A growing body of research suggests that contemporary law firms face challenges with the retention of legal talent—especially women and racialized lawyers. Yet, we know little about the conditions that prompt lawyers to leave law firms or where they go after leaving. This article builds on the scholarship of John Hagan, emphasizing the role of social capital in law firm culture, and work by Emmanuel Lazega, tracing dimensions of law firm collegiality—both with implications for lawyers’ careers within and beyond law firms. I draw on data from a twenty-seven-year longitudinal survey of Canadian lawyers. Using piecewise exponential survival models, I examine organizational, cultural, and individual factors that may encourage mobility from law firms. The study reveals a pervasive gender difference that is not explained by human capital, organizational characteristics, or individual traits. Results also demonstrate the importance of social capital and firm culture—specifically, the presence of workplace policies of flexible scheduling, lawyers’ sense of a good match with their firm, their satisfaction with status rewards, and finally, the role of mentors—in shaping the flow of legal talent from law firms to various job destinations.

Irish soldiers demobilised in London after major eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century wars were an important but overlooked source of unintentional Irish migrants to the capital. Their migration was linked to the centralised military pension system, which meant that servicemen in English regiments had to present themselves for a medical examination at Chelsea or Greenwich hospitals — both in the London area. A lack of provision available to then get these often very disabled and wounded men back home to Ireland meant that many stayed semi-permanently or permanently in London, and their presence can be measured decades later in the 1841 census. This challenges current understandings about the Irish diaspora in Britain by highlighting the role of the government in shepherding Irish men across the Irish Sea.

The COVID-19 pandemic brought the debate about the ethics of metaphors to the fore. In this article, I draw on blending theory—a theory of cognition—and theories of epistemic injustice to explore both the epistemic and ethical implications of metaphors. Beginning with a discussion of the conceptual alterations that may result from the use of metaphors, I argue that the effects these alterations have on available hermeneutical resources have the potential to result in a type of hermeneutical injustice distinct from the “lacuna” described by Miranda Fricker (Fricker 2007). Following, I examine how metaphors may therefore be considered “ethically bad epistemic practice,” as described by Rebecca Mason, because of how they may contribute to perpetuating an inequitable epistemic status quo (Mason 2011). Yet these same features may be used to promote epistemic justice in the context of intersectional power relationships. Situating the effects of metaphors within an inequitable yet dynamic epistemic system, I argue that foregrounding intersectional power dynamics enables us to interrogate the ethics of metaphors with consideration of both the epistemic and material consequences that may occur. I conclude by providing guidance for how, given that metaphors do epistemic work, we may use them to do ethical epistemic work.

Cis feminist theorists sometimes employ rhetorical moves to claim innocence while abdicating responsibility for engaging with trans scholarship and theory as well as structural transmisogyny. I suggest that it is helpful to understand this phenomenon using a conception of cis feminist moves to innocence. These rhetorical moves enable cisgender feminists to falsely position their failure to engage with both trans scholarship and structures of transmisogyny as epistemically virtuous.

The production of anthraquinones is a major characteristic of most species in the Teloschistaceae. Other secondary metabolites are quite rare in this family, but some species are known to produce depsides, depsidones, xanthones and usnic acid. A new monotypic genus, Neoplaca, with a new species N. mirabilis, is described from the subfamily Caloplacoideae of the family Teloschistaceae, lacking anthraquinones but containing the naphthopyrans simonyellin and consimonyellin. This is the first time this class of organic compounds has been found in the family Teloschistaceae and the second in the order Teloschistales, where simonyellin has been detected in Brigantiaeaceae. Simonyellin and consimonyellin have also previously been reported in the family Roccellaceae. Neoplaca mirabilis is currently known from the two nearby localities in Yakutia, Russia, where it is common and grows on base-rich soil on exposed south-facing siliceous outcrops. The thallus consists of scattered whitish to greyish, or rarely with pale yellow tinge, squamules 1–4.5 mm diam. and 0.3–1 mm thick with citrine to orange-yellow blastidia produced from their margin; apothecia and pycnidia are unknown. In addition to naphthopyrans, N. mirabilis contains an unidentified brown pigment similar in some features to melanin. The new species is also interesting in that the pigments are apparently located inside the cells of the cortex, not on their surface, where anthraquinones are found in Teloschistaceae.

Socio-legal scholars these days devote themselves routinely to the study of international law. It was not always thus. In the late twentieth century, no more than a handful of law-and-society scholars asked themselves how international law worked. Even fewer ventured into the field. John Hagan was one of those who did and the first sociologist to study empirically—and rigorously—what we now call international criminal law. In this article, I use Hagan’s oeuvre to reflect on the intellectual history of international legal scholarship in the twenty-first century. I argue that Hagan brought three things to the study of international law: criminology, methodology, and ideology. I trace each of these contributions in detail, assess their intellectual import, and relate them to alternative ways of seeing international law. The story I tell is of a pioneering scholar who charted an empirical path toward the sociology of international law, but whose moral compass—acquired during his socialization in the Vietnam era—also occasionally blinded him to the dark sides of virtue.