benefits. In the first section of the chapter, Seneca’s thinking about generosity and gratitude is explicated within the wider context of his social philosophy to show how it forms part of a theory of moral obligation, informed by a firmly Stoic notion of natural human sociability. The second section shows how Seneca’s contentions are subsequently retrieved and put to work in pre-humanist and humanist political thought to discuss the moral relationships between members of civil associations and to underline the perils of the vice of ingratitude in political society. Once the place of Seneca’s theory in Renaissance discourse is elucidated, it becomes easier to see how Machiavelli manipulates its contentions into a theory of political obligation within his account of the state.
How should we understand 1970s Kenya, with its combination of inequality and relative political stability? This article offers a new perspective on that by following the early history of the Harambee Co-operative Savings and Credit Society—the most prominent of many such societies that grew in those years. The rise and crisis of this co-operative provides evidence of mismanagement and the pursuit of personal advantage—but also suggests that civil servants saw the importance of enabling wider accumulation. As a result, the lowest-paid employees of government could see through Harambee—and other co-operatives—a possible, if precarious, route to a future as property-owners. That possibility helps explain both the institutional strength of Kenya’s provincial administration (whose employees were the members of Harambee Co-operative) and how a substantial number of Kenyans could develop a sense of themselves as citizens with a stake in the political system.
How do politicians attribute responsibility for good and poor policy outcomes across multiple stakeholders in a policy field where they themselves can affect service provision? Such ‘diffusion’ decisions are crucial to understand the political calculations underlying the allocation of blame and credit by office‐holders. We study this issue using a between‐subjects survey experiment fielded among local politicians in Norway (N = 1073). We find that local politicians attribute responsibility for outcomes in primary education predominantly to school personnel (regardless of whether performance is good or bad) and do not engage in local party‐political blame games. However, we show that local politicians are keen to attribute responsibility for poor outcomes to higher levels of government, especially when these are unaligned with the party of the respondent. These findings suggest that vertical partisan blame‐shifting prevails over horizontal partisan blame games in settings with a political consensus culture.
Chapter 4 considers the conduct of business within the framework of the law and upper-class ideology in honouring debts and protecting the family name. How were contracts arranged? How did buying and selling and letting and hiring take place? What protection was there for the buyer? How did the legal process assist this? What were the rules for partnerships? Especially important to the government were tax-collecting companies. There were rules for deposits and loans, for which a stipulatio could establish interest. Banks operated with clear rules for interest, and various types of security were available for loans. One man’s business could be conducted on his behalf by others, often by his son or household slave, but in the Roman concept of agency he could be sued to a limited extent by those who had lost out in the business. In the labour market there was very limited protection for employees.
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is standardly assumed, by apologists and critics alike, to have offered a theory of what money is: a “means of exchange” whose raison d’etre is to ease the inconveniences of barter. The present discussion rejects this consensus. Read charitably, neither Smith’s origin story in Book I nor his account of “the great wheel of circulation” in Book II traffics in a theory of what money is. Rather, the Wealth of Nations offers no theory of the nature of money at all. What Smith presents, instead, is a functionalist story of a piece with David Hume’s empiricism, which does not make any claims about natures or essences. Smith’s reply to the mercantilist theory of money—that money is specie—is not a rival theory of money’s true nature, but rather a broad depiction of the various ways money brings “conveniency.”
European colonial ventures in the Americas depended on Native American trading routes and economic practices, even as they transformed them. Europeans initially sought to extract valuable resources, but this endeavor always intersected with the day-to-day business of men and women alternately competing and cooperating to sustain their communities. European traders and settlers thus fit into networks crossing imperial and cultural boundaries that were simultaneously economic, familial, and political. Trading networks soon connected the violence of Indigenous land dispossession for the purposes of food cultivation and the export of staples such as sugar, tobacco, and rice with the violence of the Atlantic slave trade, which transported tens of thousands of captives each year from Africa to the Americas by the end of the seventeenth century. Over time, colonial settlers increasingly struggled against imperial governments for control over land, trade, and profits, with revolutionary political consequences in the eighteenth century.
“Political economy,” in the late eighteenth century, signified the statesman’s practice of managing the resources of a political “household.” In 1776, thirteen self-declared American states took control of their political economies. Under the Articles of Confederation, these states, in carefully delimited ways, acted as a composite body with a political economy of its own, and in 1787, the revised federal Constitution became a blueprint for a unified project of economic, political, and social ordering. Thus the history of US political economy can be seen as the story of an emerging One. During the 1790s, two opposing political economies emerged, envisioned and promoted by Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Recent scholarship, however, has moved beyond visions of early American political economy either as a constitutionally defined One or as a partisan Two. It envisions, instead, a postconstitutional landscape composed of many political economies – competing, overlapping, and evolving.
This chapter outlines the history of previous institutions that created forms of capital in Europe, including land, dowries, banks, bills of exchange, and government debt. It examines the reasons why the system of informal oral credit, as it had developed over the previous 100-odd years, began to be criticised during the Commonwealth period. Many authors started to claim that it was both inefficient and an obstacle to economic growth. Many pamphlets were published containing proposals of different sorts of banks, which would issue paper currency to speed up circulation. Some of these were based on previous European examples. The nature of these proposals is examined, together with a summary of how they related to the creation of the Bank of England. Its establishment is normally seen as the successful outcome of this debate, but in fact it was not primarily created as an institution to expand the supply of credit, but to help fund the government debt. The increasing cost of the War of Spanish Succession did, however, result in the issue of things like Exchequer or Treasury bills, as well as South Sea and Bank stock to fund the war. The last part of the chapter focuses on the significant effect these multiple forms of paper currency had on liquidity within London.
The Desolate Boedelskamer was an innovative institution. It introduced a new approach to insolvency. Rather than punishing the insolvent debtor, the Desolate Boedelskamer sought to raise him up. Even though it remained firmly embedded in the early modern mental world and its communal culture of governance, the Amsterdam Desolate Boedelskamer is a clear example of how professionalization and good governance were able to provide systemic trust in a world of growing complexity. This new institution was part of the moral economy of seventeenth-century Amsterdam and relied upon it to function, but it also helped to shape that moral economy. Through a careful balancing act of trust and power, this institution was able to support the proliferation of credit, granting numerous insolvents in seventeenth-century Amsterdam a true stay of execution. In this analytical conclusion, the impact and wider implications of the book's argument will be discussed in a broader context.
This chapter analyzes the shift towards a closer involvement of the Amsterdam authorities in the lives of citizens from all layers of society that occurred through various institutional innovations after the city turned Protestant in 1578. Credit was a unifying economic phenomenon in Amsterdam, and examining the function of credit allows us to shed light on the connections between people from various classes. Focusing on the phenomenon of insolvency, essentially a breakdown of credit, makes it possible to open up broader perspectives on the early modern economy. Guilds and their civic middle-class values shaped social and economic policies of this period in important ways, clearly displaying the integration among different social groups that also came to be reflected in contemporary legal theory and practice. Religious communities also occupied an important role in financial conflict resolution between creditors and debtors. The moral dimensions of insolvency that become manifest through the acts of various Amsterdam consistories reflect important changes in the attitudes towards insolvency that are typical of the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic.
In this radical reinterpretation of the Financial Revolution, Craig Muldrew redefines our understanding of capitalism as a socially constructed set of institutions and beliefs. Financial institutions, including the Bank of England and the stock market, were just one piece of the puzzle. Alongside institutional developments, changes in local credit networks involving better accounting, paper notes and increased mortgaging were even more important. Muldrew argues that, before a society can become capitalist, most of its members have to have some engagement with 'capital' as a thing – a form of stored intangible financial value. He shows how previous oral interpersonal credit was transformed into capital through the use of accounting and circulating paper currency, socially supported by changing ideas about the self which stressed individual savings and responsibility. It was only through changes throughout society that the framework for a concept like capitalism could exist and make sense.
Chapter 8 considers commerce and money management, the largest category of work in the work-task database. This provides a detailed view of petty commerce, the typically small transactions that took place every day across the country, with women and men almost equally involved. Markets remained the most common locations of commerce, but transactions took place everywhere including the home, the street, and occasionally, the specialist retail shop. Evidence of administering debts and pawning goods demonstrates the significant role played by married women in these activities.
This chapter traces the development of money, credit and banking systems in Europe, from their origins to their modern forms. It examines how the reintroduction of monetary systems following the collapse of the Roman Empire contributed to economic growth. The chapter also discusses the evolution of credit markets, the rise of banks and the development of paper money, with an emphasis on the role these institutions played in supporting economic development. It explores the relationship between financial innovation and economic crises, illustrating how the financial system has both facilitated growth and contributed to periods of instability. The chapter concludes by assessing the impact of financial systems on long-term economic development in Europe.
World-historical analyses often view the “Asian” empires that survived into the twentieth century (the Russian, Qing, and Ottoman empires) as anomalies: sovereign “archaic” formations that remained external to the capitalist system. They posit an antagonistic relationship between state and capital and assume that modern capitalism failed to emerge in these empires because local merchants could not take over their states, as they did in Europe. Ottoman economic actors, and specifically the sarraf as state financier, have accordingly been portrayed as premodern intermediaries serving a “predatory” fiscal state, and thus, as external to capitalist development. This article challenges these narratives by uncovering the central role of Ottoman sarrafs, tax-farmers, and other merchant-financiers in the expanding credit economy of the mid-nineteenth century, focusing on their investment in the treasury bonds of Damascus. I show how fiscal change and new laws on interest facilitated the expansion of credit markets while attempting to regulate them by distinguishing between legitimate interest and usury. I also discuss Ottoman efforts to mitigate peasant indebtedness and the abuse of public debt by foreigners, amid the treasury bonds’ growing popularity. In this analysis, global capitalism was forged in the encounter between Ottoman imperial structures, geo-political concerns, and diverse, interacting traditions of credit, while the boundaries between public and private finance were being negotiated and redefined. Ultimately, Ottoman economic policies aimed to retain imperial sovereignty against European attempts to dominate regional credit markets—efforts often recast by the latter as “fanatical” Muslim resistance.
This innovative work delves into the world of ordinary early modern women and men and their relationship with credit and debt. Elise Dermineur focuses on the rural seigneuries of Delle and Florimont in the south of Alsace, where rich archival documents allow for a fine cross-analysis of credit transactions and the reconstruction of credit networks from c.1650 to 1790. She examines the various credit instruments at ordinary people's disposal, the role of women in credit markets, and the social, legal, and economic experiences of indebtedness. The book's distinctive focus on peer-to-peer lending sheds light on how and why pre-industrial interpersonal exchanges featured flexibility, diversity, fairness, solidarity and reciprocity, and room for negotiation and renegotiation. Before Banks also offers insight into factors informing our present financial system and suggests that we can learn from the past to create a fairer society and economy.
This chapter deals with banks as creators and stores of money. We first offer an overview of the economic theories developed in the 1960s and 1970s, where the role of banks depended on their function of transmitting monetary policy of the central bank to the rest of the economic system. We then discuss more modern interpretations that explain the role of banks based on their ability to resolve the informational asymmetry between investors (borrowers) and savers (lenders). Financial innovation raises the question of whether banks may disappear, replaced by financial markets and digital credit management techniques, including artificial intelligence, that minimize the need for human intervention. The experience of financial crises has given new life to reform proposals where banks would be split into a depositary institution providing payment services and an investment arm providing long-term credit and financing itself at long maturities. A related proposal, also aiming at reducing the risk of crises, would subject depository institutions to a 100 percent reserve constraint (the so-called Chicago proposal). At the end of the chapter, reasons are given as to why these proposals should be discarded because they would neither reduce the risk of crises nor give rise to a more efficient intermediation system.
The academic imprint of Susan Strange, long considered a pioneer in the field of IPE, no longer resonates with contemporary debates about the organization and structure of the global political economy. We argue that her analytical framework continues to be a productive way to think about important current developments, most importantly in relation to what can now be called the digital age and its emergent form of capitalism. We therefore modify and update Strange’s framework to highlight its unique analytical potential, and to set out the operational principles of what we want to call a ‘neo-Strangean’ framework of authority. We then apply it to what Strange identifies as the finance or credit structure. By focusing on a core domain of political-economic power, we demonstrate our principal claim that a neo-Strangean framework of authority points towards an understanding of how new actors and imperatives are reshaping the global political economy. We close by outlining the analytical benefits that a neo-Strangean research agenda promises for the field of IPE, which for us centre on emphasizing the dynamics and disruptive consequences of a knowledge-infused global political economy in a way that pays sufficient attention to ideational and material factors.
Algorithmic pricing did not arise in a vacuum but is part of a wider phenomenon of using personal data to profile individuals on the market and make predictions about their preferences and behaviour in future market settings. The potential for price personalization is one of the most important and salient aspects of the wider phenomenon of algorithms and big data analytics that have come to dominate consumer market. The personalization of the contract should not be regarded separately from the personalization of other elements of a market relationship, neither theoretically nor from a practical perspective.
Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in China often struggle to secure loan financing. In response, the government has required banks to increase credit for MSMEs and incorporate digital technologies into traditional credit evaluation models. In 2018, the state introduced “credit easy loan” digital lending platforms under its social credit system to facilitate collateral-free loans for MSMEs in a bid to enhance financial inclusion and social trust. Meanwhile, the actual implementation of these initiatives remains understudied. Drawing on six months of ethnographic fieldwork, this paper examines how “packaging agencies” act as intermediaries in preparing and “beautifying” bank loan applications. These agencies may manipulate credit data and leverage close relationships (guanxi) to help clients obtain loans, while banks may tacitly approve their practices to fulfil their financial inclusion requirements. Through such processes and in a supposedly digitalized system, a single MSME loan multiplied into ten loans, large companies became small businesses, and one housewife became a creditworthy microentrepreneur.