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One of the central logical ideas in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus is the elimination of the identity sign in favor of the so-called “exclusive interpretation” of names and quantifiers requiring different names to refer to different objects and (roughly) different variables to take different values. In this paper, we examine a recent development of these ideas in papers by Kai Wehmeier. We diagnose two main problems of Wehmeier’s account, the first concerning the treatment of individual constants, the second concerning so-called “pseudo-propositions” (Scheinsätze) of classical logic such as $a=a$ or $a=b \wedge b=c \rightarrow a=c$. We argue that overcoming these problems requires two fairly drastic departures from Wehmeier’s account: (1) Not every formula of classical first-order logic will be translatable into a single formula of Wittgenstein’s exclusive notation. Instead, there will often be a multiplicity of possible translations, revealing the original “inclusive” formulas to be ambiguous. (2) Certain formulas of first-order logic such as $a=a$ will not be translatable into Wittgenstein’s notation at all, being thereby revealed as nonsensical pseudo-propositions which should be excluded from a “correct” conceptual notation. We provide translation procedures from inclusive quantifier-free logic into the exclusive notation that take these modifications into account and define a notion of logical equivalence suitable for assessing these translations.
We show that a $(\kappa ^{+},1)$-simplified morass can be added by a forcing with working parts of size smaller than $\kappa $. This answers affirmatively the question, asked independently by Shelah and Velleman in the early 1990s, of whether it is possible to do so.
Our argument use a modification of a technique of Mitchell’s for adding objects of size $\omega _2$ in which collections of models – all of equal, countable size – are used as side conditions. In our modification, whilst the individual models are, as in Mitchell’s technique, taken ad hoc from quite general classes, the collections of models are very highly structured, in a way that is somewhat different from, perhaps more stringent than, Mitchell’s original, arguably making the method more wieldy and giving the prospect of further uses with more delicate working parts.
This paper investigates the principles that one must add to Boolean algebra to capture reasoning not only about intersection, union, and complementation of sets, but also about the relative size of sets. We completely axiomatize such reasoning under the Cantorian definition of relative size in terms of injections.
We define a weak iterability notion that is sufficient for a number of arguments concerning $\Sigma _{1}$-definability at uncountable regular cardinals. In particular we give its exact consistency strength first in terms of the second uniform indiscernible for bounded subsets of $\kappa $: $u_2(\kappa )$, and secondly to give the consistency strength of a property of Lücke’s.
TheoremThe following are equiconsistent:
(i)There exists$\kappa $which is stably measurable;
(ii)for some cardinal$\kappa $, $u_2(\kappa )=\sigma (\kappa )$;
(iii)The$\boldsymbol {\Sigma }_{1}$-club property holds at a cardinal$\kappa $.
Here $\sigma (\kappa )$ is the height of the smallest $M \prec _{\Sigma _{1}} H ( \kappa ^{+} )$ containing $\kappa +1$ and all of $H ( \kappa )$. Let $\Phi (\kappa )$ be the assertion:
TheoremSuppose there is no sharp for an inner model with a strong cardinal. Then in the core model K we have:$\mbox {``}\exists \kappa \Phi (\kappa ) \mbox {''}$is (set)-generically absolute${\,\longleftrightarrow \,}$There are arbitrarily large stably measurable cardinals.
When $u_2(\kappa ) < \sigma (\kappa )$ we give some results on inner model reflection.
We show in ZFC that the existence of completely separable maximal almost disjoint families of subsets of $\omega $ implies that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4.1.2}$ is complete with respect to the Čech–Stone compactification of the natural numbers, the space $\beta \omega $. In the same fashion we prove that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4}$ is complete with respect to the space $\omega ^*=\beta \omega \setminus \omega $. This improves the results of G. Bezhanishvili and J. Harding in [4], where the authors prove these theorems under stronger assumptions ($\mathfrak {a=c}$). Our proof is also somewhat simpler.
The proofs of Gödel (1931), Rosser (1936), Kleene (first 1936 and second 1950), Chaitin (1970), and Boolos (1989) for the first incompleteness theorem are compared with each other, especially from the viewpoint of the second incompleteness theorem. It is shown that Gödel’s (first incompleteness theorem) and Kleene’s first theorems are equivalent with the second incompleteness theorem, Rosser’s and Kleene’s second theorems do deliver the second incompleteness theorem, and Boolos’ theorem is derived from the second incompleteness theorem in the standard way. It is also shown that none of Rosser’s, Kleene’s second, or Boolos’ theorems is equivalent with the second incompleteness theorem, and Chaitin’s incompleteness theorem neither delivers nor is derived from the second incompleteness theorem. We compare (the strength of) these six proofs with one another.
We obtain modal completeness of the interpretability logics IL$\!\!\textsf {P}_{\textsf {0}}$ and ILR w.r.t. generalised Veltman semantics. Our proofs are based on the notion of full labels [2]. We also give shorter proofs of completeness w.r.t. the generalised semantics for many classical interpretability logics. We obtain decidability and finite model property w.r.t. the generalised semantics for IL$\textsf {P}_{\textsf {0}}$ and ILR. Finally, we develop a construction that might be useful for proofs of completeness of extensions of ILW w.r.t. the generalised semantics in the future, and demonstrate its usage with $\textbf {IL}\textsf {W}^\ast = \textbf {IL}\textsf {WM}_{\textsf {0}}$.
For a given inner model N of ZFC, one can consider the relativized version of Berkeley cardinals in the context of ZFC, and ask if there can exist an “N-Berkeley cardinal.” In this article we provide a positive answer to this question. Indeed, under the assumption of a supercompact cardinal $\delta $, we show that there exists a ZFC inner model N such that there is a cardinal which is N-Berkeley, even in a strong sense. Further, the involved model N is a weak extender model of $\delta $ is supercompact. Finally, we prove that the strong version of N-Berkeley cardinals turns out to be inconsistent whenever N satisfies closure under $\omega $-sequences.
We present three examples of countable homogeneous structures (also called Fraïssé limits) whose automorphism groups are not universal, namely, fail to contain isomorphic copies of all automorphism groups of their substructures.
Our first example is a particular case of a rather general construction on Fraïssé classes, which we call diversification, leading to automorphism groups containing copies of all finite groups. Our second example is a special case of another general construction on Fraïssé classes, the mixed sums, leading to a Fraïssé class with all finite symmetric groups appearing as automorphism groups and at the same time with a torsion-free automorphism group of its Fraïssé limit. Our last example is a Fraïssé class of finite models with arbitrarily large finite abelian automorphism groups, such that the automorphism group of its Fraïssé limit is again torsion-free.
We study a partial order on countably complete ultrafilters introduced by Ketonen [2] as a generalization of the Mitchell order. The following are our main results: the order is wellfounded; its linearity is equivalent to the Ultrapower Axiom, a principle introduced in the author’s dissertation [1]; finally, assuming the Ultrapower Axiom, the Ketonen order coincides with Lipschitz reducibility in the sense of generalized descriptive set theory.
In the present paper we use the theory of exact completions to study categorical properties of small setoids in Martin-Löf type theory and, more generally, of models of the Constructive Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets, in terms of properties of their subcategories of choice objects (i.e., objects satisfying the axiom of choice). Because of these intended applications, we deal with categories that lack equalisers and just have weak ones, but whose objects can be regarded as collections of global elements. In this context, we study the internal logic of the categories involved, and employ this analysis to give a sufficient condition for the local cartesian closure of an exact completion. Finally, we apply this result to show when an exact completion produces a model of CETCS.
It is known that there exists a first-order sentence that holds in a finite group if and only if the group is soluble. Here it is shown that the corresponding statements with ‘solubility’ replaced by ‘nilpotence’ and ‘perfectness’, among others, are false.
These facts present difficulties for the study of pseudofinite groups. However, a very weak form of Frattini’s theorem on the nilpotence of the Frattini subgroup of a finite group is proved for pseudofinite groups.
In a recent paper by M. Rathjen and the present author it has been shown that the statement “every normal function has a derivative” is equivalent to $\Pi ^1_1$-bar induction. The equivalence was proved over $\mathbf {ACA_0}$, for a suitable representation of normal functions in terms of dilators. In the present paper, we show that the statement “every normal function has at least one fixed point” is equivalent to $\Pi ^1_1$-induction along the natural numbers.
A first-order theory is equational if every definable set is a Boolean combination of instances of equations, that is, of formulae such that the family of finite intersections of instances has the descending chain condition. Equationality is a strengthening of stability. We show the equationality of the theory of proper extensions of algebraically closed fields and of the theory of separably closed fields of arbitrary imperfection degree.
We prove that the homeomorphism relation between compact spaces can be continuously reduced to the homeomorphism equivalence relation between absolute retracts, which strengthens and simplifies recent results of Chang and Gao, and Cieśla. It follows then that the homeomorphism relation of absolute retracts is Borel bireducible with the universal orbit equivalence relation. We also prove that the homeomorphism relation between regular continua is classifiable by countable structures and hence it is Borel bireducible with the universal orbit equivalence relation of the permutation group on a countable set. On the other hand we prove that the homeomorphism relation between rim-finite metrizable compacta is not classifiable by countable structures.
There is a Turing computable embedding $\Phi $ of directed graphs $\mathcal {A}$ in undirected graphs (see [15]). Moreover, there is a fixed tuple of formulas that give a uniform effective interpretation; i.e., for all directed graphs $\mathcal {A}$, these formulas interpret $\mathcal {A}$ in $\Phi (\mathcal {A})$. It follows that $\mathcal {A}$ is Medvedev reducible to $\Phi (\mathcal {A})$ uniformly; i.e., $\mathcal {A}\leq _s\Phi (\mathcal {A})$ with a fixed Turing operator that serves for all $\mathcal {A}$. We observe that there is a graph G that is not Medvedev reducible to any linear ordering. Hence, G is not effectively interpreted in any linear ordering. Similarly, there is a graph that is not interpreted in any linear ordering using computable $\Sigma _2$ formulas. Any graph can be interpreted in a linear ordering using computable $\Sigma _3$ formulas. Friedman and Stanley [4] gave a Turing computable embedding L of directed graphs in linear orderings. We show that there is no fixed tuple of $L_{\omega _1\omega }$-formulas that, for all G, interpret the input graph G in the output linear ordering $L(G)$. Harrison-Trainor and Montalbán [7] have also shown this, by a quite different proof.
We study large cardinal properties associated with Ramseyness in which homogeneous sets are demanded to satisfy various transfinite degrees of indescribability. Sharpe and Welch [25], and independently Bagaria [1], extended the notion of $\Pi ^1_n$-indescribability where $n<\omega $ to that of $\Pi ^1_\xi $-indescribability where $\xi \geq \omega $. By iterating Feng’s Ramsey operator [12] on the various $\Pi ^1_\xi $-indescribability ideals, we obtain new large cardinal hierarchies and corresponding nonlinear increasing hierarchies of normal ideals. We provide a complete account of the containment relationships between the resulting ideals and show that the corresponding large cardinal properties yield a strict linear refinement of Feng’s original Ramsey hierarchy. We isolate Ramsey properties which provide strictly increasing hierarchies between Feng’s $\Pi _\alpha $-Ramsey and $\Pi _{\alpha +1}$-Ramsey cardinals for all odd $\alpha <\omega $ and for all $\omega \leq \alpha <\kappa $. We also show that, given any ordinals $\beta _0,\beta _1<\kappa $ the increasing chains of ideals obtained by iterating the Ramsey operator on the $\Pi ^1_{\beta _0}$-indescribability ideal and the $\Pi ^1_{\beta _1}$-indescribability ideal respectively, are eventually equal; moreover, we identify the least degree of Ramseyness at which this equality occurs. As an application of our results we show that one can characterize our new large cardinal notions and the corresponding ideals in terms of generic elementary embeddings; as a special case this yields generic embedding characterizations of $\Pi ^1_\xi $-indescribability and Ramseyness.
We study the consistency and consistency strength of various configurations concerning the cardinal characteristics $\mathfrak {s}_\theta , \mathfrak {p}_\theta , \mathfrak {t}_\theta , \mathfrak {g}_\theta , \mathfrak {r}_\theta $ at uncountable regular cardinals $\theta $. Motivated by a theorem of Raghavan–Shelah who proved that $\mathfrak {s}_\theta \leq \mathfrak {b}_\theta $, we explore in the first part of the paper the consistency of inequalities comparing $\mathfrak {s}_\theta $ with $\mathfrak {p}_\theta $ and $\mathfrak {g}_\theta $. In the second part of the paper we study variations of the extender-based Radin forcing to establish several consistency results concerning $\mathfrak {r}_\theta ,\mathfrak {s}_\theta $ from hyper-measurability assumptions, results which were previously known to be consistent only from supercompactness assumptions. In doing so, we answer questions from [1], [15] and [7], and improve the large cardinal strength assumptions for results from [10] and [3].
This paper reconstructs Steel’s multiverse project in his ‘Gödel’s program’ (Steel, 2014), first by comparing it to those of Hamkins (2012) and Woodin (2011), then by detailed analysis what’s presented in Steel’s brief text. In particular, we reconstruct his notion of a ‘natural’ theory, describe his multiverse axioms and his translation function, and assess the resulting status of the Continuum Hypothesis. In the end, we reconceptualize the defect that Steel thinks $CH$ might suffer from and isolate what it would take to remove it while working within his framework. As our goal is to present as coherent and compelling a philosophical and mathematical story as we can, we allow ourselves to augment Steel’s story in places (e.g., in the treatment of Amalgamation) and to depart from it in others (e.g., the removal of ‘meaning’ from the account). The relevant mathematics is laid out in the appendices.