Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-45ctf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-03-27T14:39:22.184Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Seeing and thinking: Foundational issues and empirical horizons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2017

Chaz Firestone
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205. chaz.firestone@yale.edubrian.scholl@yale.edu
Brian J. Scholl
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205. chaz.firestone@yale.edubrian.scholl@yale.edu

Abstract

The spectacularly varied responses to our target article raised big-picture questions about the nature of seeing and thinking, nitty-gritty experimental design details, and everything in between. We grapple with these issues, including the ready falsifiability of our view, neuroscientific theories that allow everything but demand nothing, cases where seeing and thinking conflict, mental imagery, the free press, an El Greco fallacy fallacy, hallucinogenic drugs, blue bananas, subatomic particles, Boeing 787s, and the racial identities of geometric shapes.

Information

Type
Authors' Response
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable