This chapter furthers and advances the decolonial process discussed in previous chapters by providing a deeper understanding of the totality of anti-oppressive practice and its embedding into direct clinical work through the clinical supervision process. Special attention is paid to complimentary theories and concepts (e.g. the cycle of socialization, relational-cultural theory, building allyship, dismantling racism, inclusive supervision and followership, etc.) that strengthen anti-oppressive decolonial supervision and leadership practice.

This chapter explores the role of drugs in understanding neurotransmitter systems and addressing behavioral problems. It begins by discussing drug administration methods such as oral, intravenous, and inhalation, explaining how these routes influence pharmacokinetics, including drug absorption and metabolism. Like Chapter 6, the chapter then covers several practical applications, including in depression, anxiety and trauma, eating behavior (obesity), addiction, cognitive enhancement, and sleep. These examples underscore the progress that neuroscience has made (e.g., psychiatric medication), the progress that it continues to make (e.g., in psychedelic medicine), and the ongoing need for research and technological innovation. Furthermore, each example illustrates the complex and often ambiguous relationship between neurotransmitters and behavior, where neurotransmitters can influence multiple behaviors, and behaviors can be influenced by multiple neurotransmitter systems.

Liberation as a praxis for the helping professions is a tool of resistance aimed at increasing cultural awareness and trauma informed approaches to engaging with marginalized populations. This approach requires of each of us in the helping professions to interrogate our own relationships with anti-Blackness, white supremacy, and bigotry. In order for effective advocates to do the good work of helping people, there must be a disassociation from white supremacy and white supremacists’ ideologies. Liberation as a praxis is the only way.

Abstract: In Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Dewey claims there is no specific “organ of moral knowledge” apart from ordinary activity. Such a claim collapses an important distinction in Greek philosophy between “arts” (technē) guided by theoretical knowing and mere “knacks” (empeiria) that accrue their results by trial and error. By denying that there is a specific “organ of moral knowledge,” it would appear that, for Dewey, morality is nothing but a hit-or-miss process, and such a position has exposed Dewey to criticisms over the years. This chapter will explore such concerns through engagement with the Daoist tradition. The focus will be on the Zhuangzi, a text that is replete with stories about craftspeople gaining insight and developing efficacy by engaging in ordinary activity without reliance on theoretical knowing. Such stories, commonly known as “knack passages,” are meant to be prescriptive; they tell us how to live. As such, they have occasioned critiques similar to those that Dewey received. Here, it will be argued that the Daoist tradition, while not providing “moral direction” as conventionally understood, is not without its own virtues. Similar virtues, in fact, are outlined in Dewey’s own philosophy, and these might mitigate the concerns of his critics.

Reinforcement and addiction are commonly attributed to dopamine and its release along the pathway from the ventral tegmental area to the nucleus accumbens. This chapter traces the historical development of research linking dopamine to reinforcement, reward prediction error, and incentive salience. It then evaluates the evidence for and against the dopamine theory of addiction and discusses challenges in testing this theory in human studies. The chapter concludes with a speculative exploration of potential dopamine-based treatments for addiction.

Abstract: In this chapter, Welchman examines John Dewey’s critique of traditional moral theories, particularly those grounded in nonempirical moral norms. She shows how Dewey challenges the idea that moral obligations derive from an intuitive grasp of absolute truths, arguing instead that norms emerge from human habits and social interactions. Tracing Dewey’s evolution from his early idealism to his later pragmatism, Welchman highlights his rejection of “intuitional ethics” and his shift toward a naturalistic account of moral reasoning. Dewey sees morality as a dynamic process, shaped by experience and subject to revision in light of its social consequences. Dewey maintains that moral principles should be empirically tested and continually refined. He argues that social institutions generate obligations, but these obligations must remain open to critical reflection. The chapter illuminates how this pragmatic approach positions morality not as an immutable ideal but as an evolving practice aimed at enhancing human welfare.

Abstract: In this chapter, Herbert explores John Dewey’s concept of impulse in Human Nature and Conduct (1922), highlighting its oft-neglected role in his theory of agency. Dewey presents impulse as a spontaneous and creative force essential for breaking rigid habits and fostering intelligent inquiry. Unlike moral theories that treat impulse as something to suppress, he sees it as crucial to moral growth and adaptation. Dewey’s naturalistic framework situates impulse within a dynamic interplay with habit and intelligence. While habit provides stability, impulse introduces novelty, enabling the reorganization of conduct when patterns fail. This aligns Dewey with Peirce’s view of inquiry as emerging from disrupted expectations and contrasts with Bergson’s élan vital, which lacks Dewey’s empirical grounding. Dewey also engages implicitly with Freud, critiquing reductionist views of instinct while endorsing the constructive redirection of impulses through sublimation. Dewey envisions ethics as a form of empirical inquiry, treating moral agency as continuous experimentation rather than rule adherence. As Herbert concludes, Dewey critiques traditional moral philosophies for their distrust of impulse, arguing that rigid norms stifle creativity. Instead, Dewey advocates an ethics that integrates impulse, habit, and intelligence into a flexible and adaptive model for human flourishing.

Abstract: This chapter examines John Dewey’s concept of moral education as growth, emphasizing its implications for moral development beyond his earlier work. While Moral Principles in Education (1909) presents Dewey’s approach to moral education through social participation, it does not incorporate his later view of growth as the sole moral end. Waks points to the need for the reconstruction of Dewey’s moral education theory in light of Human Nature and Conduct (1922), where he defines morality as the expansion of conduct in meaning. As Waks illustrates, Dewey’s later theory of growth introduces a tension between cooperative participation and individual moral development. The chapter shows how, for Dewey, true moral growth requires openness to new experiences, creative problem-solving involving new ends and new means, and self-transformation, sometimes in conflict with established social norms and cooperative action. This challenges educators to cultivate both group cooperation and individual moral experimentation. Waks concludes that a reconstructed Deweyan moral education must balance social engagement and cooperation with fostering independent growth, requiring educators to create environments that encourage both communal participation and personal moral discovery.