This article presents a methodology for identifying the influence of free Black women in a set of Spanish legal documents. In response to a 1574 decree imposing tribute on them, Panamá’s free men and women of African descent collectively petitioned for exemption on the basis of their poverty and decades of uncompensated military service. They presented sworn depositions from twenty of the city’s Spanish notables in support. This essay analyzes those depositions for patterns of grammatical and orthographic variances and interruptions that point to the influence of free Black women—who formed the majority of the city’s free Black population—in the preparation and performance of the successful legal case.

As corporations increasingly embrace ethical commitments and prioritize corporate social responsibility (CSR), commentators have begun to speak of a shift toward “moral capitalism.” This shift has revived debates about the compatibility of CSR with economic efficiency and the role of markets in promoting social change. We find the economic concern misplaced: moral capitalism efficiently responds to a growing demand for CSR from all stakeholders, including shareholders. Yet the same market mechanisms that make modern CSR profitable raise political objections worth considering. Major shareholders can now leverage their disproportionate economic power to use corporations as vehicles for forcing unilateral resolutions of societal issues, bypassing and undermining formal democratic processes. Beyond this, there is a broader risk to social cohesion: when markets become arenas for adjudicating rather than sidestepping moral and political disagreements, they reinforce exchanges among “friends” (those with shared preferences) while deepening divisions with “foes.” This may import polarization into market life, with spillover effects on society at large. Taken together, these concerns raise the question of whether moral capitalism may threaten the very democratic moral sensibility it claims to uphold.

We are never more high-minded about what matters in life than when we are at commencement ceremonies. As new graduates prepare to head into the real world, speakers tell them that to live meaningful lives they need to get out there and make their mark: change the world, upset the status quo, solve the biggest problems, and shape the revolutions of our time. But is this good life advice? Not really. Commencement Speech Morality encourages young people to become moralizers and busybodies. We should be wary of preaching it.

Corporate activism—companies taking public stances on contested sociopolitical issues—has become increasingly prevalent in American life. Against such activism, this essay raises two normative complaints. First, corporate activism undermines democracy by violating political equality and distorting public deliberation. Second, corporate activism adds to the undesirable overpoliticization of everyday life. Corporations, the essay concludes, should generally avoid activism.

Social entrepreneurs face a dilemma. When making decisions about corporate giving, should they prioritize groups with whom they share some historical, national, or emotional tie or should they maximize the overall effectiveness of their contributions? According to a thesis I call “associationist priority,” the moral reasons to favor stakeholders with whom the entrepreneur shares an associative relationship trump the reasons to promote the impartial good. An important component of the argument for associationist priority is the premise that some nonvoluntary associations, including those between corporations and members of their communities, create special moral obligations. This essay argues against associationist priority by way of denying nonvoluntary associative obligations generally. This expands the moral discretion corporate social entrepreneurs enjoy both in how they give and to whom they give.

The aim of this paper is to challenge the argument that says, as judges are not elected, they have weaker or no democratic legitimacy when compared to legislators. This paper draws on dicta from Laws LJ, as he then was, in the Divisional Court case of Cart v Upper Tribunal, to offer two reasons why this is false. Call these the efficacy and equality principles of representation. The claim here is that without an independent judiciary, legislators cannot legislate or legislate in a way that applies equally. So, without an independent judiciary, the democratic legitimacy of a legislature is weakened or disappears. This argument makes a legal difference, but the kind of legal difference it makes varies between jurisdictions. This paper focuses on one difference the democratic legitimacy of judges makes in the UK: the extent to which Parliament can oust judicial review for error of jurisdiction.