Are parties responsive to public opinion and, if so, to whom exactly? These key questions continue to be major topics of debate among party and representation scholars. This research note extends recent contributions to the literature in three distinct ways. Unlike most extant studies, I do not limit my analysis to Western European countries and the left-right dimension but examine party responsiveness across the entire EU with a focus on six key issues. Conceptually, I draw on two responsiveness frameworks that are concerned with distinct ways through which parties can change their position to align with the general electorate or their partisan supporters. The standard framework tests whether parties shift in the same direction as the public, whereas the congruent responsiveness framework focuses on whether parties reduce past incongruencies with the public. Using updated expert and voter survey time-series data for the period between 1999 and 2024, I show that parties are primarily responsive to their supporters. The uncovered patterns of responsiveness are consistent across responsiveness frameworks, issues, European regions, and time. Both mainstream and niche parties primarily respond to their supporters. The findings carry important implications for our understanding of representation in contemporary European politics.

Political responsiveness is highly unequal along class lines, which has triggered a lively debate about potential causes of this political inequality. What has remained largely unexplored in this debate are the structural economic conditions under which policymakers operate. In this contribution, we hypothesize that budgetary pressures affect both the level and the equality of political responsiveness. Using a dataset containing public opinion data on around 450 fiscal policy proposals in Germany between 1980 and 2016, we investigate whether policymakers are more responsive on issues with budgetary consequences under conditions of low fiscal pressure than under conditions of high fiscal pressure. We find that responsiveness indeed varies systematically with the degree of fiscal pressure and that policymakers are less responsive on fiscal issues when fiscal pressure is high. This holds for both left‐wing and right‐wing governments. In contrast, we do not find strong effects of fiscal pressure on political inequality: responsiveness is not more equal in fiscally more permissive times. However, since different types of policy proposals are adopted in times of high fiscal stress, unequal responsiveness has different policy implications in times of high and low fiscal pressure.

Individual legislators can be important agents of political representation. However, this is contingent upon their responsiveness to constituency requests. To study this topic, an increasing number of studies use field experiments in which the researcher sends a standardized email to legislators on behalf of a constituent. In this paper, we report the results of an original field experiment of this genre with the members of the German Bundestag. Supplementing previous research, we explore whether constituency requests in which voters mention a personal vote intention (rather than a partisan vote intention) increase legislators’ responsiveness, and how this treatment relates to electoral system's incentives. We find that legislators treated with a personal vote intention were more likely to respond (67 per cent) and respond faster than those treated with a partisan vote intention (59 per cent). However, we also show that the treatment effect is moderated by electoral system incentives: it is larger for nominally‐elected legislators than for those elected via a party list. Our results suggest that electoral system's incentives matter for legislators’ responsiveness only when constituents explicitly signals an intention to cast a personal vote.

We combine the recent literature on issue competition with work on intra‐party heterogeneity to advance a novel theoretical argument. Starting from the premise that party leaders and non‐leaders have different motivations and incentives, we conjecture that issue strategies should vary across the party hierarchy. We, therefore, expect systematic intra‐party differences in the use of riding the wave and issue ownership strategies. We test this claim by linking public opinion data to manually coded information on over 3600 press releases issued by over 500 party actors across five election campaigns in Austria between 2006 and 2019. We account for self‐selection into leadership roles by exploiting transitions into and out of leadership status over time. The results show that party leaders are more likely than non‐leaders to respond to the public's issue priorities, but not more or less likely to pursue issue‐ownership strategies.

In this article it is argued that citizens take into account the degree of a government's political autonomy to implement particular policies when expressing their views on satisfaction with democracy (SWD) but, in order to do so, they need to perceive it. When citizens directly observe the external constraints that reduce their government's autonomy, then variations in levels of regime satisfaction may no longer be exclusively about government performance – as widely argued by political economists – but also about democratic choice. The argument develops after comparing the existing scenarios in the Eurozone before and after the Great Recession. Citizens only began to perceive their own lack of choice to decide between policy alternatives when the sovereign debt crisis broke out in May 2010, the date of the first Greek bail‐out. It is then when citizens started to update their beliefs about the functioning of democracy as a system in which alternative policies can be adopted as bail‐out deals were signed between national governments from the Euro periphery and the Troika. This updating process towards the way democracy works explains the increasing gap in the levels of SWD between bailed‐out economies and the rest of the countries in the Eurozone. Empirical confirmation for this claim is found after analysing Eurobarometer surveys from 2002 to 2014 and using a two‐step difference‐in‐difference analysis that combines individual and aggregate data.

A growing body of literature investigates whether legislators show biases in their constituency communication contingent upon constituent traits. However, we know little about whether and how findings of unequal responsiveness generalize across countries (beyond the United States) and across different traits. We address both issues using a pre‐registered comparative field experiment conducted in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, in which fictitious citizens (varied by ethnicity, social class and partisan affiliation) inquired about legislators’ policy priorities regarding the COVID‐19 pandemic. Our pooled analysis reveals that co‐partisanship and class both increase the responsiveness of legislators while we find no effect for ethnicity. The effect sizes we find are small, but comparable to earlier studies and also noteworthy in view of our hard test design. Our exploratory analyses further corroborate the lack of discrimination against ethnic minority constituents in showing no intersectionality effects, that is, interactions between ethnic‐minority and low‐class identities. This exploratory step also addresses the country specific differences that we find. We speculate about plausible underlying party system effects that we, however, cannot substantiate due to statistical limitations. This important issue requires further attention in future research.

A close connection between public opinion and policy is considered a vital element of democracy. However, legislators cannot be responsive to all voters at all times with regard to the policies the latter favour. We argue that legislators use their speaking time in parliament to offer compensatory speech to their constituents who might oppose how they voted on a policy, in order to re‐establish themselves as responsive to the public's wishes. Leveraging the case of Brexit, we show that legislators pay more attention to constituents who might be dissatisfied with how they voted. Furthermore, their use of rhetorical responsiveness is contingent on the magnitude of the representational deficit they face vis‐à‐vis their constituency. Our findings attest to the central role of parliamentary speech in maintaining responsiveness. They also demonstrate that communicative responsiveness can substitute for policy responsiveness.

This article addresses and observes the crisis of Western democracy through the lens of the weakness of parties and party government, especially at the European Union (EU) level. Social stratification changes, global trends and ultimately the sustained economic crisis have placed political parties atthe national and the EU level under enormous strain. Moreover, demands posed by the crisis on national governments by the EU have generated conflicting interests of different member states. The resulting development of Horizontal Euroscepticism has made intergovernmental decision making, which has represented the backbone of the EU legitimacy up to now, extremely problematic and has posed the need for rethinking democracy in multi-level Europe, ultimately by strengthening supranational democracy through the creation of a form of party government at the EU level as well.

A close connection between public opinion and policy is considered a vital element of democracy. In representative systems, elections are assumed to play a role in realising such congruence. If those who participate in elections are not representative of the public at large, it follows that the reliance on elections as a mechanism of representation entails a risk of unequal representation. In this paper, we evaluate whether voters are better represented by means of an analysis of policy responsiveness to voters and citizens in democracies worldwide. We construct a uniquely comprehensive dataset that includes measures of citizens’ and voters’ ideological (left–right) positions, and data on welfare spending in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries since 1980. We find evidence of policy responsiveness to voters, but not to the public at large. Since additional tests suggest that the mechanism of electoral turnout does not cause this voter‐policy responsiveness, we outline alternate mechanisms to test in future research.

The European Union (EU) has become increasingly visible and contested over the past decades. Several studies have shown that domestic pressure has made the EU's ‘electorally connected’ institutions more responsive. Yet, we still know little about how politicisation has affected the Union's non‐majoritarian institutions. We address this question by focusing on agenda‐setting and ask whether and how domestic politics influences the prioritisation of legislative proposals by the European Commission. We argue that the Commission, as both a policy‐seeker and a survival‐driven bureaucracy, will respond to domestic issue salience and Euroscepticism, at party, mass and electoral level, through targeted performance and through aggregate restraint. Building on new data on the prioritisation of legislative proposals under the ordinary legislative procedure (1999–2019), our analysis shows that the Commission's choice to prioritise is responsive to the salience of policy issues for Europe's citizens. By contrast, our evidence suggests that governing parties’ issue salience does not drive, and Euroscepticism does not constrain, the Commission's priority‐setting. Our findings contribute to the literature on multilevel politics, shedding new light on the strategic responses of non‐majoritarian institutions to the domestic politicisation of ‘Europe’.

Contexts outside the advanced developed democracies present a challenge to assessing how well party systems reflect voter preferences across over-arching policy dimensions because not all electorates readily interpret political conflict in dimensional terms. In this contribution, I advocate an approach suited for such contexts that combines deductive and inductive elements: It starts out with what observers consider the most important dividing lines in a party system, and then goes on to operationalize these dimensions in an inductive fashion by drawing on all theoretically relevant items that are available in mass and elite surveys. I devise a relative-fit measure of responsiveness that can be compared across space and time, even if positions at the elite and mass levels are measured on different scales. To illustrate the usefulness of the strategy, I show how it leads to novel contrasts in terms of programmatic responsiveness among four Latin American countries, namely Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia.

At the time of the election of the European Parliament (EP) in 2014, the European Union (EU) was heavily affected by a multifaceted crisis that had – and still has – far‐reaching implications for the political system of its member countries, but also for the European level of governance. Against the background of the strong Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 EP elections, this study aims to investigate in which way Eurosceptic parties of the left and the right respond to the multiple crises of the EU. Using data from the Euromanifesto Project from 2004/2009 and 2014, changes in the party positions towards the EU are analysed in the shadow of the multiple crises and the reasons thereof are explored. The findings show a general anti‐European shift among the two types of Eurosceptic parties. Nevertheless, the changes in the EU polity tone are not determined by issue‐based repercussions of the multiple crises, but by the EU‐related evaluation – the polity mood – of the national citizenry. For far‐right Eurosceptic parties, the shift is moderated by the level of public support for EU integration in their national environment. Among far‐left Eurosceptic parties, by contrast, it is moderated by the more specific public attitudes about the monetary union policy of the EU. Consequently, political parties when drafting their manifestos for EP elections are not so much guided by the objective severity of political problems or by the evaluations of these problems by the citizenry. What matters in the end is the link that citizens themselves are able to establish between the severity of political problems, on the one hand, and the responsibility of the EU for these problems on the other. This has important consequences for understanding of the nature and substance of political responsiveness within the EU system of multilevel governance.

A large body of research shows that members of Congress disproportionately represent the interests of copartisans and affluent Americans. Is there also racial disparity in representation? I draw on three standards of political equality—proportionality, race-conscious egalitarianism, and pluralism—and assess the extent to which minority representation satisfies each. To do so, I match roll-call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives to survey data fielded prior to each vote (2006–2016) and use multilevel regression and poststratification to estimate racial subgroups’ opinions. I then examine how closely House members’ voting aligns with these opinions, focusing on districts where White and minority preferences differ. My analysis rules out “coincidental representation’ driven by similar opinions across groups and accounts for how much of each racial group’s national population resides in each district. Among districts where racial group opinions differ, I find strong support for the proportionality over the race-conscious egalitarian standard: Racial minority representation is substantially greater in majority–minority districts than in those that are not. However, I find strong evidence for the race-conscious egalitarian standard among Democratic legislators and moderate evidence for the pluralist standard among all legislators, as voting tends to align with racial minority opinion on explicitly race-targeted bills.

Understanding and responding to patient expectations is crucial for providing high-quality, person-centred mental healthcare, but remains underexplored in humanitarian settings. This study examines the preferences and experiences of Syrian mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) service users in Northwest Syria and Türkiye. We conducted structured interviews with 378 displaced Syrians (55% female, mean age: 31 years). Participants completed the Client Satisfaction Questionnaire-8 and responded to nine open-ended questions. An abductive qualitative content analysis guided by the World Health Organization’s health system responsiveness framework was used to interpret their accounts. Participants most frequently described the importance of time and understanding (62%), dignity (43%), confidentiality (36%) and continuity of care (31%), with notable variation by gender. Interpersonal aspects of care were crucial for building trust and sustaining service engagement. Service-level factors, such as adequate time with practitioners and integrated and coordinated care, ensured high-quality support in a context of ongoing conflict, displacement and poverty. These findings underscore the importance of embedding person-centred approaches in MHPSS service design and delivery. As efforts to rebuild Syria’s health system begin, prioritising service user experiences could improve the quality of care and restore health system trust and legitimacy.

This paper examines how public demand and institutional contexts shape the substantive representation of LGBTQ+ populations across Europe. I argue that while positive social constructions of LGBTQ+ populations are a necessary condition for the advances of LGBTQ+ rights, issue salience can facilitate LGBTQ+ rights only if public opinion on LGBTQ+ is positive. Furthermore, I assert that translating social constructions of LGBTQ+ populations into policy outputs is mediated by the proportionality of electoral systems. I analyze policy scores, public attitudes, and online interest concerning LGBTQ+ topics. I find that positive social constructions are correlated with more inclusive LGBTQ+ rights across countries, and the positive impact of issue salience on LGBTQ+ rights is observed only in countries with positive social constructions. Additionally, the analysis of electoral systems provides mixed evidence regarding the role of proportionality.

While research shows that public preferences across policy domains tend to move in parallel, the mechanisms behind this dynamic remain unclear. We examine four explanations: (1) alignment in preferred policy levels; (2) parallel policy movement combined with domain-specific thermostatic feedback; (3) feedback to global policy across domains; and (4) responsiveness to presidential partisanship. These mechanisms matter for how we interpret public opinion change and policy responsiveness. We develop and test a theoretical model using data on four social spending domains in the USA. Our findings suggest that spending mood reflects both parallelism in preferred policy levels and responsiveness to overall social spending and presidential party affiliation.