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In this chapter we consider systems that consist of individuals who generate some type of production outputs and are awarded shares of the resulting utility of production according to a utility sharing mechanism. Think of systems in which individuals make contributions to one or several projects that for each project amount to some value of utility of production. Contributors to each project are awarded according to a utility sharing mechanism that determines how the utility of production of each project is shared among those who contributed to it. Such systems arise in many real-life situations. For example, in the context of online services, users may contribute to activities such as online content creation or software development and may be awarded credits for their contributions in various kinds such as monetary payments, attention, and reputation. Another example is that of scientific collaborations where scientists work jointly on research projects and receive credits for the impact of their research results. In this case, the value of credit received may depend on some measure of the impact of the work on society and how much each individual contributed toward the success of the project. It is natural in such scenarios to consider strategic individuals who aim to selfishly maximize their individual payoffs, both in non-cooperative and cooperative strategic settings. A central question of interest here is that of the efficiency with respect to the social utility of production in environments where individual objectives are not necessarily aligned with the social objective. We are especially interested in evaluating the efficiency of utility sharing mechanisms that are simple and commonly deployed in practice; for example, sharing of the produced utility of production according to equal shares, sharing that is proportional to individual contributions, or sharing according to fixed shares depending on the ranks of individual contributions.
The class of contests considered in the present chapter differs from those in previous chapters in that prizes are shares of the utility of production, which is a function of effort investments, rather than shares of a fixed prize purse. Another important distinction is that in the present context we also consider collaborative environments where it is natural for players to form coalitions. This asks us to go beyond the solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory to consider those that account for strategic cooperation among players.
In this chapter we consider normal form games that consist of a set of one or more contests each offering a prize of a certain value and a set of two or more players who simultaneously invest efforts across the set of available contests. We consider strategic players who aim at selfishly maximizing their individual payoffs. The payoff of each player is assumed to be quasi-linear in the total value of prizes won across different contests and the incurred cost of production. The values of prizes are allowed to assume arbitrary positive values, except when we consider the case of contests with identical values of prizes. The existence of multiple available contests provides players with alternative options for effort investment. From the perspective of any given contest, this provides players with outside options that may significantly affect the effort investments directed into the given contest.
The type of normal form games that we study in this chapter serves as a natural model of the competition-based crowdsourcing services that solicit contributions to projects from online communities through contests. In such crowdsourcing services there are typically several open contests at any given time, sometimes as many as in the order of hundreds. Each contest awards one or more prizes to the winning solutions selected from the set of solutions submitted to this contest. This selection is made according to a set of contest rules, which are public information, or at a discretion of a contest owner who identifies one or more best-quality submissions according to a criteria. Some of the competition-based crowdsourcing services allow workers to choose to participate in any of the open contests. Such a design rests on a premise that each individual worker may be in a best position to appreciate his or her ability to perform well in any given contest based on specification of the underlying project requirements and some prior sense about the competition. However, such an assignment of projects to workers may result in inefficiencies due to non-cooperative strategic behavior. Some projects may attract many while others may only attract a few workers.
This book synthesizes what one may refer to as contest theory, understood in a broad sense to encompass scientific methods and theories for the better understanding and informed design of contests. Its goal is to provide a contest designer with a set of theoretical results and methods that can be used for the design of contests. An ambitious aspiration is to provide a toolkit for a contest designer of a similar kind to what control theory offers to engineers for the design of control systems. This is, undoubtedly, a challenging task, primarily because of the complexity of user behavior and incentives that play a key role in most of the systems of concern. This book covers a wide range of models developed in different areas of science including computer science, economics, and statistics.
Generally speaking, we refer to contests as situations in which individuals invest efforts toward winning one or more prizes, those investments of efforts are costly and irreversible, and prizes are allocated based on the relative values of efforts. A prize is understood in a broad sense to refer to a notion of value that is general enough to include not only monetary prizes but also social reputation and gratitude. How to allocate a prize purse to competitors in a contest was studied as early as 1902 by Galton, who reasoned about the question, “what is the most suitable proportion between the values of first and second prizes?” assuming a statistical model according to which individual production outputs are independent and identically distributed random variables with a given distribution. An economist's approach is to assume that contestants are rational players who strategically invest efforts with a selfish goal of maximizing their individual payoffs, which combine in some way the value of winning a prize and the cost of production. The study of a contest as a game using the framework of game theory allows us to reason about properties that arise in a strategic equilibrium. The design of a contest needs to ensure that proper incentives are put in place to achieve a desired objective. Commonly studied objectives include the total effort invested by contestants, the maximum individual effort over all contestants, and the social welfare defined as the value of the prizes to those who win them.
In this chapter we consider contests that award one or more placement prizes based on the rank of individual performance. Such contests are rather common. The number of placement prizes and how the prize purse is split over a given number of placement prizes vary widely from one contest to another. Perhaps the most common contest design is to award only the first place prize, thus rewarding only the best performing contestant. Another common practice is to award two prizes: the first place prize and the runner-up prize to the best performing and the second best performing contestant, respectively. Also common are designs with three placement prizes: the first place prize to the best performing player, the second place prize to the second best performing player, and the third place prize to the third best performing player. A case that also often arises in practice is a contest that offers one or more prizes of identical values. For example, such prizes can be positions in the next stage of a tournament, admissions to a school program, or research papers accepted for inclusion in a conference program. The rank-based allocation of prizes that is considered in this chapter can be seen as a generalization of that studied in Chapter 2, where the focus was on contests that award only the first place prize. One might expect that devoting some amount of a prize purse to the runner-up and perhaps also to other placement prizes would incentivize lower ability contestants to try harder and as a result yield overall higher performance.
Our goal in this chapter is to characterize strategic behavior in contests that award one or more placement prizes. We shall pay particular attention to identifying conditions under which it is optimal for a contest owner to offer only the first place prize and when it is better to split a prize purse across several placement prizes. There are two important factors here: the informational assumptions about abilities of players and the nature of production costs. We shall see that if players are ex-ante identical with respect to their abilities and the production of each player exhibits a weakly diminishing marginal cost of production, it is optimal for the contest owner to allocate the entire prize purse to the first place prize with respect to both the expected total effort and the expected maximum individual effort in an equilibrium.
Recent inapproximability results of Sly (2010), together with an approximation algorithm presented by Weitz (2006), establish a beautiful picture of the computational complexity of approximating the partition function of the hard-core model. Let λc($\mathbb{T}_{\Delta}$) denote the critical activity for the hard-model on the infinite Δ-regular tree. Weitz presented an FPTAS for the partition function when λ < λc($\mathbb{T}_{\Delta}$) for graphs with constant maximum degree Δ. In contrast, Sly showed that for all Δ ⩾ 3, there exists εΔ > 0 such that (unless RP = NP) there is no FPRAS for approximating the partition function on graphs of maximum degree Δ for activities λ satisfying λc($\mathbb{T}_{\Delta}$) < λ < λc($\mathbb{T}_{\Delta}$) + εΔ.
We prove that a similar phenomenon holds for the antiferromagnetic Ising model. Sinclair, Srivastava and Thurley (2014) extended Weitz's approach to the antiferromagnetic Ising model, yielding an FPTAS for the partition function for all graphs of constant maximum degree Δ when the parameters of the model lie in the uniqueness region of the infinite Δ-regular tree. We prove the complementary result for the antiferromagnetic Ising model without external field, namely, that unless RP = NP, for all Δ ⩾ 3, there is no FPRAS for approximating the partition function on graphs of maximum degree Δ when the inverse temperature lies in the non-uniqueness region of the infinite tree $\mathbb{T}_{\Delta}$. Our proof works by relating certain second moment calculations for random Δ-regular bipartite graphs to the tree recursions used to establish the critical points on the infinite tree.
Suppose that X1, X2, . . . are independent identically distributed Bernoulli random variables with mean p. A Bernoulli factory for a function f takes as input X1, X2, . . . and outputs a random variable that is Bernoulli with mean f(p). A fast algorithm is a function that only depends on the values of X1, . . ., XT, where T is a stopping time with small mean. When f(p) is a real analytic function the problem reduces to being able to draw from linear functions Cp for a constant C > 1. Also it is necessary that Cp ⩽ 1 − ε for known ε > 0. Previous methods for this problem required extensive modification of the algorithm for every value of C and ε. These methods did not have explicit bounds on $\mathbb{E}[T]$ as a function of C and ε. This paper presents the first Bernoulli factory for f(p) = Cp with bounds on $\mathbb{E}[T]$ as a function of the input parameters. In fact, supp∈[0,(1−ε)/C]$\mathbb{E}[T]$ ≤ 9.5ε−1C. In addition, this method is very simple to implement. Furthermore, a lower bound on the average running time of any Cp Bernoulli factory is shown. For ε ⩽ 1/2, supp∈[0,(1−ε)/C]$\mathbb{E}[T]$≥0.004Cε−1, so the new method is optimal up to a constant in the running time.
We propose a new method, probabilistic divide-and-conquer, for improving the success probability in rejection sampling. For the example of integer partitions, there is an ideal recursive scheme which improves the rejection cost from asymptotically order n3/4 to a constant. We show other examples for which a non-recursive, one-time application of probabilistic divide-and-conquer removes a substantial fraction of the rejection sampling cost.
We also present a variation of probabilistic divide-and-conquer for generating i.i.d. samples that exploits features of the coupon collector's problem, in order to obtain a cost that is sublinear in the number of samples.
A uniform hypergraph H is called k-Ramsey for a hypergraph F if, no matter how one colours the edges of H with k colours, there is always a monochromatic copy of F. We say that H is k-Ramsey-minimal for F if H is k-Ramsey for F but every proper subhypergraph of H is not. Burr, Erdős and Lovasz studied various parameters of Ramsey-minimal graphs. In this paper we initiate the study of minimum degrees and codegrees of Ramsey-minimal 3-uniform hypergraphs. We show that the smallest minimum vertex degree over all k-Ramsey-minimal 3-uniform hypergraphs for Kt(3) is exponential in some polynomial in k and t. We also study the smallest possible minimum codegree over 2-Ramsey-minimal 3-uniform hypergraphs.
In a recent paper, Baxter and Zeilberger showed that the two most important Mahonian statistics, the inversion number and the major index, are asymptotically independently normally distributed on permutations. In another recent paper, Canfield, Janson and Zeilberger proved the result, already known to statisticians, that the Mahonian distribution is asymptotically normal on words. This leaves one question unanswered: What, asymptotically, is the joint distribution of the inversion number and the major index on words? We answer this question by establishing convergence to a bivariate normal distribution.
Contests are prevalent in many areas, including sports, rent seeking, patent races, innovation inducement, labor markets, scientific projects, crowdsourcing and other online services, and allocation of computer system resources. This book provides unified, comprehensive coverage of contest theory as developed in economics, computer science, and statistics, with a focus on online services applications, allowing professionals, researchers and students to learn about the underlying theoretical principles and to test them in practice. The book sets contest design in a game-theoretic framework that can be used to model a wide-range of problems and efficiency measures such as total and individual output and social welfare, and offers insight into how the structure of prizes relates to desired contest design objectives. Methods for rating the skills and ranking of players are presented, as are proportional allocation and similar allocation mechanisms, simultaneous contests, sharing utility of productive activities, sequential contests, and tournaments.
In 1990 Bender, Canfield and McKay gave an asymptotic formula for the number of connected graphs on [n] = {1,2,. . .,n} with m edges, whenever n and the nullity m−n+1 tend to infinity. Let Cr(n,t) be the number of connected r-uniform hypergraphs on [n] with nullity t = (r−1)m−n+1, where m is the number of edges. For r ≥ 3, asymptotic formulae for Cr(n,t) are known only for partial ranges of the parameters: in 1997 Karoński and Łuczak gave one for t = o(log n/log log n), and recently Behrisch, Coja-Oghlan and Kang gave one for t=Θ(n). Here we prove such a formula for any fixed r ≥ 3 and any t = t(n) satisfying t = o(n) and t→∞ as n→∞, complementing the last result. This leaves open only the case t/n→∞, which we expect to be much simpler, and will consider in future work. The proof is based on probabilistic methods, and in particular on a bivariate local limit theorem for the number of vertices and edges in the largest component of a certain random hypergraph. We deduce this from the corresponding central limit theorem by smoothing techniques.
Suppose k is a positive integer and ${\cal X}$ is a k-fold packing of the plane by infinitely many arc-connected compact sets, which means that every point of the plane belongs to at most k sets. Suppose there is a function f(n) = o(n2) with the property that any n members of ${\cal X}$ determine at most f(n) holes, which means that the complement of their union has at most f(n) bounded connected components. We use tools from extremal graph theory and the topological Helly theorem to prove that ${\cal X}$ can be decomposed into at most p (1-fold) packings, where p is a constant depending only on k and f.
Given a property of Boolean functions, what is the minimum number of queries required to determine with high probability if an input function satisfies this property or is ‘far’ from satisfying it? This is a fundamental question in property testing, where traditionally the testing algorithm is allowed to pick its queries among the entire set of inputs. Balcan, Blais, Blum and Yang have recently suggested restricting the tester to take its queries from a smaller random subset of polynomial size of the inputs. This model is called active testing, and in the extreme case when the size of the set we can query from is exactly the number of queries performed, it is known as passive testing.
We prove that passive or active testing of k-linear functions (that is, sums of k variables among n over $\mathbb{Z}$2) requires Θ(k log n) queries, assuming k is not too large. This extends the case k = 1, (that is, dictator functions), analysed by Balcan, Blais, Blum and Yang.
We also consider other classes of functions including low-degree polynomials, juntas, and partially symmetric functions. Our methods combine algebraic, combinatorial, and probabilistic techniques, including the Talagrand concentration inequality and the Erdős–Rado theorem on Δ-systems.
A k-uniform hypergraph H = (V, E) is called ℓ-orientable if there is an assignment of each edge e ∈ E to one of its vertices v ∈ e such that no vertex is assigned more than ℓ edges. Let Hn,m,k be a hypergraph, drawn uniformly at random from the set of all k-uniform hypergraphs with n vertices and m edges. In this paper we establish the threshold for the ℓ-orientability of Hn,m,k for all k ⩾ 3 and ℓ ⩾ 2, that is, we determine a critical quantity c*k,ℓ such that with probability 1 − o(1) the graph Hn,cn,k has an ℓ-orientation if c < c*k,ℓ, but fails to do so if c > c*k,ℓ.
Our result has various applications, including sharp load thresholds for cuckoo hashing, load balancing with guaranteed maximum load, and massive parallel access to hard disk arrays.
For positive integers n and q and a monotone graph property $\mathcal{A}$, we consider the two-player, perfect information game WC(n, q, $\mathcal{A}$), which is defined as follows. The game proceeds in rounds. In each round, the first player, called Waiter, offers the second player, called Client, q + 1 edges of the complete graph Kn which have not been offered previously. Client then chooses one of these edges which he keeps and the remaining q edges go back to Waiter. If, at the end of the game, the graph which consists of the edges chosen by Client satisfies the property $\mathcal{A}$, then Waiter is declared the winner; otherwise Client wins the game. In this paper we study such games (also known as Picker–Chooser games) for a variety of natural graph-theoretic parameters, such as the size of a largest component or the length of a longest cycle. In particular, we describe a phase transition type phenomenon which occurs when the parameter q is close to n and is reminiscent of phase transition phenomena in random graphs. Namely, we prove that if q ⩾ (1 + ϵ)n, then Client can avoid components of order cϵ−2 ln n for some absolute constant c > 0, whereas for q ⩽ (1 − ϵ)n, Waiter can force a giant, linearly sized component in Client's graph. In the second part of the paper, we prove that Waiter can force Client's graph to be pancyclic for every q ⩽ cn, where c > 0 is an appropriate constant. Note that this behaviour is in stark contrast to the threshold for pancyclicity and Hamiltonicity of random graphs.
How many strict local maxima can a real quadratic function on {0, 1}n have? Holzman conjectured a maximum of $\binom{n }{ \lfloor n/2 \rfloor}$. The aim of this paper is to prove this conjecture. Our approach is via a generalization of Sperner's theorem that may be of independent interest.