A general asymptotic theory is established for sample cross moments of nonstationary time series, allowing for long-range dependence and local unit roots. The theory provides a substantial extension of earlier results on nonparametric regression that include near-cointegrated nonparametric regression as well as spurious nonparametric regression. Many new models are covered by the limit theory, among which are functional coefficient regressions in which both regressors and the functional covariate are nonstationary. Simulations show finite sample performance matching well with the asymptotic theory and having broad relevance to applications, while revealing how dual nonstationarity in regressors and covariates raises sensitivity to bandwidth choice and the impact of dimensionality in nonparametric regression. An empirical example is provided involving climate data regression to assess Earth’s climate sensitivity to CO$_2$, where nonstationarity is a prominent feature of both the regressors and covariates in the model. To our knowledge, this application is the first nonparametric empirical analysis to assess potential nonlinear impacts of CO$_2$ on Earth’s climate while allowing for nonstationarity in both the regressors and covariates.

This analysis estimates the tax incidence for leased cropland and pastureland in Oklahoma. Periodic adjustments to agricultural land taxes may lead to an incidence, a share of the property tax burden, passed on to renters as higher rental rates. This pass-through can discourage rental activity, limit renters’ access to land, and jeopardize broader agricultural development goals. There was a statistically significant increase in the incidence for cropland and pastureland renters. The combined pastureland and cropland incidence over the study period was $7.83 million, representing 22% of the total current agricultural use value assessment for the same period.

This paper studies the price-setting behaviour in food products, using the microdata underlying the Portuguese Consumer Price Index (CPI). We document that, in each month, about 1 in 4 food items changed prices compared to the previous month, including promotions and sales. If these temporary price changes are excluded, the frequency drops to 1 out of 5, on average. Positive price changes were more frequent but had lower magnitudes than negative ones. There were strong heterogeneities in price-setting not only across products but also across industries and outlets. We find that, from 2009 to 2019, food inflation was primarily driven by the relative frequency of positive versus negative price changes, rather than changes in their size, consistent with standard New Keynesian calibrations of price rigidity. Finally, we report that price changes were more frequent at the producer than at the consumer level, but with a lower magnitude. Taken together, these results highlight that the frequency margin is the key driver of inflation dynamics and provide micro evidence supporting widely used macroeconomic calibrations of price rigidity.

Generalized trust supports social cooperation and institutional performance. Formal education is often assumed to foster trust, but competing theories make opposite predictions: the social-intelligence view holds that education sharpens belief accuracy about others’ pro-social behavior, while the selection/exposure view expects a systematic optimistic bias. We test these mechanisms using an original survey in which 800 respondents in Spain estimated the return rates of “lost wallets” across four countries, based on results from previous cross-national field experiments. Respondents misjudged others’ honesty (overestimating returns when no money was involved and underestimating them when money was present) and predicted a decline in honesty as the amount of money in the wallet increased, while actual return rates rose across those conditions. Higher education does not correct these errors or produce consistent optimism. The findings thus challenge both explanations and suggest that the education–trust link operates through other, yet-to-be-identified, institutional or normative pathways.

Organized, competitive wholesale power markets emerged in the U.S. during the 1990s, driven by technological change and regulatory restructuring. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) manage these markets while governing a congestible transmission network whose physical coupling creates ill-defined property rights and persistent coordination problems. The growth of new generations, storage, and digital technologies further strains RTO governance by increasing heterogeneity in participants and business models. Integrating Elinor Ostrom’s common-pool resource (CPR) framework with James Buchanan’s theory of clubs, this paper analyses how RTOs govern reliability through rule-defined exclusion. The analysis argues that reliability is a CPR, but that RTOs formalize a scalable, club-like exclusion regime as a governance institution. Because transmission systems are non-replicable, governance institutions and polycentric oversight must substitute for competitive discipline. Institutional reforms that make boundary rules adaptive and participation more inclusive are essential to preserve reliability while enabling innovation and long-run efficiency.

The field of “urban economics” is an elusive object whose US-based origins, development, and internationalization we attempt to document in this paper. To flesh out urban economists’ territory, we rely on a mix of quantitative analysis (networks of authors most cited alongside the foundational contributions of William Alonso, Richard Muth, and Edwin Mills) and archival research. We identify several periods in the development of American urban economics, including a taking-off in the 1960s, fueled by scholarly contributions, urban riots, and foundations’ grants; a marginalization in the 1980s; and a recent renewal where urban economists grappled with the theoretical legacy of the New Economic Geography, and with the transfer of new empirical techniques from neighboring fields.

Outside the conventional scope of national security, States characterize a plethora of issues as security concerns in present-day international affairs. While the securitization of unconventional issues has been studied extensively in relation to national security exceptions under economic treaties, States’ use of unconventional security claims in invoking public policy exceptions, where the legal text contains no security-related terms, has attracted less academic attention. This article investigates the WTO judiciary’s approach to unconventional security claims raised under the GATT/GATS general exceptions, focusing on energy security as a case study. It demonstrates how the WTO judiciary has used two ‘old’ legal techniques from well-established general exceptions jurisprudence to examine ‘new’ energy security claims: framing regulatory objectives and identifying origin-based discriminations. The article finds that the WTO judiciary tends to be more permissive with energy security claims that are more closely related to the conventional, defence-oriented security notion; claims that are more distant from the conventional conception are also given substantial regard, but subject to more cautious scrutiny.

Adam Neumann surely ranks among the most disgraced corporate leaders of our time. The former WeWork founder and CEO, who was ousted from the company in 2019, became emblematic of the corporate excesses and hollow boosterism of post-dotcom Silicon Valley. In the public imagination his name is synonymous with failure and fraud. But to the outrage of many he is back on the scene, securing unprecedented backing from venture capital titan Andreessen Horowitz for his new real estate venture Flow. This essay unpacks the non-death of Adam Neumann, interrogating why someone seemingly so untouchable is being funded at the highest level by one of Silicon Valley’s most infamous VCs. I argue that, through his atypical ‘exiting’ of WeWork, whereby he extracted billions from the company without initial public offering or acquisition, Neumann attained a level of wealth and power that made him ripe for reinvestment. The case challenges the liberal ‘fake-it-till-you-make-it’ myth of Silicon Valley meritocracy. US tech today increasingly takes the form of billionaire VCs funding already-powerful, deceptive and ruthless repeat founders. It is this increasingly consolidated and cynical system that enables Adam Neumann to ‘fail up’; rewarded rather than punished for his extreme misdemeanors.