Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-g98kq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-03-28T15:44:56.206Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Firestone & Scholl conflate two distinct issues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2017

Ryan Ogilvie  and
Peter Carruthers
Ryan Ogilvie
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7615. rogilvie@umd.edu pcarruth@umd.edu https://sites.google.com/site/ryanogilvie/ http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/
Peter Carruthers
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7615. rogilvie@umd.edu pcarruth@umd.edu https://sites.google.com/site/ryanogilvie/ http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Firestone & Scholl (F&S) seem to believe that the viability of a distinction between perception and cognition depends on perception being encapsulated from top-down information. We criticize this assumption and argue that top-down effects can leave the distinction between perception and cognition fully intact. Individuating the visual system is one thing; the question of encapsulation is quite another.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e255
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Barrett, H. & Kurzban, R. (2006) Modularity in cognition. Psychological Review 113:628–47.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Carruthers, P. (2006) The architecture of the mind: Massive modularity and the flexibility of thought. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1983) Modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kok, P., Brouwer, G., van Gerven, M. & de Lange, F. (2013) Prior expectations bias sensory representations in visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience 33:16275–84.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ogilvie, R. & Carruthers, P. (2016) Opening up vision: The case against encapsulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7:1–22 [ePub ahead of print]. doi:10.1007/s13164-015-0294-8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar