To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In her chapter, Maureen O’Connor shows how feminist revivalists, in their writings and political work, experienced the Irish landscape and nature as powerful forces in the conception of “Irishness.” Revival feminists give voice and prominence to the supernatural, which has long been a component of Irish folklore. While writers such as Alice Milligan, Ethna Carbery, Eva Gore-Booth, and Hannah Lynch were critical of the dominant revival narrative – particularly when it romanticized rural Ireland and its “rustic” landscape or created gendered stereotypes about the land and Irishness generally – their work nevertheless embodied the revival insofar as it focuses on how time and political struggle are embedded in the landscape. The critique of violence and masculine power is especially important in works by latter-day revivalists such as Eilís Dillon and Edna O’Brien, who take aim at masculinist conceptions of the struggle for Irish freedom in the War of Independence and in late-twentieth century conflicts in Northern Ireland.
This article develops two logical arguments from evil that bypass Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defence through a critical examination of the relationship between freedom and value. The first argument assumes that morally innocent freedom is valuable, challenging the traditional emphasis on significant freedom. The second argument draws on an interpretation of J.L. Mackie’s underexplored ethical perspective, which highlights a form of evil that contrasts with the positive value of free will.
This article argues that a pervasive but confused theory of free will is driving unwarranted resistance to behavioral genetic research and undermining the concept of personal responsibility enshrined in our moral and legal conventions. We call this the theory of ‘free-will-by-subtraction’. A particularly explicit version of this theory has been propounded by the psychologist Eric Turkheimer, who has proposed that human agency can be scientifically quantified as the behavioral variation that remains unexplained after known genetic and environmental causes have been accounted for. This theory motivates resistance to research that suggests genetic differences substantially account for differences in human behavior because that is seen to reduce the scope of human freedom. In academic philosophy, free-will-by-subtraction theory corresponds to a position called ‘libertarian incompatibilism’, which holds that human beings are not responsible for behavior that has antecedent causes yet maintains that free will nonetheless exists because some fraction of human behavioral variation is self-caused. However, this position is rejected by most professional philosophers. We argue that libertarian incompatibilism is inconsistent with a secular materialist outlook in which all human behavior is understood to have antecedent causes whether those causes are known to science or not — an outlook Turkheimer shares. We show that Turkheimer sustains this contradiction by adopting an untenable position we call ‘epistemic libertarianism’, which holds that antecedent causes of our behavior only infringe on our freedom if we know about them. By contrast, the overwhelming majority of secular materialist philosophers support a position called ‘compatibilism’, which maintains that free will is compatible with the comprehensive causation of human behavior. We show that compatibilism neutralizes the threat that genetic explanation poses to human agency and rescues a generous conception of personal responsibility that aligns with our moral intuitions.
This chapter distinguishes various sorts of rudimentary spatial structure and particularity that are present in our visual experience, in a kind of palimpsest. It develops a modal structuralist understanding of the neurophysiology that roots this type of experience.
Howard CH Khoe, National Psychiatry Residency Programme, Singapore,Cheryl WL Chang, National University Hospital, Singapore,Cyrus SH Ho, National University Hospital, Singapore
Chapter 14 covers the topic of hoarding disorder. Through a case vignette with topical MCQs for consolidation of learning, readers are brought through the diagnosis and treatment of a patient with hoarding disorder. Topics covered include diagnosis, risk factors, etiology, pharmacological and non-pharmacological management of hoarding disorder.
Humanity’s impact on the planet is undeniable. Fairly and effectively addressing environmental problems begins with understanding their causes and impacts. Is over-population the main driver of environmental degradation? Poverty? Capitalism? Poor governance? Imperialism? Patriarchy? Clearly these are not technical questions, but political ones.
Updated to cover new debates, data, and policy, and expanded to include chapters on colonialism, race and gender, and the impacts of energy and resource extraction, this book introduces students to diverse perspectives and helps them develop an informed understanding of why environmental problems occur.
How the international community should act is deeply contested. Guiding students through the potential responses, including multilateral diplomacy, transnational voluntary action, innovative financial mechanisms, problem displacement, consumer-focused campaigns, and resistance, this book explains the different forms of political action, their limitations and injustices.
Online resources include lecture slides, a test bank for instructors, updated weblinks to videos, and suggested readings for students.
‘Last Wills and Remembrance’ builds on Chapter 3’s findings by examining the social authority and memorial value afforded to the last will. The dramatic potency of a last will centres on its ability to evoke the presence of an absent testator, imposing the latent will of the dead upon the living through the obligation of remembrance. This chapter focuses on Ben Jonson’s Volpone, and Thomas Middleton’s The Phoenix, and The London Prodigal (of an uncertain author) to show how consistently this memorial duty elicited a struggle between the will of the testator and their beneficiaries, and that such moments often centre on the manipulation of blank, invalid, or fake wills. I argue that the execution of last wills in these plays illuminates the pitfalls associated with the commemoration of human endeavours, the anxieties related to the endurance of familial dynasties, and the sociopolitical disparities caused by patrilineal succession. The last will, once again, acts as a means by which dramatists could scrutinize and deliberate upon the relative authority or vulnerability of the individual faculty of the will.
Howard CH Khoe, National Psychiatry Residency Programme, Singapore,Cheryl WL Chang, National University Hospital, Singapore,Cyrus SH Ho, National University Hospital, Singapore
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the teaching of the so-called Peripatetics in the Tusculan Disputations with regard to their views on passions. Such views serve Cicero’s dialectical purposes and his wish to present the debate in Books 3–5 as primarily a dialectical exchange between Stoic ‘lack of passions’ (apatheia) and Peripatetic ‘moderation of passions’ (metriopatheia). Moreover, the Peripatetics are presented as siding with the early followers of Plato, and in particular with Crantor, in a unified camp against the Stoics. I argue that, despite the polemical features of Cicero’s presentation of the Peripatetics in the work, the metriopatheia view merits serious consideration, being much more than just a foil for an argument in favour of Stoicism.
Howard CH Khoe, National Psychiatry Residency Programme, Singapore,Cheryl WL Chang, National University Hospital, Singapore,Cyrus SH Ho, National University Hospital, Singapore
Question 1: James is a three-year-old boy brought to the clinic for concerns over his behaviour. James appears ‘always on the go’ and does not interact with his younger brother. He has difficulties waiting his turn, which leads to conflicts with his peers. He does not appear to pay attention despite being spoken to directly. On examination in the clinic, you notice it is very difficult to sit James down in a chair. Physical examination is normal and developmentally appropriate for his age. What is the most likely diagnosis?
The legal services marketplace sits on the cusp of a revolution. For nearly a century, American lawyers have enjoyed a monopoly over the provision of legal services. Sweeping unauthorized practice of law (UPL) laws have prohibited (and in some cases, criminalized) the practice of law by anyone other than a licensed attorney – and these rules have further mandated that lawyers work as solo practitioners or in lawyer-owned law firms.1 This one-two punch has meant that only lawyers can provide legal advice and that even lawyers can’t practice law in nonlawyer-owned entities.2
Twentieth-century scholars defined “pastoral nomadism” as an environmental adaptation inherently linked to specific political, social, and economic traits: long-distance mobility; tribalism, social egalitarianism, and dependence on sedentary agricultural communities; economic specialization in pastoralism; and “marginal” land. To resolve conceptual conflation and promote the writing of histories of pastoralism, archaeologists require a new framework that draws on anthropological ideas about mobility, political complexity, intensification of production, and pastoral landscapes.
Why do some revolutions fail and succumb to counterrevolutions, whereas others go on to establish durable rule? Marshalling original data on counterrevolutions worldwide since 1900 and new evidence from the reversal of Egypt's 2011 revolution, Killian Clarke explains both why counterrevolutions emerge and when they are likely to succeed. He forwards a movement-centric argument that emphasizes the strategies revolutionary leaders embrace both during their opposition campaigns and after they seize power. Movements that wage violent resistance and espouse radical ideologies establish regimes that are very difficult to overthrow. By contrast, democratic revolutions like Egypt's are more vulnerable, though Clarke also identifies a path by which they too can avoid counterrevolution. By preserving their elite coalitions and broad popular support, these movements can return to mass mobilization to thwart counterrevolutionary threats. In an era of resurgent authoritarianism worldwide, Return of Tyranny sheds light on one particularly violent form of reactionary politics.
Over the past twenty years, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) have moved from the periphery to the centre of the human rights debate. The potential of NHRIs to transmit and implement international norms at the domestic level, and to transfer human rights expertise to regional and global human rights fora, is increasingly recognised. In Europe, the continent with the widest variety and density of human rights protection mechanisms, NHRIs are also gradually gaining recognition as actors that can enable more comprehensive and effective human rights promotion and protection.
Filling a gap in the legal literature, this book aims to bridge the gap between the European and Latin American experiences of NHRIs, exploring the impact that this has internationally. As such, it not only includes introductory chapters on the relationship between NHRIs and the United Nations, the European Union and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, but also offers general contributions on other European and Latin American institutions and valuable deep dives into specific case studies on certain regional commissions, ombuds offices and institutes. In order to assess the distinct models these institutional organisations adopt, three of the major European NHRIs have been chosen: the Spanish Ombuds Office; the French Commission; and German Institute. The main Latin American NHRIs which adopt either an ombuds, a commission or an institute model are also analysed, including those of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay.