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Representation of affect in sensory cortex

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2017

Vladimir Miskovic
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902 miskovic@binghamton.edu kkuntze1@binghamton.edu
Karl Kuntzelman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902 miskovic@binghamton.edu kkuntze1@binghamton.edu
Junichi Chikazoe
Affiliation:
Department of Human Development, Human Neuroscience Institute, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 aka47@cornell.edu Section of Brain Function Information, National Institute for Physiological Sciences, Okazaki, Aichi, 444-8585, Japan chikazoe@nips.ac.jp
Adam K. Anderson
Affiliation:
Department of Human Development, Human Neuroscience Institute, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 aka47@cornell.edu

Abstract

Contemporary neuroscience suggests that perception is perhaps best understood as a dynamically iterative process that does not honor cleanly segregated “bottom-up” or “top-down” streams. We argue that there is substantial empirical support for the idea that affective influences infiltrate the earliest reaches of sensory processing and even that primitive internal affective dimensions (e.g., goodness-to-badness) are represented alongside physical dimensions of the external world.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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