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Perception, as you make it

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2017

David W. Vinson
Affiliation:
Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA 95340 dvinson@ucmerced.edu dabney@ucmerced.edu rdale@ucmerced.edu spivey@ucmerced.edu
Drew H. Abney
Affiliation:
Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA 95340 dvinson@ucmerced.edu dabney@ucmerced.edu rdale@ucmerced.edu spivey@ucmerced.edu
Dima Amso
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912 dima_amso@brown.edu
Anthony Chemero
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45220 chemeray@ucmail.uc.edu
James E. Cutting
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850 james.cutting@cornell.edu
Rick Dale
Affiliation:
Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA 95340 dvinson@ucmerced.edu dabney@ucmerced.edu rdale@ucmerced.edu spivey@ucmerced.edu
Jonathan B. Freeman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003 jon.freeman@nyu.edu
Laurie B. Feldman
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Albany, SUNY, Albany, NY 12222 lfeldman@albany.edu
Karl J. Friston
Affiliation:
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom k.friston@ucl.ac.uk s.ondobaka@ucl.ac.uk dcr@eyethink.org
Shaun Gallagher
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152 s.gallagher@memphis.edu
J. Scott Jordan
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61761 jsjorda@ilstu.edu
Liad Mudrik
Affiliation:
School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel mudrikli@tau.ac.il
Sasha Ondobaka
Affiliation:
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom k.friston@ucl.ac.uk s.ondobaka@ucl.ac.uk dcr@eyethink.org
Daniel C. Richardson
Affiliation:
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom k.friston@ucl.ac.uk s.ondobaka@ucl.ac.uk dcr@eyethink.org
Ladan Shams
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095 lshams@psych.ucla.edu
Maggie Shiffrar
Affiliation:
Office of Research and Graduate Studies, California State University, Northridge, Northridge, CA 91330. mag@csun.edu
Michael J. Spivey
Affiliation:
Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA 95340 dvinson@ucmerced.edu dabney@ucmerced.edu rdale@ucmerced.edu spivey@ucmerced.edu

Abstract

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether “what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth” (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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