Drawing on the case of the US Civil War, this article redefines crises of hegemony as crises of “articulation,” in which insurgent actors disrupt support for joining up the elements of the dominant social order under existing terms. The collapse of mass white consent just prior to the war entailed partisan struggle over imagined demographic futures. Breaking with the nativists of their former party, Illinois Whigs, turned Republicans, argued that the extension of slavery into Indigenous territory and northern Mexico would permit the planter class to monopolize the land, overrun it with the enslaved, and condemn white workers, many of them immigrants, to a life of endless toil in the factory. Having thus framed slavery as a demographic threat, northern Republicans held that the territorial claims of white settlers must supersede those of planters. Alabama Democrats, now Southern Rights secessionists, retained their erstwhile party’s expansionist politics but predicted that prohibiting the transport of human chattel to new territories would dam whites up with the enslaved, who, after overtaking the white population, could overthrow slavery and the white race itself. The article illuminates the role of population politics and partisan struggle in the re-organization of white supremacy and the advent of critical historical conjunctures. That white supremacy underpins even paradigmatic transitions to liberal democracy may also inform the work of mass movements, as they diagnose and challenge the ways in which supposedly democratic institutions consolidate, rather than protect against, elite power.

This article interrogates the formation of a national political consensus around coal in the United States. In the postwar era, the domestic future of coal was seriously challenged by the oil, gas, and nuclear alternatives. In less than two decades, however, coal mining shifted from being one of multiple energy options to being a national political project tied to regional development and energy sovereignty. Why did this shift occur? Using archival data, I argue that it was not primarily a response to market forces or corporate pressures but was furthered through the work of the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). In the years following its inception in 1965, the agency articulated the coal consensus as both a solution to the problem of Appalachian underdevelopment and to the looming energy crisis. In doing so, it brought together the interests of regional, federal, and corporate actors around this consequential project. In this article, I delineate a pathway through which bureaucratic agencies can play a decisive role in the formation of political ideas and advance our understanding of the conditions that make energy transitions possible.

In the 1900 Paris Exposition Universelle, W. E. B. Du Bois deployed imperially charged terminologies such as “progress,” “nation,” and “civilization,” entangled with racism-imbued linear-progressive historiography. Rather than discounting Du Bois’s usage of these terms as a passive internalization of the imperial episteme, we regard Du Bois’s adoption of these terms (and curation in the exhibition more broadly) as a fruitful avenue for us to consider the methodological, theoretical, and public-sociological implications of using imperially entangled terms. Centering Du Bois’ embeddedness in collaborative epistemic communities and his socio-political context, we read his work for the Paris Exhibition of 1900 as a strategic response to the double crisis of social science and post-Reconstruction Black America. We argue that Du Bois subverted and dislocated the concepts of “progress,” “crisis,” and “nation” from their contemporary decontextualized usage to address grounded problems facing Black people in the United States and undertook this redefinition through his dialogic interactions with Black American and Pan-African activists of his time. With a plethora of images, statistics, books written by Black authors, photographs, and cultural artifacts, he provided a narrative of social development that challenged racial stereotypes and the developmental model favored by empire-states. Today, historical social sciences are also undergoing institutional and epistemological crises. Building on Du Bois’s subversive exhibit and adopting the conceptual framework of “reverse tutelage,” we argue that contemporary historical social scientists should also approach conceptual development and global linkages by being grounded in communities of resistance to grasp and recover radical potentialities.

This article considers indicators of group similarity and difference and their relation to institutional discrimination in the United States and Japan. For this inquiry, discrimination is operationalized as the extent to which exclusion or marginalization in society is determined by the embodiment of difference (in this case, the Western conception of race). I contend that belonging and race are tightly coupled within the US context because its society was founded on a racial hierarchy that subjugated all groups deemed “not white” for the direct benefit of enfranchised white males. Although some racial groups have made substantial gains, race remains highly consequential for the life outcomes of most individuals in the United States. Japan, however, has a much looser association between Western race and belonging. This is largely because ethnocultural identity, not the Western construction of race, has historically been the primary axis of discrimination in Japanese society. Although race as understood in the West is relevant for some forms of interpersonal discrimination, ethnocultural identity remains the primary determinant of belonging or exclusion in Japan.

The global wave of anti-racist social movements in the summer of 2020 was marked by calls for the removal or recontextualization of statues in public space. Conservative politicians and pundits, in turn, framed cultural activism as a “culture war” and a crisis that entailed “erasing history” by calling national heroes into question. I argue that framing the toppling of statues as a historical crisis derives from a colonial understanding of knowledge as singular, universal, and fundamentally European. This understanding of knowledge analytically bifurcates the past and refuses anti-colonial histories of insurgency and contestation. To counter this approach, I engage with the concept of postcolonial critical realism, which theorizes the power of colonial discourses to shape material institutions and esthetic forms, as well as the anti-colonial potential of counter-discourses. To illustrate this argument, I consider the history of two contested statues: Robert E. Lee in Richmond, Virginia, and Joséphine de Beauharnais in Fort-de-France, Martinique. By revisiting this crisis and the responses it engendered, we can make sense of the present “culture war” not as a contemporary crisis but as a response to a longer historical crisis.

This article examines the enduring connections between past and present in world history by analyzing recurrent social mechanisms and evolving practices that enact them. While sociology has traditionally emphasized discontinuities and social change, I argue that some foundational mechanisms persist across time and space, yet they appear under varying practices. Drawing from Charles Tilly’s framework of mechanisms and repertoires of practices, I identify six recurrent mechanisms in world-historical processes: threat attribution, group identification, subordination, affinity bridging, rebellion, and commodification. Then, I provide a broad historical narrative tracing their gradual emergence, beginning with threat attribution in early hominid evolution, group identification in the Upper Paleolithic, and subordination with the transition to agrarian civilizations. During the Axial Age, institutional entrepreneurs and their followers developed affinity bridging and rebellion, which emerged as a reaction to subordination, first manifesting through religious movements and later through secular political practices. I then combine these mechanisms to briefly discuss further historical processes, including the trajectories of Islam and Christianity, the European conquest of Hispanic America, the rise of modern society (where I discuss the intensification of commodification), and the evolving global order following World War II. This perspective views human history as structured by both continuity and change between the past and the present: while mechanisms persist and recur, they are enacted through historically specific and evolving repertoires of practices.

This presidential address discusses the developing body of research on the quality and idiosyncrasies of historical data, focusing in particular on historical census microdata. I argue that greater attention to source criticism as a genuine subfield of social science history is essential for four reasons: to fully benefit from the expansion of big historical data, to imagine new ways to analyze historical data beyond the intentions of creators, to share insights with a wider range of scholars, and to contribute nuanced perspectives on historical data to public debates surrounding the use of these sources. I contend that historians outside social science history are vastly underestimating the creativity that is happening in our field. I also argue that social science historians are underestimating how important our work is to informing public discourse.

Three great waves of public anxiety about census privacy swept over the United States in the twentieth century. In 1940, 1970, and 2000, newspapers reported on fears of the public and politicians about invasive census questions. This article focuses on the second wave of privacy concerns surrounding the 1970 census, which focused on Big Brother and government overreach. The Census Bureau response stressed the confidentiality of census responses, but it failed to address the public concerns and sources of resistance to census inquiries. In addition to analyzing newspaper reports and congressional testimony, we examine individual refusals to respond to the census by members of the public and the Census Bureau’s responses to such refusals. By focusing on specific individual complaints instead of the general characterizations of concern found in newspaper coverage, we can gain a clearer understanding of the motives of the objectors.

Wages earned by men are often used as an indicator of the material standard of living (MSoL). However, this indicator relies on several assumptions when used for comparisons across time and space. Considering these assumptions will improve estimates of the MSoL from wages. One necessary assumption is that households in the compared populations relied on the primary income of the male head of household to a comparable degree. I demonstrate that the degree of reliance on the male income was closely associated with the complexity of households within the population. Nuclear households – typical of English-speaking countries – were more reliant on the male income than more complex households found elsewhere. Consequently, estimates based on male wages are less accurate for populations with complex households, likely underestimating their MSoL. While the complexity of households in historical populations is seldom known, it can be predicted using demographic and economic indicators. I conclude that populations at similar stages of industrialization and the demographic transition are the most comparable when using male wages to estimate their MSoL. Further, I use a reductive model to show that a household’s MSoL is determined by the following three factors: time spent on productive work, the market wage for men, and the female/male (F/M) wage ratio. My analysis shows that including the F/M wage ratio does not change the ranking of the MSoL based on male wages. Nonetheless, I argue that there are compelling reasons to expect the wage ratio to be a useful addition when comparing the MSoL of historical populations.

Spatial studies of British Victorian cities have been historically limited either in scope or specificity due to the unwieldiness of census data. However, over the last decade, the digitization of historical source material has created new possibilities for the exploration of geodemographic patterns. For the case of Manchester, the “shock city” of the British Industrial Revolution, these advancements are especially pertinent in order to settle long-standing debates as to the extent of segregation in the city. This article presents a method for the highly granular georeferencing of census data for the Manchester Township for the second half of the nineteenth century by drawing on historical material, including geographic and commercial surveys. Linking households to specific buildings presents increased possibilities for studies of heterogeneity and neighborhood patterns at a micro-scale. This approach ultimately lays the groundwork for future revisitations of nineteenth-century cities and the traditional claims that have been made around their urban dynamics.

Data quality is a key input in efforts to link individuals across census records. We examine the extreme case of low data quality by identifying US census enumerators who fabricated entire families. We provide clear evidence of fake people included in the 1920 US Census for Homestead, Pennsylvania. We use the features of this case study to identify other places where information in the census may have been falsified. We develop an automated approach that identifies census sheets that have much lower match rates to other census records than would be expected, given the characteristics of the people recorded on each sheet. We perform a hand-check on the suspicious sheets using standard genealogy tools and identify at least 90 sheets where the entire census sheet appears to have been fabricated.

This article proposes a mixed-method approach to examine historical censuses with regard to race. It does so by exploring various kinds of demographic records from nineteenth-century Buenos Aires in order to test the conventional hypothesis of a significant census underenumeration of the city’s population of African descent. Starting from the overall progression of census results, the article is divided into three parts. The first of these deals with potential under-coverage, the second with the possibility of classificatory changes, and the third with vital statistics, largely derived from parish books. With special attention to two censuses of the 1850s, it concludes that Buenos Aires’s Afro-descendant population likely did suffer serious demographic decline between 1840 and 1890.

This article analyzes the Romanian transition to communism in the late 1940s. The cultural turn in political sociology shows that state building has a strongly symbolic and performative element. Less attention has been paid to the symbolic aspects of regime change, which involves the need to not just accrue power but also diminish that of others. This article starts with a processual understanding of the state, one where a regularity such as the state needs to be validated with reference to time and space. Preexisting understandings, however, are sticky and potentially path-dependent. Regime change is therefore not simply (or always) a matter of failing to validate old understandings – but also actively elaborating and promoting their replacement. To justify regime change, Romanian communists thus worked to elaborate new historical and contextual understandings of the state, engineering a turning point that effectively established a new version of the Romanian state. Without reifying institutions, we can nonetheless make space for process itself to accumulate and (momentarily, incompletely) stabilize, such that social change is a difficult though not impossible achievement.

This article investigates how early modern migrants articulated identification with their host society in the context of the late eighteenth-century Dutch Republic, a period preceding modern nationalism. Drawing on a unique dataset derived from the Prize Papers – a collection of testimonies from captured sailors interrogated by British Admiralty courts – we analyze migrants’ declarations of sovereign allegiance. We assess how factors such as duration of residence, local citizenship (poorterschap), occupational rank, and marital status influenced migrants’ identification with their adopted polity. Using logistic regression, we find that civic institutional embeddedness, reflected in city citizenship, and occupational rank, especially among ship captains, significantly predicted identification with the Dutch Republic. In contrast, duration of residence and marital status had weak and statistically insignificant effects. Our findings highlight that pre-national forms of identification were deeply embedded in civic and institutional contexts rather than simply reflecting modern nationalist sentiments. By combining quantitative analysis with targeted archival research into individual biographies, this study demonstrates the complex interplay between institutional opportunities and personal networks in shaping migrants’ allegiances, thereby offering a nuanced historical perspective relevant to contemporary debates on civic integration.

Richard Nixon won a narrow popular and electoral vote victory in 1968. This article investigates whether newspaper endorsements, which heavily favored Nixon, were pivotal in his victory. Utilizing the shift in endorsements between 1964 and 1968, we find a sizable endorsement effect. This estimated effect was large enough to be pivotal: eliminating Nixon’s endorsement advantage would have deprived him of an Electoral College victory, resulting in a contingent election. Alternatively, if newspapers had endorsed his opponent, Hubert Humphrey, at the same rates they endorsed Johnson in 1964, Humphrey would have won the Electoral College.

The Cold War, as a historical period, ranged from 1947 to 1991. During this time when the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other, this interstate rivalry was the stage on which both superpowers sought to bring the other to its knees. As Andreas Glaeser underscores, on both sides, Cold War politics was “an intentional effort to maintain or get an advantage in the balance of power while at the same time avoiding any direct military confrontation.” The United States was a liberal, capitalist state that espoused political democracy; the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a communist state with a centralized economy that ignored political democracy. Both sought to create their own empires as part of their struggle. Empire building and decolonization both took place during these years. For generations, the rest of the world was faced with only three choices: to be on the side of the United States, to be on the side of the USSR, or to try to be nonaligned.

The ontological complexity of the twentieth-century Cold War motivates this special issue’s investigation of how social scientists conceptualize institutional novelty and change. We begin by noting the peculiar elision of the Cold War as an explanatory mechanism in mainstream sociology, even while sociologists have theoretical tools for making sense of the phenomenon: war, schema, field, world systems, and empire. All are useful; none are sufficient. We locate the explanatory problem in a tension between notions of structure and event that has organized debate in historical social science for several scholarly generations, and offer a new intellectual tool – medium durée – as a way forward. Medium durée describes phenomena that have sufficient cohesion as ideas and relationships to endure over time, yet remain sufficiently unfixed and ambiguous as to enable multifarious action and sensemaking. Our notion of medium durée is substantially informed by the articles and commentaries assembled for this special issue, which represent three years of dialogue among the authors as well as audiences in serial panels at the 2022 and 2023 annual meetings of the Social Science History Association.

Wars make states, but the conclusion of conflict is critical for the trajectory of state-building that follows. At the end of World War II, both conservatives and progressives in the United States recognized the potential for ongoing statist development fueled by the wartime introduction of mass taxation and the expansion of regulatory intervention into the lives of citizens and the activities of firms. Entrenched traditions of anti-statism in American politics resurfaced forcefully only to encounter the new threats of a nuclear-capable Soviet Union and the onset of what came to be known as the Cold War. This conjuncture both reoriented and fractured trajectories of state development, leading to reliance on mechanisms – capitation, categorical eligibility, regulation of organizations, and limited duration – that enabled expansive federal intervention in the form of funds attached to rules but minimized the construction of new bureaucratic organization. These governing practices are evident in both the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill) and the European Recovery Act of 1948 (the Marshall Plan). The result was the development of a powerful postwar state that was deeply marked by anti-statist politics, a configuration that shaped future waves of both policy expansion and openings for renewed efforts to constrain the capacity of the American state.

This study examines gender bias in the investigative work of medieval inquisitors, focusing on Albert of Castellario’s trial of the Waldensians in Giaveno, Italy, in 1335. Drawing upon advancements in sociological and criminological literature, we conceptualize an inquisitorial trial as a discretionary information-gathering endeavor contingent upon the inquisitor’s judgment in deciding which leads to pursue. Employing social network analysis and survival methods, we evaluate whether Albert demonstrated gender biases in his investigative decisions, particularly regarding the weight assigned to testimonies from men versus women. Our findings demonstrate that Albert was more inclined to investigate men and prioritize their testimonies, even where similar levels of incriminating evidence were present for both genders. These results highlight the influence of societal attitudes toward gender on inquisitorial practices, on the representativeness of historical records, and on prevailing understandings of heretical groups. Furthermore, this study underscores the broader utility of our methodological framework for addressing related historical inquiries, including the political motivations behind the medieval inquisition.