Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-lfk5g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-19T15:02:24.878Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The folly of boxology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2017

Diane M. Beck
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL 61820. dmbeck@illinois.edu http://becklab.beckman.illinois.edu/ jcleven2@illinois.edu
John Clevenger
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL 61820. dmbeck@illinois.edu http://becklab.beckman.illinois.edu/ jcleven2@illinois.edu

Abstract

Although the authors do a valuable service by elucidating the pitfalls of inferring top-down effects, they overreach by claiming that vision is cognitively impenetrable. Their argument, and the entire question of cognitive penetrability, seems rooted in a discrete, stage-like model of the mind that is unsupported by neural data.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable