In Chapter 4, I explore another way in which morality functions to serve psychological protective functions: the will to “self-tormenting” (GM II 22). By attending to this inwardly directed form of “self-ravishment” (GM II 18), I conceive of the protective, defensive functions of morality thus: To stave off, moderate, disavow, or dissociate a painful affect that is “becoming unendurable” – for instance, helplessness, impotence, “depression, heaviness, [or] weariness” – one turns to oneself as the “sole cause of [such] suffering” (GM III 20). Such self-recriminations thereby: (1) drive “out of consciousness at least for the moment” the painful feeling (GM III 17) and (2) restore a sense of efficacy, a sense of power (GM III 15). After distinguishing between two prominent ways in which such cruelty turned inward may be felt – namely, through guilt and shame – I argue it is shame that plays an underdeveloped and underappreciated role in the Second Essay. In this evaluative framework, our shame, that familiar form of self-reproach, is shown to serve psychological protective functions as it renders us ever more obscure to ourselves.

The Asia region (including the Indo-Pacific region) is critically important for Australia’s long-term future as people-to-people links through education and cultural exchange, migration, business, trade, defence and tourism continue to expand and Australia’s relationship with the countries of the region evolves. Referred to as the ‘Asia priority’, the Asia and Australia’s engagement with Asia cross-curriculum priority provides opportunities for learners to investigate, understand and recognise the diversity within and between the peoples and countries of the Asia region as well as the diversity within communities in Australia. Referred to as ‘Asia literacy’, and more recently as ‘Asia capability’, this combination of knowledge, understanding and skills prepares learners for the challenges of living, studying and working in the region and in global contexts. This chapter offers strategies for teaching and learning about and from the diverse peoples and cultures of the region in ways that go beyond the instrumentalism of national economic and security interests in Asia. Learners can be encouraged to recognise commonalities and differences as well as appreciate and empathise with the lived experiences of diverse peoples and local communities in Asia and in Australia.

This chapter elaborates on the logic of policy change, arguing that the forces of status quo usually hold the upper hand in preserving existing policies and limiting the amount of their change. However, over time pressure builds up and, when accompanied by media attention and skillful political entrepreneurs, this status quo can be shattered and fundamental changes take place abruptly. There is a serendipitous quality to such transformation, pointing to the confluence of accidental factors that are usually beyond the control of any individual political actor, thus making its specific nature and timing difficult to predict.

This chapter argues that much of the complexity and rigour of Geography revolves around the sophisticated conceptualisation that is involved in thinking geographically, something that begins to develop in preschool. It is not so much what the geographer studies but the way they look at the human or physical phenomena they are exploring that makes the study of Geography what it is. This leads some to say that everything can be studied geographically or everything is geography! Going back to the discussion on the ‘grammar’ of a subject, we can again highlight that what many people perceive as geography is purely the vocabulary of the subject and what makes geography is the grammar of the subject; that is, it is the implicit conceptual thinking involved when exploring and trying to make sense of the world in which we live.

For almost three millennia the pastoral nomads of the Eurasian steppe formed a great reserve of mounted cavalry, threatening their settled neighbours while offering them goods and services of great value – in particular horses and skilled soldiers for their armies. The Eurasian nomads were also empire-builders, creators of imperial ideology and administrative structures that were passed down through generations of successor states. Their imperial centre in Mongolia was home to two related peoples – the Turks and the Mongols – each defined by the powerful empires they erected. The Türk Empire, which flourished from the mid-sixth to mid-eighth centuries, was the first of these and it controlled the steppe from Mongolia to the Volga river, fighting and trading with China, the empires of the Middle East, and Byzantium. The second great state was the Mongol Empire, founded by Chinggis Khan in 1206. The Mongols extended their power yet further than the Turks, conquering much of Eurasia.

The chapter focuses on how Chile’s conservatives rallied in opposition to the country’s popular mobilization of the 1960s. At its center is a group of authoritarian thinkers named the “Gremialistas.” Buoyed by the ICH and Opus Dei apparatuses, this group was responsible for devising an ideology akin to that of technocratic Spain and, subsequently, stood at the forefront of the opposition to Salvador Allende’s government. In turn, it served as the ideological backbone of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, thereby defining its neoliberal economic model and constitutional frameworks.

Chapter 11 summarises the arguments in the book. It concludes that, although the evidence is incomplete, there is little reason to believe that the severe disfigurement provision is inducing positive attitudinal or behavioural change, nor providing an effective remedy for people discriminated against because of the way they look. It concludes by noting that other social changes may bring this issue into sharper focus, and suggests some ways in which holes in the evidence could be filled.

Few figures have been more controversial in the history of modern Italy than Luigi Cadorna. When he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, in summer 1914, he was already popular with his fellow countrymen. Since May 1915, he became an untouchable autocrat. Enjoying exceptional powers, he governed the war zone – virtually the whole of Northern Italy – with an iron fist, more and more explicitly defying government and parliament who were, he claimed, a bunch of weak, inept, radical progressives who would lead the country to ruin. He was too much of a monarchist to aspire to dictatorship, as some of his supporters actually proposed. But he sincerely believed Italy needed a strong man in command and did his utmost to achieve his purpose. Only the catastrophe of Caporetto in autumn 1917 eventually toppled him. He was relieved of his command, held to account for his performance, and turned into the scapegoat for all the woes of the Italian war: bloodbaths in the trenches, iron discipline, firing squads galore, the home territory overrun. For several years he vanished from the scene until Mussolini, firmly ensconced as dictator, decided to call him back to the public eye.

Generations of historians have seen the interplay between the early modern state and its armed forces, and between warfare and state formation, as key factors in the process of modernisation. The creation of the modern state was most powerfully expressed through the supposed symbiosis between absolute regimes and standing armies. The image of geometric order and discipline generated by formations of infantry drawn up in kilometre-long battle lines; the authorities’ direct involvement in provisioning, equipping, and uniforming its soldiers; central government’s reach into every aspect of warfare and military planning. All of these have been regarded as defining traits of the interconnection between the standing army and the state. Research on the inner structures of early modern military society has, until recently, been coloured by preconceptions about functioning hierarchies and chains of command, an increasingly effective military administration, rigid discipline, and corresponding efficiency in the waging of warfare. Such a top-down view remained unchallenged as long as researchers relied almost exclusively on sources derived from governmental and/or legal provenance, leaving an impression of overwhelming state authority reaching right down to the level of the common soldier.